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• 	 ABSTRACT 
This study examines the development of marine resource policy 
highlighting the interaction between resource management institutions 
and resource user interest groups, and the effect of this interaction on 
both the policy process and policy output concerned with fisheries and 
offshore oil and gas policy in Bass Strait. It is argued that this 
interaction, and policy development, can best be explained as ocurring 
within issue communities composed of a range of policy actors „(the 
institutions and interest groups) concerned with specific aspects of 
fisheries and/or offshore hydrocarbons policy. 
It is claimed that this interaction between actors cannot be 
adequately treated using the existing institutionalised structures 
concerned with the formulation of fisheries and/or oil and gas policy, 
and that such interaction within an issue community is likely to result 
in the emergence of specific „accomodating institutions- in the policy 
environment. This proposition is developed through the examination of 
two case studies dealing with policies developed in the period 1983-85, 
first, the introduction of a management regime for the Bass Strait 
scallop fishery, and second, the introduction of a resource rent tax and 
cash bidding policies in the offshore petroleum sector. 
The thesis examines specific issues from Australia's emergent 
marine policy agenda, which although increasing in significance, given 
both international and domestic political developments in the period 
1965-1985, has tended to be ignored by most commentators on Australian 
public policy. The impact of international developments such as the 
United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, (UNCLOS III), in 
providing extended (200 mile) jurisdiction over marine areas for coastal 
states, has increased the visibility of issues concerned with marine 
resources policy. This impetus from UNCLOS HI has coincided with 
domestic issues which provide the background of this thesis, the 
developments associated with what is termed the evolution of Australian 
offshore federalism. The impact of inter-governmental relations between 
the Commonwealth and • States on fisheries and offshore oil and gas 
policy, provides the policy environment within which the interaction 
between various institutions and interest groups takes place. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INSTITUTIONS, INTEREST GROUPS AND MARINE RESOURCES POLICY: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
1:1 INTRODUCTION 
The study of marine resources issues has been a relatively 
neglected area of policy analysis in Australia until comparatively 
recently (Bergin, 1983; Haward, 1986). This thesis attempts to partially 
remedy such neglect by examining policy issues about the Bass Strait 
region, using a frame of reference drawn from public policy literature. 
The primary focus is on interaction between policy making institutions 
and interest groups concerned with specific aspects of marine resource  
policy. Examination of the interaction between different policy actors 
may provide an insight into how and why particular policy options were 
— implemented, why particular issues emerged and what impact the different 
actors achieved on the processing °tissues. 
The study emerged out of a concern with the development of 
resources policy in Bass Strait, where it became apparent that when 
numerous interests were involved in the policy process, interaction over 
policy options became complicated and contentious. The relevance of the 
work of Richardson and Jordan (1979) on policy development became 
apparent, 	 as their thesis, 	 concentrating on the close relationships 
between 	 institutions 	 and 	 interest 	 groups, 	 argues 	 that 	 policy 	 is 
developed in communities arising out of the interaction between 
institutions and interest groups (and occaisonall Y 	 other actors); a 
proposition that can be analysed empirically. 	 Richardson and Jordan 
argue that interaction between _institutional actors and interest groups_ 
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is an important influence on both the policy process and the outcome. 
Thre are other perspectives, nonetheless the framework of analysis 
adopted by Richardson and Jordan seems potentially useful. Accordingly 
this particular study tests the validity of the Richardson and Jordan 
proposition by reference to specific marine resource policies in Bass 
Strait. 
Central to the Richardson and Jordan model is the notion of 
issue communities. These communities, centred on specific issues, form 
an interaction network amongst different policy actors. Actors  may be 
drawn into the "issue community" as they attempt to influence the output 
of the policy process. "Outputs" can be identified as legislation, 
policies and guidelines assumed to facilitate the management of marine 
resources, (fisheries and hydrocarbons), within the Bass Strait region 
of South Eastern Australia. Ajthough outputs are perhaps the most 
obvious and easily identifiable aspects of the policy process, the 
- 
Richardson and Jordan approach is particularly useful as it provides a 
means of examining the impact of interaction on policy style and process 
responsible for determining these outputs. The importance of the 
"machinery" in determining output is somewhat neglected in existing 
studies of marine resources policy. 
It 	 wil 	 be 	 argued 	 that 	 institutional 	 actors 	 (i.e. 	 Ministerial 
Departments or government agencies) are particularly important in the 
development of these resource management policies, through their 
influences on the extent and impact of interest group involvement in the 
emergent issue communities. The attempts of institutional actors to 
maintain the initiative and keep the issue manageable, (in their terms) 
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during 	 interaction 	 amongst 	 diverse 	 interest 	 groups 	 constitutes 	 an 
important element of policy process, becoming known in the literature as 
"agenda control" (Stringer and Richardson, 1980). 
An additional major influence on the development of Australian 
marine resource policy is the notion of "offshore federalis m", the 
constitutional and judicial evolution of Australian experience within a 
system of shared responsibilities between Commonwealth and State 
governments. Management of marine resources takes place within the 
context of the complex evironment of Australian "offshore federalism" 
(Cullen, 1985) with interaction between actors reflecting, and being 
influenced by, the features of a federal political system. Development 
of policies concerned with the management of marine resources in Bass 
Strait, which separates the island state of Tas mania fro m mainland 
Australia, are closely influenced by the features of this "offshore 
federalism". 
Implicit in the argument developed in this study is a view that the 
traditional perspectives of policy making as the sole preserve of 
Ministers and bureaucrats is no longer relevant. The increase in 
influence •of the bureaucracy in formulating and implementing delegated 
or subordinate legislation indicates that public agencies are no longer 
li mited to a role concerned with i mple mentation of policies. The 
"decline of parliament thesis" proposed by a number of writers on the 
Westminster system focusses on the emergence of "extra-parliamentary 
institutions" in the develop ment of "policy" within the political 
system; that is through a widening of the polity. The "issue community 
thesis" underscores these arguments claiming, as has been stated, that 
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policy is developed through the interaction of a multiplicity of actors, 
inside and outside the formal institutional framework for policy making. 
It is from this range of actors with _ an "interest" in particular aspects 
of policy, (whether as individual actors, interest groups or corporate 
bodies), together with their associated institutions that the issue 
com-munity develops. 
1:2 PREMISES, SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
initial premise concerning the analysis of marine resource 
policy has been identified above. It is postulated that the issue 
community model provides an appropriate framework within which policy 
— 
development and implementation can be studied; since it considers policy 
emerging 	 from 	 the 	 interaction 	 of 	 different 	 policy 	 actors. 	 Such 
interaction can be seen to relate • to who gains (or loses) during the 
development of policy and In terms of policy process and outcomes, i.e. 
"what difference it makes" (Dye, 1984:xi emphasis added). 
Within the broad areas of fisheries and/or offshore oil and gas 
resource policy, the study is concerned with the emergence, processing 
and implementation of specific issues, (such as the introduction of -a —
management regime for a specific fishery of Bass Strait and the 
introduction of revenue policies for hydrocarbon developments), chosen 
for their contemporary relevance and as typical of the management issues 
facing the decision makers. It is considered that the patterns of 
interaction identified in particular case studies may have application 
in the analysis of broader issues concerning other marine resources or 
marine policy issues such as marine pollution policy or the establisment 
of marine parks or reserves. The issues chosen are, first, the 
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development of a scalop fishery management regime in Bass Strait, and 
secondly the introduction of new revenue policies in the petroleu m 
sector, the introduction of a Resource Rent Tax (RRT) and cash 
bidding,(sometimes caled cash bonus bidding - CBB) for offshore titles. 
Bass Strait contains a rather diverse marine resource base, 
including major fisheries, (utilising a range of species) and 
Australia's current largest oil and gas production facilities, but also 
involving other prospects such as the alginates industry derived from 
kelp processing, outside the scope of this study. Further, the 
development of policies concerning the management of these resources in 
Bass Strait is greatly influenced by the maritime boundary between the 
States of Tas mania and Victoria. The deli mitation of this boundary 
first occurred in statutes enacted in 1825 and although this original 
baseline is largely anachronistic in ter ms of conte mporary 
federal-state 	 relations, 	 the 	 issues 	 surrounding 	 marine 	 resource 
manage ment are integral to the question of jurisdiction and 
extra-territorial legislative competence which effect develop ment and 
implementation of policy. Bass Strait, through accidents of history and 
the "evolution" of Australian federalism, involves an overlapping State 
and Federal ad ministrative and political syste m, responsible for 
fisheries and oil and gas resources policy. The development of these • 
policies involves the States of Tas mania and Victoria and the 
Commonwealth in what can become complex intergovernmental negotiations. 
This federal structure has the effect of markedly increasing the number 
of institutions involved in policy development and multipling the number 
of interests affected by these decisions. The issue communities that 
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develop over issues concerned with marine resources policy in Bass 
Strait are therefore likely to be complex, reflecting the character of 
the political and administrative overlays in Bass Strait policy. In 
addition the development and implementation of policies deriving from 
the interaction within issue communities is likely to involve a long 
time frame prior to implementation, given the multiple number of actors 
involved and the presence of intergovernmental overlays. 
The preceding paragraphs have identified the scope of the thesis, 
but some limitations must also be noted. Limiting the study to 
interaction concerning two principal policy issues provides a manageable 
"task environment" but may also oversimplify the sdituation. The 
adoption of a public policy approach was deliberately undertaken, as 
little analysis of Australian marine policy has been made using a 
political/administrative framework, compared with research into aspects 
of marine science, economics or law. Attempting to examine policy issues 
drawn from the current political agenda provide some limitations to the 
study; for example one cannot stand back and trace the involvement of 
key actors with the benefit of hindsight on the format of the policy. It 
is necessary to carry out detailed research on the membership of each 
issue community. This problem is regarded as a minor limitation,as such 
research highlights the dynamic nature of the issue community, in itself 
an important factor in the development of policy. 
A case study approach has been adopted, involving a range of 
sources of empirical evidence. The major sources of data were secondary 
sources, chiefly published reports and papers, although important data 
was obtained by interviews, (primary sources). These interviews were 
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with resource managers and 	 policy advisers as well as with 
representatives of interests in each case study. Industry publications 
provide a source of industry viewpoints and were utilised extensively. 
Examples of these publications include Australian Fisheries, Fin-Tas and 
the APEA Journal. 	 A range of academic journals in the fields of 
political 	 science and public admininistration and secondly marine 
science contain relevant material. 	 The former includes specialised 
publications such as the Petroleum and Mining Law Journal (Aust), which 
includes articles on the administrative and legal regimes of offshore 
hydrocarbon developments. The latter publications include Coastal  
Zone Management Journal (USA), Marine Policy (UK), and Maritime Studies 
(Aust) to provide an indicative list. 
The case study research, utilising as it does "current issues", 
meant that the media provided a further source of data. Where possible, 
media reports were verified from the releases from various government 
agencies. 	 Since both the issues forming the case studies were 
extensively 	 covered in the print and electronic media, media releases, 
press statements together with media reports provide an additional 
source of data. For example the scallop fishing isssue was extensively 
covered by Tasmanian print and electronic media, and the oil tax and 
rent issue was the focus of media coverage by the financial press, for 
example the Australian Financial Review, Australian Business and 
Business Review Weekly. 
Interviews were undertaken throughout the course of the research 
during 1985 and 1986. The interviews with individuals representing 
institutions and interests within both areas of policy were important 
S 
sources of information. Interviews were semi-structured although a 
formal questionnaire format was rejected early in the research in favour 
of key questions; allowing the interview- to develop, rather than being 
constrained to a predetermined pattern. Interviews were sought with 
major actors, the exceptions being the Australian Petroleum Exploration 
Association, (APEA), and the Department of Resources and Energy, (DRE), 
where, due to constraints of distance, correspondence was undertaken. 
The interviews ran for varying lengths of ti me, with follow up 
interviews undertaken where more information was sought. 
Additional sources of data included parliamentary Reports 	 and 
Papers  and Hansard,  as well as un-published information bulletins and 
briefing papers. A range of publications from each government were 
utilised at various stages, ranging from Yearbooks and administrative 
guides to departmental reports. These "internal" publications 	 have 
varying 	 degrees of authority, and their use in the research for the 
case studies depended on their status. 
1:3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
As earlier indicated, the principal ai m of the thesis is to study 
• the interaction bet ween different policy actors over, issues 
concerned with the management of marine resources, with a view to 
provide an insight into how these policies are developed and 
implemented. 
Fro m this central focus an argu ment is developed that issue 
communities 	 highlight 	 the 	 inadequacies 	 of 	 existing 	 institutional 
structures 	 for 	 the 	 development 	 of policy. 	 More 	 particularly 	 the 
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resolution of differences between the members of the issue community that 
arise out of interaction is likely to prove difficult, given the 
limitations of the institutional framework. Notwithstanding the attempt 
at institutional controls over the involvement of interest groups, the 
resource user interest groups are seen as an important feature of this 
particular policy arena. 
The proposition is therefore that there will be a tendency 
create new structures within the institutional framework in order to  
deal adequately with representative non-institutional interests,  
chiefly from the principal resource user groups, as a result of  
interaction between these political, corporate, administrative and  
community actors during the "policy process". 
1:4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The public policy framework from which the analysis undertaken in 
this study derives, forms the first substantive chapter in the thesis, 
Chapter Two. This chapter allows the concepts of the issue community, 
and policy interaction to be considered in detail. An examination of 
aspects of the policy process literature, although brief, allows the key 
features of a range of perspectives on the process to be examined. Two 
models of the policy process/cycle, Jenkins (1978) and Hogwood and 
Peters (1983), are used to reinforce the view that interaction between 
actors can be seen to ocurr within three major phases of the policy 
process or cycle. These phases are first the emergence of issues, 
second, the processing of issues and finally the implementation of 
policy. As these phases have an influence on the character and operation 
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of the issue community, through the level of interaction experienced at 
each phase, discussion of the key features of each of the phases of 
what has been termed the "policy cycle" (liogwood and Peters 1983) is 
useful. 
Chapter Three provides an survey of the main features of the policy 
environment which provide a background to the development of specific 
resources policy. These features include the characteristics of the Bass 
Strait region which also delimits the study area. In terms of the 
management of marine resources the evolution of Australian offshore 
federalism since the Second World War provides an important set of 
parameters within which to place the development of particular policies. 
In terms of the constitutional and legislative framework for both 
fisheries and hydrocarbons management, the major shift in constitutional 
control over the territorial sea towards the Commonwealth in the early 
1970s and the political "settlement" of intergovermental conflict which 
arose out of this centralism which occurred in the late 1970s, are 
important. The regimes deriving from this settlement and institutional 
framework for the implementation and adminstration of marine resource 
policy, (providing key actors within the specific issue communities) 
are also examined. This chapter provides a background to the complex 
policy environment surrounding marine resource policy, from which the 
specific issues emerge, and which supports issue communities based on 
these issues. This policy environment derives its complexity from the 
particular character of Australian offshore federalism. 
The fourth chapter considers the main features of the Bass Strait 
fishing industry, emphasising the regional and localised character of 
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an industry based on a number of small ports around the margin of the 
Strait. An assessment of the landings from Bass Strait in terms of the 
value of the catch •and its tonnage indicates that the Strait produces 
twenty two per cent of the value of production and eighteen per cent of 
the live weight of the Australian catch. The utilisation of a diverse 
range of fish, crustaceans and molluscs as well as the regional 
character of the fishery is seen as a major influence on the development 
of policy, with groups organised around membership based on home ports, 
species or industry sectors providing the potential for differences to 
arise among these interest groups. These differences have to be resolved 
as issues are processed or policies concering the management of these 
resources developed and implemented. 
From this general survey the development of a management regime 
for the scalop fishery of Bass Strait is exa mined in detail. The 
differences in management adopted between Tasmania and Victoria are 
emphasised. The methods of licensing, the major controls of access to 
resource stocks by scalop fishermen adopted in Tasmania and Victoria, 
emphasises these differences. The multiple endorsement, open entry 
syste m operating in Tas mania is contrasted with the single fishery 
licence, and limited entry criteria used in Victoria. Emerging problems 
in the manage ment of the scallop fishery in Bass Strait led to the 
introduction of the Bass Strait Scalop Management Regime which forms a 
case study of policy interaction. This case study first emphasises the 
problems in developing policy in a large and complex issue community, 
and second indicates the importance of institutional controls over the 
interaction of interest groups. 	 The development of the Bass Strait 
Scallop Task Force, 	 which incorporated representatives of industry 
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groups from both States, is an example of the need to develop adequate 
structures to incorporate interest groups in the policy process. The 
Task Force can also be seen as an attempt to develop what Richardson and 
Jordan have called a "preferred relationship" of interaction between 
actors. The Task Force also allowed the key institutions to keep the 
issues surrounding scallop manage ment manageable. Prior to the 
introduction of the Task Force little progress had been made in 
resolving policy differences between institutions responsible for, and 
interest groups concerned with, the management of the scallop fishery 
fro m the States of Tas mania and Victoria. The second part of this 
chapter provides an analysis of the scallop •case study applying the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter Two to the evidence provided 
in the case study. 
This 	 section 	 of 	 the 	 study 	 also 	 provides an insight 	 on 
the lack of progress in the resolution of the management issues when 
they re mained State based, that is the issue initially concerning 
,Tasmanian fishermen was the increasing visibility of Victorian boats in 
what were perceived as Tas manian waters, rather than changes to 
management practices. This relates to the importance of the presence of 
an overlapping syste m of jurisdiction in Bass Strait, discussed 
previously in Chapter Three, where the competence of the States to 
resolve the scallop fishery issues was in doubt prior to agreements on 
the OCS package. 
The next chapter, Chapter Five, examines issues concerning oil and 
gas policy in Bass Strait. From a general overview the development of 
the Resources Rent Tax (RRT ) and Cash Bidding for offshore titles (CBB) 
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provide a case study of interaction over offshore oil and gas "rent" 
issues. The history of exploration for Bass Strait oil and gas and the 
development of the hydrocarbons production system, with its links with 
constitutional and intergovernmental features of offshore federalism, 
described in Chapter Three, provides an introduction to this chapter. 
So me sections of the chapter outline the develop ment of offshore 
petroleum revenue policy between 1964 and 1984 and the mechanisms of the 
work programme system of tenement alocation which had been undertaken 
since the initial Gippsland exploration programme. The issues that form 
the case study 	 can be viewed as the latest "succession" in a continuing 
incremental "style" of policy making. 	 The RRT/CBB issue community 
involved interest groups, including the major industry organisation and 
individual petroleu m exploration co mpanies interacting with the 
Commonwealth government over the introduction of the two separate yet 
related issues. The Commonwealth has pre-eminence over the States in 
revenue policy making for offshore resources outside the States 
territorial co mpetence. The second part of this chapter provides an 
analysis of the interaction over these issues, again applying the 
framework examined in Chapter Two. The "pattern of interaction" over 
these oil and gas issues is interesting, as the issues were placed on 
the agenda by the then recently elected Commonwealth Minister for 
Resources and Energy ensuring that the focus of interest groups was not 
in the first instance the State or Commonwealth bureaucrats as was the 
pattern of interaction experienced in the fisheries case study. 
The final chapter of the thesis considers the issue co m munity 
framework as a means of eaxamining policy development .The impact of 
interest groups in the development of the policies which emerged out of 
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the interaction over the two marine resource management issues 
emphasises the importance of institutional actors within these 
communities. The hypothesis concerning the impact of interaction within 
these issue communities on the institutional framework for the 
development of marine resources policy is examined and some conclusions 
concerning the impact of interest groups on the development of marine 
resource policy are made. The study concludes with an assessment of the 
use of a public policy orientation to examine the impact of institutions 
and interest groups in the development of marine resources policy. 
It is not claimed that this is the only feasible interpretation 
in explaining the interaction process, but rather that the approach 
adopted, together with the analytical framework proposed, permits one to 
more easily comprehend interaction among participants and " the general 
dynamics of the policy process. The approach adopted tends to emphasise 
process, rather than policy outcomes or policy content, and thus has 
some inherent, but nonetheless marginal, weaknesses. It is felt that the 
advantaages of the approach adopted outway these disadvantages, as all 
appoaches have particular strengths and weaknesses. 
CHAPTER TWO 
ISSUE COMMUNITIES, THE POLICY PROCESS AND INTERACTION 
2:1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with providing a theoretical perspective 
to the analysis of the interaction between different policy actors seen 
as comprising a specific issue-community within the policy environment. 
The study and analysis of public policy making has developed greatly in 
the last twenty five years. Policy analysis has been described as "the 
thinking persons response to demands for relevance", (Dye, 1984:v) 
through its focus on the "description and explanation of  the causes and  
consequences of government activity" (Dye, 1984:3 -original emphasis). 
An ever increasing number of studies have concentrated on various 
aspects of policy analysis, conveniently summarised as comprising seven 
main categories: studies of policy content, policy process, policy 
outputs, evaluation studies, information for policy making, process 
advocacy and policy advocacy. (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 26-27; Ham and 
Hill, 1985:8-10) 
The 	 study 	 of 	 interaction 	 between the institutions responsible 
for policy development and implementation, and those interest groups 
which attempt to influence processing of policies, involves analysis 
which at times may overlap between the categories described by above. 
Interaction, the actions and reactions between different policy actors 
within a specific 	 policy or issue arena, can be examined from a number 
of 	 perspectives. Given the particular policy environment within which 
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marine resources policies are developed, where resource user groups are 
actively encouraged, (or discouraged), to provide input into the 
development of policies concerning the management of natural resources, 
this interaction can be examined through the concept of issue 
communities developed by Richardson and Jordan (1979). 
In 	 order 	 to 	 analysise 	 the 	 development 	 of 	 specific 	 marine 
resource management issues from a public policy perspective, the 
framework by which this analysis is to be undertaken needs to be 
discussed. By considering a theoretical framework prior to empirical 
evidence, one can be accused of forcing the theory to "fit" the data, 
rather than using the theory to illuminate and explain the data, 
nonetheless, it is felt that theoretical framework should be placed at 
the beginning of the study and applied to the issues in later chapters. 
This theoretical framework, utilising as it does the Richardson and 
Jordan proposal for communities of "interest" as the basis for policy 
development, argues that traditional models of the policy environment 
and to a lesser extent the policy process are in need of revision. The 
issue community model is not solely concerned with the environment in 
which policy agendas are set; the the means by which the policy options 
are processed and implemented are equally important. The issue community 
model is therefore concerned, even if implicitly, with the notion of the 
policy process.  It is argued here that the Richardson and Jordan model 
provides an useful framework for the analysis of interaction between 
different policy actors, although the model does have weaknesses, in 
that it does not explain adequately the barriers to interaction by these 
interest groups or the tendency for institutional actors to control the 
17. 
policy process. Even though institutional actors may attempt to keep 
issues manageable and hence act as "gate keepers" (Cobb and Elder, 1983) 
for the entry and departure of interest groups to and from the policy 
arena, or to control information flows, the issue-community model 
retains utility as a framework within which to examine the interaction 
between institutions and interests concerned with fisheries and offshore 
hydrocarbons policy. 
The structure of this particular chapter reflects the main features 
of the framework proposed. The "issue community" concept is examined in 
detail, including a consideration of the difference between "issues" and 
"policies". The examination of the differences between issues and 
policies leads logically to an examination of policy process or 
agenda-building. This process is perceived to be initiated by the 
emergence and processing of issues and concludes with the implementation 
of policy, providing support for the study of interaction between 
interest groups and institutions based on issues rather than policies. 
Interaction within specific issue communities, located within the broad 
policy environment concerned with marine resource management, is linked 
closely to the setting and operation of what has been called the 
policy agenda, (Cobb and Elder, 1983; Hogan, 1986). This interaction is 
controlled by a range of institutional actions including issue 
identification, agenda setting and control, all of which influence the 
participation of interest groups in policy making. The "management" of 
interaction within the issue community is a major concern of this study; 
the extent to which this interaction is influenced by the actions of 
bureaucratic actors in first, the formation and operation of the issue 
community and second, the emergence, processing and implementation of 
18. 
issues and policies may have important effects on the form of policy 
outputs. 
2:2 THE ISSUE COMMUNITY 
An underlying theme of much of the literature on policy 
development concerns the fact that increasingly, policy emerges from 
within a complex social and political environment, where more and more 
actors are involved in the process of making policy. The presence of 
such an environment was observed by Heclo (1975) and forms the basis for 
the thesis developed by Richardson and Jordan that, not only are a range 
of interest groups present in the policy environment, but policy is 
likely to be markedly influenced through the active involvement of such 
interest groups, the groups constituting "issue communities" with key 
institutional actors responsible for policy development. The membership 
of issue community is obviously important both in terms of defining the 
concept and providing a means of assessing the impact of interaction 
between the actors which comprise these communities 
The increasing visibilty and involvement of interest groups in 
interaction over issues constituting the policy agenda has led to a 
re-examination of the traditional perspectives of policy making. The 
Westminster system, whether in its classic form or as the Australian 
"mutation" (Thompson, 1980) is based on the concept of responsible 
government where the parliament was perceived as the key institution, 
and as having important functions in the development of policy. It is 
almost universally recognised that the sivation is far more complex than 
this. 	 In a society "containing a plurality of interests there will be 
many, and diverse, inputs into the policy process. 	 Richardson and 
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Jordan subtitle their book the "policy process in a post-parliamentary 
democracy" (1979) and emphasise the growth of policy emerging out of 
tripartism between government, the civil service and pressure groups. 
Tripartism infers that the traditional pattern of policy development in 
a Westminster system, where policy is initiated in the parliament and 
implemented by the bureaucracy, is no longer adequate to explain how 
policy is developed. This increase in triapartis m is not so much 
concerned with the "decline of parliament thesis" (Brugger and Jaensch, 
1985; Summers, 1985) as it is concerned with the relative significance of 
other actors in the policy making triu mvirate, the bureaucracy and 
interest groups. 
Writers, 	 chiefly fro m the United States, 	 commenting on the 
emergence of "extra institutional" actors in policy making viewed these 
actors as part of an "iron triangle" (Jordan, 1981), where policy 
emerges out of the inter-relationships between the government, the 
bureaucaracy and interest groups, (see Figure 2:1 following). Jordan 
(1981) claims the issue community model owes some debts to the iron 
triangle concept, although it differs considerably in its view of the 
pattern of interaction between actors. The so-called iron triangle is a 
useful starting point in the analysis of the emergence of communities of 
interest within the policy environment, although practical as well as 
se matic li mitations reduce its efficacy.The i mplicit treat ment of the 
equality of the actors at each "apex" of the triangle in the development 
of policy ignores the substantial differences in legitimacy, power and 
authority between institutions responsible for public policy making and 
interest groups (Jordan, 1981). Se mantically the ter m i mplies the 
existence of a stronger bond between the actors than may be 
evident in the interaction over policy. 
INTEREST GROUPS 	1  
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Jordan 	 views 	 interaction 	 taking 	 place 	 in 	 networks where 	 the 
relationships may be "elastic" (1981). Although this study argues that 
marine resources policy is developed through the interaction between 
three main sets of actors the issue community model avoids many of the 
limitations associated with the iron triangle. 
FIGURE 2:1 
THE IRON TRIANGLE 
GOVERNMENT 
BUREAUCRACY 
ADAPTED FROM JORDAN (1981) 
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Richardson and Jordan's model, like the iron triangle, is concerned 
with the notion that policy is developed through interaction between 
different actors. A major difference between the iron triangle and the 
Richardson and Jordan thesis is that the latter approach does not 
prescribe equality between the major actors and therefore avoids 
problems implied by the iron triangle model. The members of the 
community become identified as issues are placed on, or become part of, 
the agenda, with interest groups being attracted to or congregating 
around institutional actors they perceive as having greatest prospective 
input into policy areas with which they, as groups with a particular 
interest in aspects of policy, are _primarily concerned. Richardson and 
Jordan's key theme is, noting the existence of interest groups within 
the policy environment, "the point is not only that many groups are 
involved in policy making but that policy is to a large extent made  
in issue communities" (1979:53) (emphasis added) to which various 
institutions and interests are members. 
L.J. Sharpe views these communities as comprising a range of 
actors. Although Sharpe uses the term "policy community" rather than 
"issue community" his defintion is an useful one. The semantic and 
methodological reasons for distinguishing between the terms and the 
reasons for choosing the term "issue" over "policy" will be discussed 
shortly. Sharpe states that 
the policy community may comprise not only the professionals but 
private firms (that have a direct financial interest in the 
service), national media journalists, local government press, 
lay pressure groups, academics, interested members of the 
national legislature and last but not least the department or, 
more likely, sub-department of the central government. 
(1985:369) 
One can extend and slightly modify Sharpe's definition to adapt the 





resource policy making and include the State government "legislatures" 
and "departments" as wel as the State based interest groups and media. 
A diagra m of a likely issue co m munity is depicted in Figure 2:2, 
folowing. 
FIGURE 2:2 
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ADAPTED FROM SHARPE (1985) 
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2:3 ISSUES AND POLICIES: Differences and Implications. 
In order to assess the interaction within this issue community 
it is necessary to make some distinctions between the two important 
concepts of "issues" and "policies". This is important in terms of the 
analysis of interaction between policy actors, as such interaction tends 
to focus on the emergence and processing of issues, rather than during 
the implementation of policies. The point to be reinforced is that 
issues tend to be loose, sometimes poorly defined or illusive. Policies, 
in contrast, are authorative and have legitimacy within the political 
and legislative systems. The dilemma posed in the application of 
Richardson and Jordan's "issue community" thesis is that they use the 
terms issue and policy community interchangeably. Later British writers, 
most notably Jordan (1981) and Sharpe (1985), discuss the emergence of 
policy communities, although one can detect in Jordan's writing an 
unhappiness with the limitations posed by the term policy community. 
These points will be discussed subsequently in greater detail. 
In developing the issue community thesis Richardson and Jordan 
argue that the number of interest groups involved in interaction over 
issues or policies in any Western parliamentary system is enormous. They 
consider "that the number of groups (outside government itself ) is 
unfathomable" (1979:53). Australian experience is similiar in terms of 
the number of non governmental organisations 	 (QANGOS) or interest 
groups concerned with policy issues. 	 Parkin, describing the Australian 
political system considered that it contained a multiple 	 number of 
interests 	 (1981) 	 comprising 	 the 	 obvious 	 interest 	 groups 	 but 	 also 
including 	 corporate 	 bodies 	 and 	 individuals as 	 wel 	 as institutional 
actors at each tier of government, all concerned with aspects of public 
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policy. To illustrate the range of actors involved in a policy area 
relevant to the concerns of this study, the Archer Committee into the 
Development of the Australian Fishing Industry (which published its 
Report in 1982) attracted 124 witnesses representing numerous 
fishermen's groups, corporate bodies, governments,academics and 
individuals as well as receiving 66 written submissions from individuals 
or groups that did not present themselves to the committee. If all 
actors who provided submissions were to become actively involved in the 
policy process actual delivery of policy might be seriously affected. 
A clarification of the difference between the terms "policy" and 
"issue" as it affects both the concept of "interaction" communities and 
the policy process, is necessary. To illustrate the difference between 
the terms and how this difference affects the notion of communities of 
policy actors one can conveniently use the example of the Archer 
Inquiry, mentioned above. The large number of groups that were 
represented or provided submissions to the Archer Committee can be seen 
to comprise the major part of what Jordan (1981) would distinguish as 
the the fishing policy community. This large community contains a number 
of potential issue communities which may arise in response to specific 
issues, for example the requirements of individual species management or 
as a result of increases in the price of diesel fuel. Richardson and 
Jordan use the terms issue and policy community interchangeably (1979, 
see pages 73 and 53), and although writers have tended to support the 
term policy community (Jordan, 1981; Sharpe, 1985) there are significant 
methodological differences between the terms reinforcing the utility of 
the use of the issue community "label". 
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An example of the methodological problems of using the terms issue  
and policy interchangeably is developed by Hogan in a recent study of 
"issue-packaging", the relationships between interest groups and 
political parties. Hogan argues that issues are not the sa me as 
policies, which are often quite detailed (1986:95), highlighting the 
"loose" and sometimes elusive character of the issue as contrasted to 
the detailed and authoritative policy output. Different actors may, and 
frequently do, perceive issues differently, "conflict between (interest 
groups) and government over the nature or very existence of a "problem" 
is common" (Stringer and Richardson 1980:23). Schattschneider, in an 
earlier study, 	 claimed 	 that 	 in the develop ment of policies "the 
antagonists 	 can rarely agree on what the issues 	 are" (1960:84). 
Schattschneider 	 felt that the difference in perceptions over what is 
"at issue" is an i mportant factor in deter mining the extent of 	 the 
involvement of interest groups as "whoever decides what the game is 
about also decides who gets into the game" (1960:105). This point is 
less relevant to the application of the issue co m munity thesis but it 
does suggest the i mportance of issue identification in exa mining 
interest group interaction in the develop ment of policy. A further 
factor separating issues fro m policies is that the issue may be so 
loosely defined that in fact the "issue" may change, or be transformed 
as it is processed. One of the reasons behind the develop ment of 
relatively distinct issue communities may derive from the need to make 
the issues clear. The interchange of the ter ms issue and policy to 
describe the community of policy actors within Richardson and Jordan's 
analysis illustrates the fact that "the distinction between policies and 
issues is not always clear in normal discussion" (Hogan 1986:95). 
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One can separate issues and policies relatively si mply on the 
basis of the extent of their respective authority and legitimacy within 
the political syste m. It is the policy process that produces a 
legitimate policy from a range of alternative and sometimes conflicting 
issues. Cobb and Elder (cited by Hogan (1986) in his recent study on 
issue packaging) view an "issue [s a conflict between two or more  
identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to  
the distribution of positions or resources" (1983:82-original 
e mphasis). Cobb and Elder's definition of an issue reinforces the 
possibility that there may well be many issues concerning interest 
groups within a particular policy community. The choice of "issue" to be 
given priority is usually the prerogative of the institutional actors, 
and is therefore a major influence on the resulting interaction between 
the instititution and the interest groups which make up the issue 
co m munity. The control over issue definition is an i mportant, yet 
sometimes neglected aspect of agenda control, and may be one way for the 
institutional actors to maintain control over the process of 
interaction. 
Given that "issue" is a better 	 ter m to describe the state of a 
"policy" prior to 	 legitimisation and implementation, the study of 
interaction between institutional actors and interest groups which 
chiefly concerns the emergence and processing of issues rather than 
authorative or clearly defined policies, is best perceived as being 
focussed on issue communities. This term is used in preference over the 
term policy community which can either be seen as the multiplicity of 
groups concerned with broad policy areas (Jordan 1981) or interaction 
arising from the evaluation of implemented policy. The former definition 
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is probably the most common, although certain authors have used the 
policy community as an description of the arena of interaction over the 
processing of issues. 
•2:4 INTEREST GROUPS, INTERACTION AND THE ISSUE COMMUNITY 
Although existence of a large number of groups, each of whom may 
be concerned with issues surrounding a particular policy area, creates 
what has been identified as a crowded policy environment, the presence 
of these groups does not lead to an a priori  asssumption that all will 
be involved in the development of policy. One weakness identified with 
the issue-community model is that it maintains a pluralistic view of the 
policy process (S mith 1980) which may not accurately describe the 
pattern of interaction within and between groups, the issue community or 
policy process where interest groups may be hindered or blocked in their 
attempts to influence or become involved in the processing of issues. 
Grant Jordan, writing in a later paper, argued that 
there was flexibility in the syste m, not all groups are active 
in all aspects of an area ... (even).., narrowly defined. On 
different aspects of policy different sets of participants are 
involved. While some groups are very much of the departments 
"legiti mised clientele" others enjoy less co mfortable 
coexistence with the department. (1981:105) 
If 	 a 	 "legitimised 	 clientele" 	 exists the 	 pattern 	 of interaction 
will be influenced by the close proxi mity of these clients to key 
institutions. It is clear that interest groups that maintain strong 
links to a particular department or to a particular agency will be able 
to gain much at the expense of other groups. Hogwood and Peters claim 
that "entrenched interests will tend to have an advantage over (other) 
groups seeking policy succession" (1983:120), although they do consider 
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that the level of prestige and support for less entrenched groups from 
outside the community of actors may increase the effectiveness of these 
interest groups. Peters (1977) considers that the level of interaction 
between interest groups and the bureaucracy depends on the interest 
groups position as either an insider, those groups which enjoy a close. 
relationship with the decision makers or as an outsider, lacking close 
contact with institiutional actors. 
This 	 proximity 	 to 	 the 	 policy 	 makers 	 gives 	 insider 	 interest 
groups the potential for wielding considerable influence in the the 
processing of issues, although it is obvious that this proxi mity may 
reduce the chance of the interest group developing or maintaining an 
"independent" viewpoint. At its extre me the develop ment of strong 
linkages between an interest group and a particular agency may lead to 
what has been termed a clientela relationship. This type of realtionship 
was first developed by La Palombara. La Palombara considered that 
clientela groups were those 
that succeed in becoming in the eyes of a given administrative 
agency the natural expression and representative of any given 
social sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or 
reference point for the administrative agency. 
(1965: 262) 
Richardson and Jordan argue that the issue community thesis, 
which they consider to be part of their concept of group sub-government, 
is related to the concept of clientelism, 
but at the sa me ti me is stressing a different aspect. Group 
sub-government implies that the significant policy differences 
are within the group subsystem whereas clientelism notes the 
shared priorities within the subsystem. 
(1979:55) 
The issue community is therefore both an arena for policy interaction 
and a mechanism to facilitate, or otherwise the interaction between 
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interest groups and institutions responsible for the development of 
policy. 
The emergence of client, or using a less restrictive definition, 
"insider" groups reinforces the importance of bureaucratic institutions 
responsible for the development and implementation of policy within the 
issue community. These institutions are key actors in their own right 
and have a more active role in policy making than acting as a broker 
between competing interests as classic pluralism would maintain. Jordan 
admits that "not all parties are equal, the government department is an 
actor with special resources (legitimacy, prior knowledge, staff ) not 
available to other actors" (1981:106). Sharing a a common interest in a 
particular policy area may not lead to equality of input into the 
processing of issues between interest groups and instututions. From the 
preceding discussion it is clear that different actors may be pursuing 
different aims, or concerned with different issues. The perception of 
what is at issue has been seen to differ between the members of the 
community. These factors support the institutional actors ability to 
manage the interaction so to reduce or negate the effects of 
participation. 
Although many groups have an interest in contributing to the 
development of policies, a much smaller number of interest groups are 
actually involved in close and constant interaction with the key policy 
makers. Jordan claims that the term 
[issue] 	 community 	 might 	 be 	 better 
comparatively small circle of participants 
might define as being of relevance for 
than the examples listed in Richardson 
Jordan is implying the existence of some controls 
reserved 	 for 	 that 
that a civil servant 
any particular policy 
and Jordan (1979). 
(1981:105) 
over the institution's 
interaction with the interest groups, 	 including the very important 
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discretionary decision making power of the public servants to decide 
which groups are "policy relevant" and should be consulted. 
The 	 comparatively 	 smal 	 circle 	 of 	 participants 	 results 	 from 
the "difference... between the scale of policy relevant groups who can 
become involved in a given issue and those who would do so  on a routine 
basis" (Jordan 1981:106 emphasis added). It is the difference between 
the potential for interest group interaction and the level of 
involvement which focusses on the impact of institutional actors within 
the issue communities. These institutions have many means available to 
manage the level of interaction by interest groups. The institutions act 
as "gate keepers", regulating the flow of demands and groups within the 
arena that is the focus of interest group involvement (Cobb and Elder 
1983). It is this power to influence the functioning as well as the 
outcome of the policy process that• is considered as an important aspect 
of institutional control over policy development. 
The ability of bureaucrats to identify the appropriate interest 
groups from within the the "multiplicity of interests" making up the 
policy environment is important in developing the issue community. 
Richardson and Jordan indicate the importance of the policy makers 
ability to "target" the appropriate interest group during the processing 
of particular issues. In supporting evidence Richardson and Jordan 
show that the institution responsible for the development of the 
(British) Water Act  1973 was able to accurately identify the key groups 
from within a range of interest groups. The identification of the 
"policy relevant" interest groups from within a large number of 
potential actors is used by the authors to show that "civil servants 
31 . 
know their customers" ( 1979:54 ) . The empirical data examined later 
in the thesis on the processing of specific marine resource issues 
indicates the i mportance of the identification of these "custo mers" 
by the key decision makers. In the development of the scallop fishery 
manage ment regi me policy makers at both tiers of the Australian 
political system indicated that they were aware of the key groups or 
individuals. One resource manager went so far as to say that the ability 
of his staff to target these groups meant that decisions could be made 
avoiding lengthly delays in consultation. 
The identification of specific interest groups, or targetting , may 
be the first stage in the process of incorporation of these "policy 
relevant" groups into the formal policy machinery. Incorporation, or 
co-option, occurs when an interest group is co-opted into this machinery 
which usually takes the form of the group's membership of an advisory 
committee concerned with a particular policy area. Incorporation helps 
to create the conditions of a dichoto my between "insider" 	 and 
"outsider" interest groups in the policy process, 	 discussed earlier, 
without necessarily creating the formal conditions of clientelism . The 
concept of incorporation (co-option ) relates closely to the model of 
"group sub government" developed by Richardson and Jordan ( 1979 ) . It is 
an interesting paradox, ( particularly for the analysis of interest group 
interaction in the policy process ) , that co-option may be used to reduce 
the level of interest group involve ment in the policy process while 
providing these groups close proxi mity to decision makers in this 
process. 
Considerable debate has occurred over the motives of institutions 
during the co-option of interest groups. The creation of advisory 
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committees, while providing the interest group with input into the 
policy process, may be aimed at removing the group from the public arena 
or placating a vocal group with token involvement. The use of 
incorporation to placate interest groups, and therefore reduce the level 
of conflict over the processing of issues has been identified in a wide 
range of areas of public policy making. Denying the interest group 
access to the "public" may reduce the interest groups chance of 
increasing support for particular policy initiatives, given that the 
creation of public awareness and attempts to foster changes in public 
opinion may be important strategies for the group to attempt to 
influence the development of policy. In such a sense incorporation may 
reduce the interest group's chance of interaction over issues as the 
processing of the issue is internalised and moved away from the public 
arena (Scott 1980). 
Scott perceives incorporation as containing "an implicit rejection 
of the notion of community participation in policy making and the 
embracing of institutional arrangements which will assist in the 
exclusion of non elite views" (1980:230). Perceiving advantages in 
becoming entrenched interest groups may seek to become involved in the 
policy process and take up offers of positions on advisory bodies set up 
by institutional actors, but the motives of the institutions may be in 
fact be aimed at preventing "non elite" groups interacting with other 
members of the community. As Richardson and Jordan state "not all 
committees are set up to obtain a decision - some are set up to delay 
others are set up in an attempt by the department to educate its clients 
about the difficulties it faces" (1979:72). 
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Even if the co-option of interest groups is undertaken for 
positive purposes, 	 that is, 	 to facilitate the group's input in the 
policy making process, 	 there are still significant issues surrounding 
the interaction of these co-opted interests. Scott comments that while 
incorporation is a common response of policy making systems to 
the demands of interest groups which are regarded as legitimate, 
[it] may not represent a permanent solution once general opinion 
within the community as a whole undergoes a period of change. 
(1980:232) 
The co-option of particular interest groups may reduce the abilty of the 
institution to respond to changing conditions, or the emergence of new 
interest groups from with the broader policy community. 
Richardson and Jordan argue that incorporation or co-option is 
an important feature of the style of policy making that is associated 
with the issue community model, effecting both the pattern of 
interaction among members of the community as well as the outcomes from 
this process. 
It is the relationships involved in communities, the policy 
community of departments and groups, the practises of co-option 
and the consensual style that perhaps better account for policy 
outcomes than do examinations of party stances, of manifestos or 
parliamentary influence. 
(1979:74, original emphasis) 
Even though the development of issue communities will tend to 
internalise interaction within a closed environment the parameters of 
which are generally set by the particular issue being processed, it 
should not be assumed the "community is always able [or willing] to 
present an united front to the outside world" (Sharpe 1985:369). In the 
interaction which arises • out of attempts to influence the processing of 
issues, or policy outputs, "there is likely to be divisions [within the 
community] from time to time, especially between the professionals and 
the rest" (Sharpe 1985:369). 
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2:5 THE ISSUE COMMUNITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY 
The 	 development 	 of 	 issue 	 communities emphasises first 	 the 
complexity of policy making, and seconds the influence of a crowded 
policy environment that has resulted from the level of interest group 
involvement in a broad range of policy areas. As new areas of policy 
emerge a corresponding increase in the machinery of government is 
necessary to i mple ment these policies. With the increase in 
institutional involve ment the interaction with interest groups will 
increase, extending the policy environment further. As a result policy 
will tend to become segmented, bureaucrats and politicians will tend to 
interact with those interests that are concerned, or more importantly 
perhaps, are perceived as being concerned, with the same area of policy. 
Issue communities wil reinforce the boundaries between different policy 
areas, and decisions will tend to be made by those actors with an 
interest in the issue. Institutional actors, and for that matter 
interest groups, will tend to concentrate on issues that specifically 
concern them. This creates a distinctive pattern of policy making, where 
"strong boundaries [wil emerge] between subject matters and indistinct, 
merged relationships between departments and relevant groups within 
individual policy areas" (Richardson and Jordan 1979:42). Hence the 
development of policy, including the emergence and processing of issues 
will tend to re main within these seg mented co m munities, and the 
bureaucrats will tend to have a closer relationship with the interest 
groups which are part of the same community rather than with members of 
other departments. 
The discussion so far has concentrated on the issue community, 
highlighting aspects of this model to help develop a fra mework to 
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examine and explain the influence of interaction between actors 
concerned with the processing of specific issues in the management of 
marine resource issues. The discussion in this section has indicated 
that the issue community does not exist in a vacuum. It has been 
proposed that a mulitiple number of issue communities can exist within 
one policy area, but the community is also influenced by the political 
and institutional structures which support and maintain it. This will 
be discussed in a following chapter. The issue community concerned with 
a particular issue is seen as both the arena for interaction and a 
mechanism by which the issue is processed. 
2:6 THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS: 
Considerable effort has been expended by a large number of policy 
analyists concerned with describing and interpreting the process by 
which ideas, proposals and alternative courses of action become 
"policy". As will be clear from the introduction to this chapter the 
policy process has been examined and explained from a variety of 
perspectives each concerned how the process operated. As a result of 
these alternate perspectives interaction has been treated differently in 
a variety of approaches to the policy process. The major contrast is 
between models that treat interaction between policy actors as an 
implicit part of the policy process or those that view this interaction 
as an important and explicit part of the development of policy. 
Early models of the policy process utilised decision theory to 
explain the policy process. This theory concentrated on the behaviour of 
policy makers in terms of the way in which decisions were made over 
alternative policy options. The two major schools emerged as a result 
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of differing perceptions of the behaviour of the decision makers as they 
developing policy or when they were faced with alternative policy 
choices. These opposing schools were first the rationalists who 
perceived policy as developing from predetermined goals in an ordered, 
logical manner, (Simon 1957, 1971) and second the incrementalists who 
perceived policy making as a series of steps based on past experience 
(Lindblom 1959, 1979) The rationalists saw the policy maker as a version 
of economic man, decisions were made on the basis of satisfying the 
previously stated goals, a perspective that looked forward to the 
achievement of goals rather than looking backwards to previous policy 
decisions. The incrementalists, arguing for the utility of policy 
developing from previous experience, believe that pure rationality is 
impossible to attain. The incrementalists argue that since long term 
goals are difficult to maintain on the basis of a dynamic policy 
environment, decisions are most likely to be made on the basis of past 
experience where the effects of policy decisions can be measured and 
observed. Incrementalism has been tagged "muddling through", an 
appellation that contrasts to the ordered process perceived as occuring 
by the rationalists. 
A large body of writing has applied a a systems perspective to 
the analysis of policy making. The early systemic theorists, (Truman 
1955, Easton 1965), perceived policy outputs as deriving from demands 
that are processed through the undefined "black box" forming the policy 
process. Later systems models, (Jenkins 1978, Hogwood and Peters 1983), 
explored the content of the "black box", considering the process to be 
made up of distinct, if sometimes overlapping, stages. The systems 
models are useful conceptualisations of the policy process as they 
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identify the stages through which issues are processed leading to the 
creation of policy. 
Interaction between interest groups and institutional actors has 
been seen as an integral part of some perspectives on the policy 
process. These approaches see policy as deriving fro m the 
inter-relationships between different actors. Two contrasting 
perspectives were developed in the 1950s which relate to the number of 
groups involved in the policy process, and the extent of competition 
between them. The number of, and competition between groups was seen to 
relate to the distribution of power in the political system. Two 
contrating theories have been developed to explain the distribution of 
power. One of these theories is that of pluralism,  (Dahl 1961, 1971, 
Polsby 1974, Garson 1978), which argues that policy develops out of 
competition between a range of groups of groups with power diffused 
among a large number of groups. Policy emerges from competition among 
these groups, with interests aggregating and forming loose coalitions 
over individual issues. The key aspect of a pluralist perspective of the 
policy process is that there are no consistent winners among the 
interest groups. In contrast elite theory, (Mills 1956, Presthus 1971, 
Higley 1985), claims that policy is developed from an environment 
dominated by a small number of groups, with power concentrated in what 
becomes a dominant elite. Interaction is limited to members of the 
elite, with consistent winners from within the large number of interest 
groups identifiable. The power theorists provide a major theoretical 
basis for another approach to the analysis of policy, that of interest 
group theory (Dye 1984). Interest group theory examines the impact of 
interest groups on the development 	 of policy, 	 arguing that the 
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interaction of these groups is an important, 	 if not pre-eminent, 
influence on the development of policy 
A substantial literature has considered each of these perspectives 
of the policy process as "each offers a separate way of thinking about 
policy" (Dye 1984:20). Dye (1984) states that none of the models can be 
viewed as being necessarily better than any other, with each approach 
providing a separate focus on "policy and political life". Dye makes the 
useful observation that 
although some policies appear at first glance to lend themselves 
to explanation by one particular model, most policies are a 
combination of rational planning, incrementalism, interest group 
activity, elite preference, systemic forces, game playing, 
political 	 processes 	 and 	 institutional 	 influences. 
(1984:20) 
Several studies, utilising in the main the systemic model of the 
policy process, have as has been stated, identified the existence of 
different stages within the process of policy develop ment. 
Examples of such studies are the policy process model developed by 
Jenkins (1978) and the development of "the policy cycle" by Hogwood and 
Peters (1983). A schematic representation of each model is depicted in 
Figure 2:3, below. For the purposes of the analysis of the interaction 
between the interests groups and institutions concerned with specific 
issues, the policy process can be viewed simply, containing three 
phases. These phases correspond to 
(i) the 	 emergence 	 of 	 issues 	 onto 	 the 	 "agenda", 
(i) the processing of these issues to develop "a policy", 
and 	 finaly, 	 (iii) 	 the 	 implementation 	 of 	 this 	 policy. 
The phases identified above are indicated in Fig 2:3. 
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An important theme of the issue community model advanced by 
Richardson and Jordan is that interest groups are involved in each phase 
of the policy process. This model rejects the traditional perspective 
of interest groups as having a sole function related to the 
politicisation of issues as advanced by authors such as Greene and 
Keating (1980). 
FIGURE: 2:3 
MODELS OF THE POLICY PROCESS 
40. 
2:7 	 INTEREST 	 GROUP 	 INTERACTION 	 AND 	 THE 	 PHASES 
OF THE POLICY PROCESS 
As this study is concerned with providing an analysis of the 
interaction between interest groups representing resource users and the 
institutions responsible for resources management, one could expect the 
interest groups to be actively involved in all phases of the policy 
process. Interest groups that have immediate concerns over proposed 
changes to conditions governing resource exploitation will be active 
particpants in the debates and negotiations about such changes. One 
could expect this interaction to be greater than that experienced over 
issues or policy areas where the effect on interest groups does not have 
such an economic impact. This concern about the policy area is seen as a 
major reason for the emergence of the issue community, "Ministers and 
their associated pressure groups often conflict over details of policy 
but generally they share a commitment to ... that policy area" 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979:30). The common concerns encourage interest 
groups to become involved in the latter phases of the process as the 
groups may be unwilling to leave the institutions to process issues that 
they have have identified or politicised. In some cases the interest 
groups may be wary of the intentions of the institutional actors with 
regard to the processing of the issue and may remain active to reduce 
the possibility of the issue being removed from the agenda. 
The pattern of interaction between members of the issue community 
may well differ in each phase of the policy process. Issues will emerge 
onto the agenda in various ways. A single group may succeed in placing 
an issue on the agenda which may increase the groups importance in the 
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issue community. Other groups with an interest in the issue may be 
encouraged to become involved in the processing of the issue, the group 
which successfully promotes an issue attracts other groups into the 
issue community, what Henning (1970) describes as the "whirlpool 
effect". Schattschneider (1957) claims that the involvement of interest 
groups depends on the groups perceptions and awareness of the "issue". 
As the issue becomes more visible in the policy arena the style and 
level of debate or negotiation between actors increases. This leads to 
increased interaction over issues, (although Schattschneider uses the 
term "intensity"). The development of the level of visibility and 
intensity of interest group interaction has the effect of increasing the 
scope of the "policy conflict" (Schattschneider, 1957), which can be 
equated to the extent of interaction over policy issues. 
Issue Emergence  
It is considered that "the emergence of issues as opposed to the 
processing of issues that have already emerged has been relatively 
neglected" (Richardson and Jordan, 1979:79) in the literature. How and 
why issues are placed on the policy agenda are important, and crucial, 
influences on the interaction bewteen policy actors. One could expect 
to find the development of a different pattern of interest group 
interaction over issues that emerge onto the agenda in response from 
pressure from an interest group as distinct from the interaction that 
arises from issues that are introduced onto the policy agenda by 
institutional actors. This proposal can be tested through the 
examination of the issues forming the case studies (see Chapters Four 
and Five) of interaction as they represent alternative methods of issue 
emergence. 
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As an increasing number of studies in the public policy literature 
have begun to examine the agenda setting process, the deficiency in the 
literature over this phase of the policy process identified by 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) is gradually being overcome. Examples of 
this literature include the work by Stringer and Richardson (1980), Cobb 
and Elder (1983) and Hogan (1986). The extent to which an interest 
group is an "active" or "passive" participant in the agenda setting 
process may influence their interaction with the institutions. If an 
issue is identified by a specific group the institution may offer that 
particular group an "insider" position in the processing of that issue. 
In the preceding discussion the traditional role of interest groups 
as "issue politicisers" was viewed as being manifestly inadequate as an 
explanation of their interaction within the policy process, given that 
such groups are involved in the processing of the issues and may even be 
important actors in the implementation of policy. Interest groups do 
however provide one means by which issues can be identified. As 
Richardson and Jordan state; 
pressure groups [are]... performing an important role in the 
policy process- namely helping in the process of problem 
identification. The first stage in any ...policy process must be 
effective problem identification, and groups may well be more 
efficient at this than official policy making structures. 
(1979:85) 
Once interest groups have identified a particular issue they then 
attempt to get the issue placed on the policy agenda. In order to do so 
the issue must be recognised as important by the institutional actors 
who act as the "gate keepers" over the demands of interest groups 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979). The more important the issue the more 
likely it is to be placed on the agenda. This is supported by the fact 
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that "thousands of demands are made (on governments) each year, but only 
a small proportion of these demands are taken onboard by the political 
system, debated and possibly acted upon. Most are still born or suffer a 
premature death" (Richardson and Jordan, 1979:80 - original emphasis). 
What distinguishes those issues that are placed on the agenda from 
those that suffer the high mortality rate expected for the majority of 
myriad of demands made on institutional actors is that the former 
contain problems that cannot be displaced (removed by the emergence of 
new, more important issues), totally ignored, Or recognised as being to 
difficult to resolve, resulting in what Bachrach and Baratz designated 
"non decision making" (1962). 
One of the most interesting studies of issue emergence was 
undertaken by Anthony Downs. Downs developed what has become known as 
the "issue attention cycle" to explain how issues can be placed on the 
agenda. He argues that issues go through a series of stages beginning 
with the "pre problem stage", where an issue may only be recognised by a 
small number of actors, moving through the stage of "alarmed discovery 
and euphoric enthusiasm" into the next stage of "realising the cost of 
significant progress". The final stages of the cycle are the "gradual 
decline of public interest" and the "post problem stage". (Downs, 1972, 
Richardson and Jordan, 1979). In the final stage the issue has been 
replaced by more urgent issues on the agenda although it is "still in a 
slightly better position (in terms of attention from policy makers) than 
stage 1" (Richardson and Jordan, 1979:91). The issue attention cycle is 
depicted in Figure 2:4, following. 
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FIGURE: 2:4 
THE ISSUE ATTENTION CYCLE 
STAGE 	 CHARACTERISTICS 
1.PRE PROBLEM STAGE Occurs when an issue has not yet yet 
captured much public attention, even 
though some experts or interest 
groups may be concerned with it. 
2. ALARMED DISCOVERY 
AND EUPHORIC 
ENTHUSIASM 
As a result of publicity, or the 
eruption of some dramatic series of 
events the issue is discovered by 
the public who expect that the 
problem can be solved. 
3. REALISING THE COST OF 
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS 
The problems and costs of solving 
gradualy emerge, and impediments 
to a quick solution to the problem 
become apparent. 
4. GRADUAL DECLINE IN 
PUBLIC INTEREST 
This may arise from a realisation 
of the difficulties of solving the 
problem, or a displacement of the 
issue through the emergence of new 
issues into Stage 2. 
5. POST-PROBLEM STAGE The issue moves into a prolonged 
limbo, 	a "twilight realm" of lesser 
attention. The issue does however 
have a higher 	 profile than that 
experienced in the Pre-Problem Stage. 
From: A. Downs (1972) 
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The interest group may use a range of strategies to increase 
the visibilty of the issue and to enhance the issues identification. A 
favoured means of ensuring that an issue will be considered by the 
institutional actors is to utilise the media. Richardson and Jordan 
state that "virtually all pressure groups seek media publicity for their 
cause or interest, (however) they may not seek media coverage as their 
prime target" (1979:89) but merely to increase the visibility of the 
issue. The use of the media may well decline once an issue is placed on 
the agenda, although it remains a potent force by which an interest 
group can increase public awareness, if not sway public opinion, over 
their issue. Politicians, with a greater degree of receptiveness to 
public or electorate pressure than members of the bureaucracy, may be 
"prime targets" of interest group media campaigns. The media is 
important in the emergence of issues; if for no other reason than to 
provide the interest group a means of publicising their concerns. 
Alternate strategies for interest groups aimed at placing issues 
on the agenda may involve the notion of "issue packaging" (Hogan, 1986) 
where the interest groups provide a politcal party with some issue that 
can be incorporated into the party's platform, or making the most of 
previously conferred "insider" status to facilitate access of further 
issues onto the agenda. More often than not the link between interest 
groups and political party platforms are difficult to identify as many 
other factors may affect the development of a platform. The ability of 
interest groups to maximise their proximity to departmental or 
bureaucratic actors may be important, and help encourage conditions of 
clientelism identified earlier. The strategy adopted by the interest 
group will depend on whether the issue was initiated by the group or 
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whether they are interacting in reaction to institutional action in 
placing issues on the agenda. 
Once an issue is placed on the agenda, assuming it is not a 
candidate for "non decision making", it can be considered to have 
entered the second phase of the policy process, concerned with the 
processing of the issue, or in many cases deciding what is the issue. 
The "issue processing" phase of the policy process is where interest 
group interaction is maximised; the issue may be at its most visible and 
the issue community may be at its maximum. Since the stages of the 
policy process prior to the implementation of a policy may be critical 
in determining the form the final decision takes, interest groups may 
maximise their efforts in influencing this process. 
The Processing of Issues:  
This phase of the policy process is the locus of interaction 
within the issue community. During the processing of issues increasing 
numbers of actors are drawn into the interaction network including 
institutions and interest groups not involved directly in the emergence 
of the issue. The processing of the issue may lead to a closer 
definition of what comprises the issue or problem. Since the definition 
of the issue is the role of the institutional actors, such redefinition 
that occurs may be concerned with a re-orientation of the interest 
group's perception of what is on the agenda. If the interest groups 
perceive the issue to be defined in a particularly narrow direction they 
may attempt to broaden the scope of the issue. The most important aspect 
of this phase of the policy process is the introduction or development 
of policy machinery to facilitate the processing of the issue, which in 
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turn will create a policy that can be implemented as the final stages of 
the policy process. 
The development of a consultative mechanism to incorporate 
members of the issue community may highlight the importance of the 
interaction between different policy actors in the development of 
policy. Although "issues are handled in a multiplicity of fashions" 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979:97) including the negative actions involved 
in "non-decision making" or "agenda control", Richardson and Jordan 
claim that there is a "preferred relationship" that institutional actors 
attempt to establish with interest groups. Richardson and Jordan argue 
that the development of such a relationship generally suits the interest 
groups involved as they are familiar with the system and the process of 
interaction. (Richardson and Jordan, 1979). 
The preferred relationship in the processing of issues is to 
"internalise the required debate within some structure or institution" 
(Richardson and Jordan 1979:116). Internalising debate serves two 
purposes. It encourages the involvement of interest groups within some 
ordered framework and secondly enables institutional actors to maintain 
order over the interaction of these groups. It is claimed that 
over time any governmental/interest group relationship 	 over a 
matter of substance will evolve a special machinery such as a 
standing 	 commmitee 	 [or] 	 joint 	 advisory 	 commitee. 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979:98) 
Interest groups concerned with 	 maintaining 	 close 	 proximity 	 to 	 the 
centre of decision making will tend to support the creation of such 
machinery. 
One of the problems that may emerge is that the machinery may be 
unable 	 to 	 adequately 	 incorporate 	 interest 	 groups. 	 Such 	 advisory 
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committees may have "second string" status, reflecting their use as 
devices to placate groups rather than to encourage interaction, as 
discussed in an earlier section. For mal institutional structures may 
exist but this machinery may be li mited to institutional me mbers. 
As marine resource policy involves considerable overlays in 
responsibility between the Commonwealth and State governments the 
machinery may be devised to reduce the level of intergovernmental 
disputation, however such machinery may be inadequate to represent the 
non-institutional actors, or for that matter specific issues that are 
localised or regional in character, not involving intergovern mental 
interaction. 
This study advances the proposition that the emergence of issue 
communities and particularly the interaction between interest groups and 
institutional actors over the develop ment of policy will lead to the 
creation of new "machinery" which can adequately involve these groups in 
the processing of the issue. Richardson and Jordan state that both sets 
of actors prefer this machinery to take some regular form, avoiding ad 
hoc bodies (1979). This supports, incidently, the view that institutions 
attempt as far as possible to retain some control over the interaction 
of the interest groups. This control is facilitated by the establishment 
of some formal relationship with these groups. 
The 	 extent 	 and 	 influence 	 of 	 institutional 	 control over 	 the 
involvement of interest groups is as important during the processing of 
issue as it was in issue emergence. Once a commitment has been made to 
resolve a particular proble m or to place a particular issue on the 
agenda the politicians rely on the bureaucrats to keep the issue under 
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control. "The civil [public] servant who cannot "manage" his [interest] 
group is a liabilty to his Minister" (Richardson and Jordan, 1979:101). 
Interest groups will tend to avoid falling offside with members of the 
bureaucracy, "the task of the civil servant and his counterpart on the 
pressure group side is to minimise conflict" (Richardson and Jordan, 
1979:101) during the processing of issues. 
Issue processing involves the members of the issue community 
interacting within the terms of reference set by the machinery 
introduced to resolve the "issue". Neither the institutional actors nor 
interest groups will attempt to force the issue away from the machinery 
set up to facilitate its processing; the former actors want to maintain 
control and to ensure that the interaction remains manageable, the 
latter sets of actors want to avoid being displaced by other groups 
perceived as being less disruptive and who may be prepared to trade-off 
their outsider status with agreed co-operation with the institution. 
This reflects the importance of the issue community in enabling 
interaction to occur which leads to the development of particular 
policies. 
Implementation:  
The implementation phase of the policy process has, like the 
emergence of issues, attracted increasing analysis in the literature. 
Much of this analysis has concentrated on the apparent increase in what 
has been termed policy failure following collapse of the policy 
machinery. Attention to policy failure emerged from the first major 
publication in this field by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). Pressman and 
Wildavsky focussed on institutional failure associated with breakdowns 
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in the implementation of policy, which has set the scene for most other 
studies of implementation. These studies focus on the institutional 
aspects of policy failure. Relative neglect of the impact of interest 
groups in the implementation process has occurred as a result of this 
focus on the policy machinery and its performance in this phase of the 
process. 
This neglect may have arisen from the perception that the 
implementation of policy remains firmly in the control of these 
institutions. More recent studies have argued that the involvement of 
relevant interest groups may be essential to ensure the success of the 
implementation of policy. Richardson and Jordan state that "much of 
policy implementation depends on the goodwill and co-operation of 
participant groups for its success" (1979:131). Such co-operation is 
particularly relevant in the implementation of marine resource 
management policies as the major resource users comprise the key 
interest groups. 
A further factor contributing to the neglect of interest group 
interaction during the implementation phase of the policy process may 
result from the tendency to regard the announcement of the 
implementation of policy as concluding the passage of a particular issue 
through the policy process. The attitude may well be that 
once a decision is reached, once a policy is announced...there 
is a tendency for the issue concerned to leave the agenda 
[as]... the problem has been solved. 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979:143) 
Although the institutions may regard the implementation of a 
policy as concluding a particular "issue agenda" the interest groups may 
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continue to urge changes or to highlight perceived weaknesses or 
limitations in the policy. The interest groups may be important agents 
for identifying areas where policy , termination may be needed, or where 
policy failure has occured. This role may well contibute to the 
emergence of new issues as part of the continuation of the policy cycle  
(Hogwood and Peters, 1983). The ability of interest groups to force 
changes in policy may be limited as it will be recognised by the policy 
makers that "a policy that can be eroded or sabotaged by a powerful 
group or agency is not worth the paper it is written on" (Richardson and 
Jordan, 1979:153). 
2:8 ISSUE COMMUNITIES, THE POLICY PROCESS AND INTERACTION: 
A SUMMARY. 
This chapter has, through expanding some of the issues underpinning 
the issue Community model, discussed some of the issues that are 
involved in analysing the interaction between policy actors on the 
development of policy. This discussion wil facilitate analysis of the 
interaction between the institutions and interest groups concerned with 
issues surrounding either fisheries or offshore hydrocarbons policy. 
The utility of the issue community approach derives from its 
premise that interest groups are involved in all phases of the policy 
process. Such a perspective argues that interest groups have a broader 
role than simply remaining as politicisers of issues. The development of 
issue communities involves the processing of issues and may even 
influence the implementation of policy. The involvement of marine 
resource users in management of such resources can enhance the 
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development of policy as these groups may provide policy makers with 
important data on resource stock levels or reserves. Given that the 
management of marine resources is an inexact science, as resource 
assessments are difficult to make, information provided by the resource 
users on the impacts of proposed policies may be particularly important. 
The involvement of interest groups may also facilitate the 
processing of complex issues where implementation of particular policies 
relies upon the commitment of these groups. In such a case the 
co-option of particular groups into the policy process through the 
establishment of a structure that contains these interest groups may 
enhance the processing of the issue. Where an issue involves federal or 
jurisdictional overlays which increase the number of actors involved in 
the interaction network, the possibility of the issue being resolved 
through existing structures may diminish, encouraging the development of 
these structures that incorporate the members of the issue community. 
The interaction of interest groups is not as unrestricted as the 
pluralist theorists would postulate, but is controlled or managed in 
some degree by institutions through such devices as issue definition and 
the various measures of agenda  control, as well as by constraints posed 
by the structure of the policy environment. This policy environment 
includes regional, legislative and constitutional variables that both 
implicitlty 	 and 	 explicitly 	 provide 	 significant 	 influences 	 on 	 the 
interaction between members of particular issue communities. The 
following chapter examines some of the variables from within the policy 
environment that concern the development of marine resource policy in 
Bass Strait, and which influence the interaction between interest groups 
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and institutions. These variables have considerable influence in the 
creation of issue communities, as they provide additional parameters 
within which interaction takes place. 
One such variable is the distribution of the resource base 
through the region, introduced briefly in the following chapter prior 
to a more detailed analysis in subsequent chapters. The resource base 
provides the impetus for resource management from which the issues which 
form the empirical analysis are directly related. The management of 
these resources involves the development of policies that are linked to 
another variable within the policy environment, the political and 
legislative aspects Of what has been termed "Australian offshore 
federalism" (Cullen, 1985). Not only has the evolution of offshore 
federalism been a significant source of inter-governmental tension since 
the mid 1960s, but such a development has important effects on the 
implementation of both fisheries and offshore oil and gas policy. 
Chapter Three examines the evolution of Commonwealth-State 
relations from initial developments in inter-governmental co-ordination, 
as a result of the discovery of hydrocarbons in Bass Strait in the early 
1960s, to the introduction of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement 
(OCS) in the late 1970s. This leads to an analysis of the 
administrative regimes for these resources developed as part of the OCS. 
The OCS "legislative packages" are administered by an institutional 
framework at both Commonwealth and State level which support these regimes 
It is this institutional framework that is the focus of interest group 
interaction in the development of particular issue communities. 
CHAPTER THREE 
MARINE RESOURCE POLICY IN BASS STRAIT: 
REGIONAL, POLITICAL, LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND. 
3:1 INTRODUCTION. 
The development of marine resources policy in Bass Strait occurs as 
a result of the interaction between a range of different policy actors 
forming the issue community. The issue community is found within a 
policy environment which incorporates several key elements, chiefly 
influenced by parameters set by the political and legislative framework 
surrounding the Australian federal political system. The implementation 
of management policies concerned with fisheries and/or offshore oil and 
gas is also influenced by the particular characteristics of the region, 
particular related to the distribution of the relevant resource base. 
The previous chapter has provided a framework within which the 
analysis of particular issues related to the management of marine 
resources can be undertaken. It is argued that the interaction of actors 
comprising major institutions and interest groups at both the 
Commonwealth and State levels of government exerts an important 
influence on the process and output in this particular area of policy, 
but such interaction is ineffective within the existing institutional 
structure. The existence of overlays in responsibilty between the two 
tiers of government (Commonwealth and State) in both fisheries and 
offshore oil and gas policy making increases the numbers of institutions 
or agencies involved, increases problems of co-ordination between these 
agencies and raises the potential for conflicts between the Commonwealth 
and the States. 
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The develop ment of any aspect of mariti me policy inevitably 
involves the issue of jurisdiction as the atte mpts to develop and 
enforce laws are more complex in the marine domain since such actions 
may lead to disputes over the legal co mpetence of the particular 
legislative authority. The legal management of marine resources is made 
more difficult due to the co m mon property characteristics of these 
resources. The concern of coastal states to develop jurisdiction over 
the marine environment has been a key factor in martitime policy from 
the early seventeenth century, when the first attempts at promulgating 
mariti me laws occurred (Couper 1978). In Bass Strait, issues of 
jurisdiction, related to the evolution of Australian 'offshore federalism 
since the mid 1950s, have had a major impact on, fisheries and oil and gas 
policy. Interaction bet ween policy actors takes place in an 
institutional 	 framework and 	 policy environ ment constrained by the 
influences of this federal system. 
This chapter ai ms to illustrate the i mportance of the regional, 
political (including legislative) and institutional variables which make 
up the policy environment on the interaction between policy actors. 
These variables are particularly important; providing the political and 
legislative background to the management of fisheries and offshore oil 
and gas resource base in Bass Strait. The region provides an unique 
policy environment, as it involves the sole internal maritme boundary 
between Australian States, hence policy making is not complicated by the 
application of the "external affairs" powers of the Australian 
Constitution, which is integral to the maritime boundary agreements 
of the Timor Sea and Torres Strait. 
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3.2 BASS STRAIT - LOCATION AND DEFINITION 
Bass Strait, separating the island state of Tasmania from the 
mainland of Australia, has been described as "one of the most beautiful 
and, (yet) dangerous stretches of water in the southern hemisphere" 
(ABC, 1969:7) 	 This evocative and contradictory image derives from the 
extreme weather and sea conditions experienced in the Strait. 	 Bass 
Strait is a relatively shallow stretch of water, averaging between 25 
and 40 fathoms (45-75 metres) for most of its depth, and is located in 
the westerly wind stream on the margin of the appropriately named 
"Roaring Forties". 	 The combination of shallow depth and strong winds 
creates extreme sea conditions. 	 These weather conditions have been a 
limiting 	 factor 	 on 	 resource 	 exploitation, 	 with 	 both 	 fisheries 	 and 
offshore oil and gas resources dependent on moderate conditions. In 
recent times the introduction of semi-submersible drill rigs has removed 
many of the problems of drilling for oil or gas; however the drilling 
programme is still dependent on the presence of favourable weather 
conditions. 
Bass Strait is traditionally viewed as the stretch of water bounded 
by King Island and Cape Otway in the west and the Furneaux Group and 
Wilsons Promontory in the east. This is shown in Figure 3.1, below. A 
broader oceanographic definition includes the area of the continental 
shelf north-east of Flinders Island, to Cape Howe and Gabo Island on the 
border of Victoria and New South Wales. The use of the 200 metres 
isobath is a suitable criterion to draw in the margin of the continental 
shelf. This isobath is included on Figure 3.2, below. Baselines have 
also been developed for the administration of both fisheries and 
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hydrocarbon resources, which utilise latitude and longitudinal criteria. 
The Bass Strait Scallop management plan operates between longitudes 
143°30'E and 149°00'E and from the coast of Victoria to latitude 40°45'S 
until it meets the Tasmanian coast. 	 ( Figure 3.2 incorporates these 
baselines ) . 	 The boundaries for the allocation of oil and gas permits 
are somewhat different, with each State allocated an adjacent area for 
the purposes of ad ministration of the exploration and production 
programme. The 'adjacent areas' between Victoria and Tasmania are shown 
in Figure 3.3. 
The spatial boundaries of this study are as follows. 	 The western 
margin includes a line drawn southwards from Cape Ot way ( longitude 
143°00'E ) to latitude 40°45'S. The southern boundary of •the study area 
is along latitude 400451S to the Tasmanian coast, and then from Cape 
Portland in north east Tas mania eastwards on the sa me latitude to 
intersect with a line drawn southwards from Cape Howe, ( longitude 
149°53'E ) . This delimitation incorporates aspects of the boundaries 
drawn from oceanographic, historical and administrative criteria. 
For many people in Tasmania Bass Strait represents an aerial "half 
hour gutter between the mainland and the island state" ( Murray-Smith , 
1969:12 ) , the Strait comprises a surprisingly large amount of land. 
Murray-Smith indicates that there are 126 pieces of land in the Bass 
Strait region, ranging fro m sea stacks ( sheer rock pyra mids or 
pinnacles ) 	 to substantial islands ( Flinders , 	 Cape Barren and King 
Islands ) . The existence of these rocks, islets and islands support 
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3.3 MARINE RESOURCE BASE OF BASS STRAIT 
The resource base provides a focus of policy making. Management 
strategies concerned with resource utilization and regulation form the 
basis for marine resource policy. As a result the characteristics of 
the resources are an important feature of the policy environment. 
Bass Strait contains a range of marine natural resources, including 
Australia's major hydrocarbon production. Bass Strait supports a 
diverse fishery as well as minor resource-based industries, such as that 
based on the production of alginates from seaweed, and the harvesting of 
the mutton bird fro m Bass Strait rookeries. In ter ms of econo mic 
importance and significance the major resources are the hydrocarbons and 
fisheries. 
The oil and gas fields of Bass Strait contain a series of 
production facilities located off the Gippsland coast. The majority of 
these facilities are production platforms, although there are "sub sea 
production wells" connected by pipeline to other platforms. Some of 
these platfor ms are located on fields producing natural gas and oil. 
The characteristics of the oil and gas industry are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Five of the study. 
The Bass Strait fishery is particularly •diverse, harvesting both 
relagic and de mersal fin fish as well as molluscs; crustaceans and 
elasmobranchs (sharks). New fisheries based on cephalopod species 
(squid and octopus) have been investigated in Bass Strait, and may 
provide future development potential (Colins, 1986; Macdonald, 1986). 
The fisheries of Bass Strait are located near the margins of the 
coast, 	 with important, 	 and valuable, 	 abalone (Notohaliotosis ruber, 
61. 
Schismoses laevigata ) or southern rock lobster 	 (crayfish) 	 (Jasus 
novaehollandiae) fisheries found near the intertidal zone. 	 The scallop 
fishery, (Pecten meridonalis, Equichlamys bifrons 	 and Mimachlamys 
asperimus), although displaying variable pattern of catch, provides a 
potentially valuable fishery in Bass Strait. Examining the value of 
production of Bass Strait fisheries emphasises the importance of these 
mollusc and crustacean fisheries for the region. Tasmania's gross value 
of production for fisheries is made up of slightly less than 10% from 
fin fish (Tasmanian Year Book, 1984:395). The characteristics of the 
fisheries of Bass Strait are examined in more detail in Chapter Four. 
3.4 MARINE RESOURCE POLICY: POLITICAL, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Key Features of the Constitutional and Judicial Framework 
The arrangements of political and administrative structures so that 
responsibility for the development of policy and legislation is shared 
between various levels of government is a key feature of federalism 
(Herr, 1985). The development of Australia's marine resources policy is 
influenced greatly by the existence of a two tiered system of government 
between the Commonwealth and the States. Not only does this result in 
creation of some duplication in bureaucratic agencies, increasing the 
number of policy actors, but most significantly results in inter- 
governmental 	 relations 	 as 	 being 	 the 	 key 	 issue 	 surrounding 	 the 
development of resources policy. 
"Jurisdiction" refers to the power to make laws (Sharman, 1983), 
and as such has a significant influence on marine resources policy 
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making. 	 Sharman argues that the States "have the great bulk of law 
making power" (1983:189), although he identifies the area of offshore 
jurisdiction as one area where the Commonwealth's power to legislate was 
reinforced by High Court decisions (1983:191). In the development and 
implementation of marine policy generally, and marine resources policy 
specifically, the issues of federalis m and jurisdiction are i mportant 
frameworks within which the policy decisions are made, but also are key 
variables in their own right. 
The impact of federalism on policy making where the policy issue 
transcends the boundaries between the levels of government, has been 
considered by Ziegler (1980). Ziegler believes that the overlap in 
responsibility between the national and lower tiers of government acts 
as a constraint on the development of policy by increasing the number of 
policy actors and slowing down the process of decision making through 
increasing the co mplexity of negotiations (1980). This view of the 
impact of a federal political structure on policy making emphasises the 
i mpact of intergovern mental relations in the processing of policy 
"issues", considered in more detail in the subsequent case material. 
3:4:1 The Development of a Federal Structure of Marine Decision Making  
Prior to federation the Australian colonies were responsible for 
the development and administration of the fisheries off the adjacent 
coastlines (Harrison, 1982). The States retained control of fisheries 
following the federation of the colonies in 1901, although aspects of 
related policy areas such as navigation and the maintenance of lighthouses 
were specifically included as responsibilities of 	 the Commonwealth 
government in the Constitution. 	 The Constitution provided for the 
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Commonwealth to have responsibility for fisheries "beyond territorial 
limits" (Sec.51.xx), although there seemed to be little interest by the 
Commonwealth to act upon this power until the late 1940s, in part due to 
the uncertainty over where these limits occurred. The Commonwealth did 
sponsor attempts to establish to trawl fishery off the Australian coast, 
and undertook surveys of fish stocks in the period immediately prior to 
the First World War. After initial surveys in Bass Strait this research 
ended with the disappearance of the fisheries research vessel Endeavour 
in the south Tasman Sea in 1913 (Gilmour, 1969). 
The Australian Fisheries Act 1952  (Commonwealth) 
Folowing the Second World war the Commonwealth government moved to 
increase its influence in fisheries policy. International developments 
and the desire to strengthen the area of fisheries policy were probable 
influences on this action. 	 In the late 1940s consultation took place 
with the States over the future of fisheries policy. 	 The Commonwealth 
argued that the States' responsibilities ended at the end of the three 
mile 	 territorial 	 sea; 	 areas 	 outside 	 that 	 baseline 	 were 	 the 
responsibility of the Commonwealth (Harrison, 1982). The concurrence of 
the States on this issue was helped by the fact that the states regarded 
the limit of their territorial competence to be at the three mile limit 
(Harrison, 1982). The extensive Commonwealth-State negotiations, 
(including a special Premiers Conference in 1947) resulted in the 
introduction of the Australian Fisheries Act 1952. 
The Australian Fisheries Act  1952 gave the Commonwealth government 
responsibilities for part of fisheries policy and meant that henceforth 
this policy making would overlap between the States and the Commonwealth. 
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The potential for disputes over the jurisdiction of each level of 
government was emphasised by the ambiguous wording of Section 51.10 of 
the Constitution. The outer limits of the Commonwealth's jurisdiction 
were set by the declaration of proclaimed waters, which were "waters 
ddeclared by Proclamation under Section 7 of the Fisheries Act 1952 
(Cth)" (Cullen, 1985:App.A vi). The boundaries of these proclaimed 
waters were set at varying distances from the Australian coast, 
generally speaking about 200 miles from the •east, west and south coasts" 
(ALJR, 43 1969:275). Cullen (1985) emphasises that these proclaimed 
waters affected only Australian fishing vessels (emphasis added), and 
were concerned solely with fisheries. The inner limits were, as has 
been stated, considered to be at the three mile baseline. 
The 1967 Offshore Petroleum Agreement  
The discovery of hydrocarbons in the Gippsland basin in Bass Strait 
is detailed in Chapter Five. With the discovery of reserves of both oil 
and gas, pressike for a . reappraisal of the then existing jurisdictional 
arrangements occurred (Cullen, 1985; Wilkinson, 1983). The original 
permits were allocated in the absence of any Commonwealth legislation. 
The original exploration permit was allocated to BHP (later joned in the 
venture by ESSO Australia), by the State governments of Victoria, 
Tasmania and South Australia (Leigh, 1970; Trengove, 1975; Wilkinson, 
1983; Cullen, 1985). The Victorian government had passed the first 
specific legislation aimed at offshore oil and gas exploitation (the 
Undersea Mineral Resources Act 1963 (Vic. )), prior to the first 
exploration programme initiated in late 1964. The uncertainty of the 
question of jurisdiction over the Gippsland Basin and of Bass Strait 
generally led BHP to take out permits with all States (Leigh, 1970). 
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Prior to the successful oil and gas strikes in the Gippsland Basin 
attempts were made to resolve the constitutional position of legislation 
for offshore exploration. This topic had been discussed at a meeting of 
relevant ministers from both the Commonwealth and the States in 1962 
(Cullen, 1985). Decisions in the United States in the late 1940s "did 
nothing to dispel these doubts" (Cullen, 1985:10) over the vesting of 
jurisdiction in either the Commonwealth or the States. The question of 
offshore jurisdiction "was referred to the Standing Committee of the 
Commonwealth and State Attorney's General . . [which] concluded that 
the constitutional position was even more obscure than any one had 
previously thought" (Cullen, 1985:10). Cullen claims that the 
uncertainty over the question of jurisdiction, which, on the basis of 
the United States' experience, seemed to indicate that the states had 
particular rights in the offshore zone, "gave the Commonwealth and 
States an unusual equality of bargaining power as they began their 
discussions" (1985:11). As these discussions continued during the mid 
1960s the potential of the offshore oil and gas resources in the 
Gippsland Basin was becoming apparent, with both the Commonwealth and 
the States (particularly Victoria) wishing to maintain the impetus of 
exploration. 
The negotiations between the Commonwealth and the States were 
completed in 1967, and the results, which came to be known as the 1967 
Petroleum Agreement, were published. This agreement led to the 
introduction of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) and an 
associated legislative package. An important feature of the 1967 
Agreement was that it did not attempt to resolve the underlying question 
of jurisdiction, but instead the States and the Commonwealth undertook 
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to produce a regi me that would allow the continual develop ment of 
offshore hydrocarbons without raising the constitutional issues. This 
purpose was explicitly stated in the preamble of the Agreement which 
states inter alia: 
... the Governments of the Commonwealth and of the States have 
decided, 	 in 	 the 	 national 	 interest, 	 that, 	 without 	 raising 
questions concerning, and without derogating fro m, their 
respective constitutional powers, they should cooperate for the 
purpose of ensuring the legal effectiveness of authorities to 
explore for or to exploit petroleum resources... (Culen 1985:11) 
The constitutional issues were avoided through the introduction of 
mirror legislation into both the Commonwealth and State parliaments. 
Mirror legislation enabled the legislative basis for oil and gas 
exploration policy to 	 be 	 established, 	 with 	 the 	 sa me syste m of 
exploration permits and production licences to be undertaken by all 
governments. 	 The Petroleu m (Sub merged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) 
incorporated 	 a 	 legislative 	 package 	 which 	 set 	 up 	 "designated 
authorities", 	 responsible for the administration and management of 
offshore resources. The designated authorities were individuals 
nominated for the purpose of both the statute and the mining code within 
the Agree ment (Cullen, 1985). The designated authorities were 
responsible for the initial granting of exploration per mits, according 
to permit blocks within what became known as the "adjacent areas". A 
map of these areas can be found in an earlier section of this chapter. 
The process through which permits and licences were allocated will be 
discussed in Chapter Five. The use of the mirror legislation device 
enabled both the Commonwealth and State governments to encourage 
exploration without letting constitutional issues forestall 
developments. 
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The Constitutional status of the 1967 Agreement could be challenged 
as either the Commonwealth or the States attempted to assert primacy in 
offshore jurisdiction (Cullen, 1985). In order to investigate some of 
the constitutional questions surrounding offshore jurisdiction a Senate 
Select Committee was set up to inquire into offshore petroleum 
resources. 	 This committee was established in 1968 and presented its 
report in 1971 (Cullen, 1985:16). 	 Part of the purpose of the Senate 
Select Committee was to investigate criticisms of the 1967 Agreement, 
considered to have "so scrambled administraton between the Commonwealth 
and the States that there could be no adequate ministerial responsibility 
for either legislature" (Wettenhall, 1983:163). Criticism of the 1967 
Agreement was included in the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, (1976) known by the acronym RCAGA. 
The RCAGA inquiry examined the criticisms of the 1967 Agreement 
that the uses of the mirror legislation at the heart of the Agreement 
was not compatible with the conventions of ministerial responsibility 
under a Westminster system (RCAGA 1979, App.2:445). Sharing 
responsibility between the tiers of government negated these principles, 
as neither the Commonwealth or State Minister was solely responsible 
(RCAGA, 1979). As the RCAGA report notes "the constitutional question 
was, at the ti me, (1967) left unresolved. The High Court has 
subsequently (1975) decided that sovereignty resides in the Commonwealth 
of Australia" (1979, App. 2:444). The developments leading to this High 
Court decision, and reaction to it were fundamental in determining the 
political framework for marine resource policy making and management. 
The 1967 Agreement and the legislation which derived from it 
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provided a practical system for the management and administration of 
offshore hydrocarbon resources. 	 The Agreement did not, as has been 
stated, solve the constitutional questions surrounding the administration 
of these areas. 	 In the late 1960s the Commonwealth moved to establish 
its sovereignty over the offshore areas. 	 This attempt at establishing 
sovereignity occurred first with an abortive attempt by the Gorton 
government and then with the more successful legislation of the Whitlam 
government in 1973. 
Commonwealth Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill 1970 
The Liberal-Country Party coalition government of John Gorton 
attempted to act to resolve the issue of of fhsore jurisdiction when it 
introduced the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Bill (1970). This 
Bill "asserted the exclusive right of the Commonwealth to exercise 
sovereign control over the sea bed off the Australian coast from low 
water mark to the limits of the Continental Shelf" (Emy, 1974:204). The 
Bill was violently opposed by the States and individuals within the 
parliamentary Liberal and Country parties (Emy, 1974; Whitlam, 1983). 
The strong opposition to the Bill within the government resulted in the 
legislation being withdrawn, and has been seen as a contributing factor 
in the downfall of Gorton as leader of the Liberal Party, and as Prime 
Minister (Emy, 1974; Whitlam, 1983; 1985). The Bill lapsed when 
Gorton's successor as Prime Minister, Mr. McMahon, prorogued parliament 
for the 1972 elections when the coalition was defeated by the Whitlam 
led Australian Labor Party. 	 The fate of the "Gorton Bill" emphasises the 
importance of the States in the discussion of offshore federalism. 	 The 
"States 	 rights" 	 supporters 	 within the 	 federal 	 parliamentary Liberal 
69. 
Party, together with the State branches of the party, were able to force 
the Bill to be withdrawn. E.G. Whitlam states that "... Gorton was 
replaced by McMahon because he fell foul of the Liberal organisation in 
each State by insisting on federal control of those [offshore] 
resources" (1983:46). 
Although the "Gorton Bill" was withdrawn before it could become 
law, the "federal (Labor) opposition has made it clear that it supported 
the assertion of Commonwealth rights over the territorial sea and 
Continental Shelf" (Cullen, 1985:19). When in power the government 
introduced a similar Bill into the House of Representatives in 1973; the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Bill. 
Commonwealth Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
The election of the Whitlam-led Australian Labor party into 
government as a result of the December 1972 federal election led to a 
reappraisal of a wide range of policies. In terms of resources the 
Whitlam government believed in the Commonwealth government's 
pre-eminence in this aspect of policy making (Evans, 1977). The Whitlam 
government introduced the Seas and Submerged Lands Bill 1973 as part of 
this programme. The Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) was 
immediately challenged by the States, as it claimed Commonwealth 
sovereignty over the territorial sea from low water mark (Evans, 1977). 
The Seas and Submerged Lands Act was declaratory in nature (Evans, 1977) 
and attempted to resolve the issue of jurisdiction once and for all, by 
encouraging a High Court challenge by the States. As Cullen has 
commented, the final version of the Bill which received assent "in 
essence ... embodied the proposals put forward earlier by the Gorton 
government" (1985:21). 
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The challenge to the Commonwealth's power to legislate for control 
over the territorial sea involved all States, led by New South Wales. 
The Sea and Submerged Lands Case (New South Wales v. the Commonwealth 
135 C.L.R. 337) had its decision handed down in December 1975. The 
decision upheld the power of the Commonwealth to legislate to control 
the territorial sea, and vested sovereignty over offshore resources with 
the Commonwealth government. The defeat of the Whitlam government 
earlier in December 1975 meant that although the validity , of the 
legislation was upheld, the Whitlam government could not act upon the 
decision of the High Court. The election of the Liberal Coalition 
government, with a platform of "co-operative federalism", placed the 
issue of offshore jurisdiction back onto the political agenda. 
The Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) 
The Fraser government had no intention of implementing the Seas  
and Submerged Lands Act, given the States' opposition to the Gorton 
proposal. The States' position was made clear by their High Court 
challenge as well as the revolt within the Liberal party over the 
infringement of "States' rights" with the 1970 Bill. Ignoring the 
decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case the Liberal government 
tried to develop a means of returning the jurisdiction of part of the 
territorial sea to the States on the basis of the cooperative federalism 
programme. These issues formed the basis of a special Premiers 
Conference in 1977, which discussed the range of issues surrounding 
management of the offshore zone. The 1977 Premiers Conference resulted 
in an agreement between the Commonwealth and the States to return to the 
two tiered system of maritime jurisdiction. 
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This agree ment beca me known as the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement (OCS), and was "launched" in 1979. The OCS was described as 
being a "milestone in co-operative federalism" by the Commonwealth 
government, utilising a constitutional device to circumvent the High 
Court's action in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case. The OCS was a 
political not a constitutional solution, criticised for the fact that 
"there 	 was 	 no 	 opportunity 	 for 	 public, 	 industry 	 or 	 opposition 
participation in these dicussions" (Reid, 1980:63). The Commonwealth 
retained a constitutional "head of power" in the administration of the 
territorial sea as a result of the decisions of the seas and submerged 
case (1976, C.L.R. 337). The OCS provided a means of reducing the 
intergovernmental tension which had arisen following the enactment of 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act  (1973). 
The OCS gave the States exclusive control between low water mark 
and the three mile limit. Outside the three mile limit the OCS proposed 
the creation of joint authorities between the Commonwealth and State 
governments that would manage the marine resources. The OCS made 
specific mention of the handing to the States of "day to day" 
responsibiity for the ad ministration of petroleu m resources, while 
fisheries were to be organised so that, as far as possible, a single set 
of laws (either Commonwealth or State) would cover them. The fisheries 
negotiations have taken far longer to resolve, and the fisheries 
component of the OCS was finalised in June 1986. 
The main difference between the OCS and the earlier 1967 Agreement 
(apart from involving a broader range of marine policy areas), was that 
the "actual agreement between the parties resulting from the offshore 
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negotiations 	 has 	 not 	 been 	 published" 	 (Culen, 	 1985:68). 	 The 
Commonwealth did publish what became known as the "Agreed Arrangements" 
in a publicity kit, entitled Offshore Australia  released by the Attorney 
General's department (1980). The agreed arrangements are reproduced 
below. 
Figure 3:4 
OCS AGREED 	 ARRANGEMENTS 
The Agreed Arrangements provided that: 
I. The area involved would be li mited to a territorial sea of 3 
nautical miles irrespective of whether Australia subsequently 
moved to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. 
2. The Commonwealth Parliament would pass legislation to give 
each State the same powers with respect to the territorial ilea 
(Including the seabed) as it would have had if the territorial 
sea had been within the limits of • State. 
3. The Commonwealth Parliament would pass legislation to vest in 
each State prop ii 	 y rights and title in respect of the 
seabed of the territorial seal. 
6. 	 The Commonwealth Parliament would make consequential 
amendments to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 to ensure 
that Suite laws passed under the legislation mentioned in 2. 
and 3. would not be invalidated by that Act. 
5. Off-shore petroleum operations outside the territorial sea 
would be regulated by Commonwealth legislation alone, 
consisting of an amended Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 
(Cth.), although day-to-day administration would continue to 
be in the hands of each State. 
6. Off-shore petrolen• operations in the territorial sea would be 
regulated by State legislation alone although the Common 
Mining Code would be retained as far as practicable. 
7. Arrangements would be made to institute • regime for the 
mining of off-shore minerals other than petroleum In the same 
format as described in 5. find 6. 
S. 	 New arrangements would be introduced to enable single 
fisheries to be regulated by one set of laws, Commonwealth or 
State as agreed between the parties. 
9. The Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (COI.) would be amended so 
that it would be applicable to waters adjacent to a State or 
the Northern Territory only with the consent of that State or 
Territory. • 
10. The Crest Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth.) would 
continue to apply to the whole of the Crest Barrier Reef 
region as defined in that Act and the rights and title to be 
vested in respect of the seabed of the territorial sea would 
be subject to the operation of that Act. Other marine parks 
would be the subject of Commonwealth/State consultation. 
11. An agreed scheme of complementary Commonwealth/State 
legislation would be put in place to ensure that an 
appropriate body of Australian criminal law would be 
applicable off-shore. 
12. The regulation of shipping and navigation would be divided 
between the States and the Commonwealth with the Commonwealth 
being responsible for trading 	 Is on interstate or 
overseas voyages, drilling vessels, and the implementation of 
an Australian shipping register. The parties would also 
implement the Uniform Shipping iAlis Code published in the 
Commonwealth of Australia Casette on 28 December 1979. 
13. Commonwealth legislation would continue to control ship-
sourced marine pollution. 
14. The Northern Territory would be treated as • State for the 
purposes of the Settlement. 
Cullen (1985:68-70) 
The OCS was established by the use of Section 51.xxxviii of the 
Constitution, which allowed the States to request the Commonwealth to 
legislate on areas of mutual concern. A feature of the OCS was the 
introduction of complementary legislation at both Commonwealth. and State 
levels. Unlike the earlier system used in the 1967 Agreement, the 
legislation was not aimed as a "mirror" but to separate the areas of 
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responsibility clearly. 	 The Fraser government made it clear to the 
States that it did not expect to take unilateral action over marine 
resources policy, and that the concept of "cooperative federalism" was 
at the centre of the OCS scheme. 
The keys to the legislative design of the OCS were the Coastal  
Waters (State Powers) and (State Titles) Acts 1980. This legislation 
was to be introduced concurrently into the Commonwealth and State 
parliaments, 	 together with a range of legislation concerned with 
fisheries, petroleum, crimes at sea and historic ship wrecks. 	 Most of 
this legislative package comprised amendments to existing legislation to 
bring them into line with the OCS agreed arrangements. A non-petroleum 
minerals regime was envisaged as part of the original settlement, and 
although this legislation was passed at the Commonwealth level, no such 
legislation has yet been introduced by the States (Culen, 1985). 
The passage of the OCS emphasises the impact of federalism in the 
development of marine resources policy. Bass Strait fisheries and oil 
and gas policy has been greatly influenced by the evolution of offshore 
federalism which at times was external to issues of resource management. 
The period of time from initial discussions over the OCS to the 
implementation of the resource management or administrative packages was 
lengthly, with the agreement over the fisheries component made in 1985, 
eight years after the OCS was first mooted. Unlike the 1967 Agreement 
the OCS made the position vis a vis the Commonwealth and States clear; 
following the High Court decision in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case 
the States had everything to gain by supporting the OCS concept. The 
relative importance of hydrocarbons and fisheries can be gauged from the 
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fact that from the earliest stages the focus was on the need to develop 
a regime for administration of oil and gas exploration. Administration 
of fisheries was to be resolved "later". 
The OCS Administrative Regimes for Hydrocarbons and Fisheries Management 
The petroleum package of the OCS was, according to the "agreed 
arrangements", (included earlier in this chapter), similar to the 
framework developed out of the 1967 Agreement. The relevant State 
Ministers were to be the "designated authorities", and day to day 
administration of the areas adjacent to their State 	 were to be in their 
hands. This role continued outside 	 the three mile baseline, separating 
Commonwealth and State responsibility, although policy outside this line 
was developed in co-operation between the Commonwealth and the States. 
Inside the three mile limit the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act  1980 
(Cth. ) gave the States sole responsibilty for oil and gas policy. 
The Commonwealth Government, through the Minister for Primary 
Industry, gave a commitment to implement the fisheries package as soon 
as discussions were concluded with all States and the Northern Territory 
at the Australian Fisheries Council (AFC) meeting in Darwin in July 
1985. This announcement was made in conjunction with the release of a 
management regime for the scallop fishery in Bass Strait, discussed in a 
subsequent chapter. The scallop fishery was acknowledged by the DPI as 
the most difficult fishery to administer under the OCS, due to problems 
posed by a lack of agreement between the States of Tasmania and Victoria 
over the future management of the fishery. The announcement of the 
opening of the Bass Strait scallop fishery in June 1986 was made in 
conjunction with an statement from the DPI that this management regime 
was the first part of the OCS fisheries package to be implemented. 
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The aim of the fisheries component of the OCS was to allow a single 
fishery to• be controlled and managed by a single law, either 
Commonwealth or State, as agreed by the different parties. This led to 
the development of a variety of management categories: First a 
particular species could be managed solely as a Commonwealth 
responsibilty. A second category would allow a fishery to be managed as 
a State responsibilty. A third category of a joint system of 
Commonwealth-State management was envisaged. A fourth category, 
maintaining the status quo was also expected to be part of the final OCS 
system. It was expected that where agreement is reached that a 
particular fishery should be managed by a State, that State would have 
responsibilty, where biologically necessary, for the mangement of the 
resource from low water mark to the edge of the Australian Fishing Zone, 
(AFZ). 
3:4:2 Institutions and Agencies Responsible for Marine Resource Policy  
in Bass Strait. 
The previous section has indicated how the federal system of marine 
resource administration has developed. The basic pattern of 
Commonwealth-State shared jurisdiction which evolved from Federation and 
the 1952 Fisheries Act and the 1967 Petroleum Agreement has been 
strengthened by the development of the OCS. Within this federal 
structure, policy is developed by agencies at each level which at times 
may lead to overlays in responsibility. Increasing the number of policy 
making institutions has an obvious effect in increasing problems of 
co-ordination between them, incerasing the potential for disputes 
between the different institutions at each tier of government. Ziegler's 
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(1980) criticism of such overlays in policy making is interesting, it is 
claimed that such overlays lengthen the process of implementing policy. 
Counter to this argument is a view that the existence of an 
institutional framework with responsibility for policy shared between a 
number of actors broadens the issue communtiy and increases inputs into 
the process of resource management. 
(i) Current Institutional Structure: Oil and Gas Policy in Bass Strait. 
The OCS provided the States with the day-to-day administration of 
offshore oil and gas programmes (Cullen 1985). In Bass Strait the 
location of the Gippsland Basin production facilities gives the 
Victorian Oil and Gas Division of the Office of Minerals and Energy 
pre-eminent position in the management of these resources. The Victorian 
government has had a twenty year association with the exploitation of 
offshore hydrocarbons, and has considerable expertise in the management 
of these resources. Tasmania lacks any production facilities in its 
sector of Bass Strait, but nonetheless is involved in administering an 
increasing exploration effort, particularly in 1985-86, in the Bass 
Basin. Interms of policy initiatives, the most important institutional 
actors are the Commonwealth Department of rseources and Energy, (DRE) 
and the Bureau of Mineral Resources, (BMR), who have responsibility for 
the development and implementation of Commonwealth government policy on 
royalties, excise and pricing. The BMR also provides technical and 
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(i) Commonwealth Agencies: The DRE and BMR.  
The DRE comprises a number of divisions; the most significant for 
offshore hydrocarbon policy is the "petroleum division". The BMR forms a 
semi-autonomous organisation within the ambit of the DRE, with specific 
functions related to resource surveys and analysis. The DRE is 
responsible for policy development and programme administration 
in relation to exploration for, and development of, the nation's 
minerals and energy resources. 
(CGD 2RE Apr. 1984:1) 
The structure of the DRE is indicated below in Figure 3:5. The Petroleum 
Division of the DRE 
provides advice on exploration for production, refining, supply 
and distribution of, and contribution to government revenue from, 
petroleum and related issues. 
(CGD 2RE Apr. 1984:6) 
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Specific responsibilities of the Division relating to offshore oil 
and gas programmes include the 
administ[ration of] Commonwealth responsibilities in relation to: 
the exploration and exploitation of the petroleum resources of 
the continental shelf ... clearance of all of fshore.exploration 
and development activities such as seismic surveys and drilling 
.... and consultation with officials of State and Northern 
Territory 	 mines 	 department 	 on 	 administrative 	 matters. 
(CGD 2RE Apr. 1984: 7) 
In addition to consultation with State and Terrritory ministers and 
departments the Division "consults with industry through individual 
companies and industry associations such as the the Australian Petroleum 
Exploration Association (APEA )" (CG D2RE Apr. 1984:8) This formal 
arrangement with APEA will be examined in more detail in Chapter Five, 
as it is an important linkage between major actors. 
The BMR is primarily concerned with providing 	 technical or 
scientific data input into policy deliberations. "It is the 
responsibility of the Bureau to develop an integrated, comprehensive, 
scientific understanding of the geology of the Australian continent • • • 
[and] the Australian offshore area" (CGD 2RE Apr. 1984: 23). The BMR is 
structured into separate divisions, see Figure 3:5, with the Division 
of 	 Marine 	 Geosciences 	 and 	 Petroleum 	 Geology 	 "responsible 	 for 
undertak[ing] 	 regional 	 offshore 	 geological 	 and 	 geophysical 
investigations 	 [and] 	 analys[ing] 	 and 	 intergrat[ing] 	 of shore 	 petroleum 
company data" 	 (CGD 2RE Apr • 1984: 24). An example of the BMR's 
involvement in Bass Strait oil and gas policy can be illustrated 	 by 
reference to the Fortescue/West Halibut dispute. The BMR was called to 
provide a geologic proof that oil from the newly discovered BHP-ESSO 
Fortescue field was not the same structure as the nearby Halibut field. 
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This proof was used to resolve questions whether the oil from Fortescue 
would be regarded as "old or "new" oil in the royalty and pricing regime 
introduced by the Commonwealth government. Wilkinson (1983: 61-63) 
provides a discussion of the of the Fortescue issue and the importance 
of the BMR's proof on the development of the Fortescue field which, as 
"new oil", received import parity pricing. This is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Five. 
(iii) Institutional structure - Oil and Gas Policy (Victoria)  
In Victoria the Office of Minerals and Energy within the "super 
department" of Industry, Technology and Resources, is responsible for 
the administration of the Gippsland Basin oil and gas fields. Within 
this office the main administration is carried out by the Oil and Gas 
Division. The Oil and Gas Division 
regulates the exploration for and production of petroleum from 
both onshore and offshore Victoria, including trhe approval of 
geophysical surveys and the design, construction, operation and 
maintenance of offshore platforms and pipelines conveying crude 
oil, natural gas [and] gas liquids. 
(Vic. Govt. Direct. 1985: 132.) 
The Oil and Gas Division claims considerable expertise in hydrocarbons 
management. It has attracted staff through active outside recruitment 
and secondments to and from industry. The long association of the 
Victorian government bureaucracy with the exploration and 
production of Bass Strait oil and gas is emphasised by this agency. 
(iv) Institutional structure - Oil and Gas Policy (Tasmania)  
Given that there are no production facilities in the Tasmanian 
sector (or "adjacent area") of Bass Strait, the role of the Tasmanaian 
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Mines Department is chiefly concerned with allocating exploration 
permits and evaluating drilling programmes. Successful strikes in 
1985-86 may lead to further drilling, with possibility of production 
from these "wildcat" wells. The current Tasmanian government has 
responded to this increased offshore developmental activity by creating 
a new Resource Development, Planning and Policy Branch (RDP&P) within 
the Mines Department, as well as increasing recruitment of petroleum 
geologists to other sectors of the department. 
(v) Current Institutional Structures: Fisheries Policy in Bass Strait  
The 	 OCS 	 "agreed 	 arrangements" 	 reinforced 	 the 	 institutional 
structure of fisheries management that has existed since the enactment 
of the Australian Fisheries Act (1952).  The States of Tasmania and 
Victoria have had a long history of fisheries administration, with 
agencies responsible for aspects of fisheries management predating 
Federation (Harrison 1980, 1982). The responsibilities of the State and 
Commonwealth fisheries administrations are set by the legislation as 
introduced or amended by the OCS, with negotiations completed over the 
administration of the scallop fishery in Bass Strait. 
In any area of public policy the structure of the institutions 
responsible for the development and/or implementation of policy can have 
major influence on the policy output. The importance of these 
institutions as focal points in the issue communtiy has been examined in 
Chapter Two, and will be reinforced in the discussion of the case 
studies. The institutional actors have a significant influence in the 
interaction process but are also influential in their administration of 
delegated legislation. The institutions such as the fisheries agencies 
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of Tasmania, Victoria and the Commonwealth governments have in addition 
considerable expertise and knowledge of the resource base. This 
expertise is obviously important in the development of management plans 
for these resources, and may be relied upon by the political decision 
makers. 
As this study concentrates on interaction among policy actors, the 
institutional 	 structure 	 responsible 	 for 	 administration 	 and 	 resource 
management become important elements of the issue community. The 
institutional structure may influence the interaction of industry or 
other non-institutional groups and, conversely, may, as experienced in 
Tasmania and Victoria, be influenced by the actions of these groups. The 
restructuring of the fisheries agencies in these States was influenced 
to so me degree by the actions of industry groups. The resulting 
restructuring involved a range of issues and was in response to various 
factors. The industry was more visible in its lobbying in support of the 
overturning of the existing institutional stucture in Tas mania, 	 (see 
following discussion), although the 	 Victorian Professional Fishermen's 
Association, (VPFA ), had a long standing policy of supporting the move 
of fisheries to the primary industry portfolio. 
(vi) Institutional structure - Fisheries Administration: Commonwealth  
The 	 institution 	 responsible 	 for 	 providing advice and technical 
support to the Commonwealth government over fisheries matters is the 
Australian Fisheries Service (AFS) in the Department of Primary Industry 
(DPI). The AFS functions to advise govern ment on conservation, 
manage ment and utilisation of the marine living resources of the 
Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ), to consult with State governments, CSIRO, 
82. 
industry, and other agencies on fisheries matters and to implement and 
administer Commonwealth fisheries policy (Aust. Fish. June 1986). 
The AFS, headed by a Director, is organised into several branches 
with specific administrative or resource management functions, further 
subdivided into sections. The AFS also has developed specific fisheries 
Task Forces, seen as a major initiative of the Commonwealth government 
in this area of policy (Byrne 1985). The Task Force concept was 
funda mental to the resolution of the issues surrounding the scallop 
fishery management. 
(vi) Institutional. Structure - Fisheries Administration: Victoria  
The 	 institution 	 responsible 	 for 	 fisheries 	 adminstration, 	 in 
Victoria is a branch of the Fisheries and Wildlife Service of the 
Department of Conservation, Forests and Lands. Marine fisheries are 
administered by the Marine Resources Management Branch, (MRMB) 
comprising two sections; what was previously known as the Commercial 
Fisheries Branch, (located in the F WS and then in the Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs) and the Marine Science Laboratories 
(MSL ). The Commercial fisheries Branch is responsible for management, 
enforcement and licencing of commercial marine fisheries and the MSL 
provides research support for these management plans. The MRMB is headed 
by a Director and is being relocated at Queenscliff, , Victoria. The 
reasons for, and effects of ,the restructuring of the fisheries agency in 
Victoria is discussed in a subsequent section. 
(vii) Institutional Structure - Fisheries Administration: Tasmania  
Following the findings of the O'Kelly Review (1984) into the 
administration and operation of the Tasmanian Fisheries Development 
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Authority, (TFDA), detailed in a subsequent section, the TFDA was 
replaced by a Department of Sea Fisheries. The most significant effect 
of this change was to the structure of the new agency. The DSF was made 
directly responsible to the Minister for Sea Fisheries, rather than to a 
Board of Management as had been the case with the TFDA. 
The DSF is headed by a Director with the original proposal for 
three assistant directors to be appointed to lead specific sections. 
These sections were first, management, second research and finally 
resource development. 	 An Assistant Director (Management) was appointed 
in early 1985 with the other appointments left unfiled. 
The 	 structure 	 and 	 more 	 particularly 	 the 	 functions of 	 the 
institutions responsible for the administration of the fisheries of Bass 
Strait are important influences in the extent to which industry groups 
can become involved in the development of fisheries management plans. 
It is i mportant to note that the structure of the institutional 
framework is not static, and can undergo considerable change. This 
change can arise out of alterations to the legislative system, external  
to the institution, for exa mple the introduction of the OCS resource 
packages and the concomitant administrative regimes, or from internal  
restructuring of the institutions. During the period that the issues 
discussed in the following chapter were "on the agenda" each 
administrative agency underwent internal restructuring, ranging from 
complete changes to the agency in Tasmania to internal changes at the 
Commonwealth level in the AFS. 
84. 
(ix) Institutional Restructuring and Fisheries Agencies: 1984-1986' 
The Tasmanian Fisheries Development Authority, (TFDA ), was set up 
in 1977 folowing recommendations contained in a report, (O'Kely 1976), 
commissioned from Mr. Brendan O'Kelly, a fisheries consultant. Prior to 
the introduction of the TFDA sea fisheries had been administered by the 
Department of Agriculture. A key feature of the TFDA, and one that was 
to figure prominently in the debate over its future was the creation of 
an advisory board comprising representatives from the catch, processing 
and marketing sectors of the fishing industry, a govern ment 
representative and the chairman of the TFDA. The advisory board was to 
advise the Minister "on questions relating to the management, control, 
regulation and development of sea fisheries" (O'Kelly 1976:15). It is 
considered that the inability of the fishing industry to utilise this 
advisory body effectively had an influence on the industry's 
dissatisfaction with the TFDA. 	 The TFDA was separated into three 
divisions 	 aimed 	 at 	 providing 	 specific 	 administrative/secretariat, 
resource development and management functions. 
The TFDA faced increasing criticism over its operation from within 
the industry in the early 1980s. The Professional Fisher men's 
Association of Tasmania, (PFAT ), passed a vote of no confidence in the 
TFDA over its handling of the scallop fishery in Septe mber ,1983, 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. This criticism was linked 
to a perception of low staff morale and rumours, later raised in State 
parlia ment, of corruption in the operation of the Authority. Police 
inquiries over documentary evidence provided by former employees of the 
TFDA were folowed by an announcement, by the government, of a review of 
the TFDA. 
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The review of the TFDA was, interestingly enough, carried out by 
Brendan O'Kelly who had earlier recommended its establishment. The 
O'Kely Review,  (1984), exa mined the operation of the TFDA and 
recommended that the authority be abolished and be replaced by a 
Department of Sea Fisheries. Some features of the TFDA, particularly the 
industry liaison committees, were commended and encouraged to attract 
wider industry representation (O'Kelly 1984). The new department was 
encouraged to improve its public relations and industry consultative 
procedures (O'Kely 1984). The only recommendation not implemented by 
the government was the proposal to link inland (freshwater) fisheries 
with sea fisheries in the one Depart ment. The Depart ment of Sea 
Fisheries was established in February 1985. 
In 	 Victoria the 	 restructuring occurred out of the Victorian 
government's desire to regionalise government functions. The effect 
of this review was to lead to a decision in early 1985 to separate the 
ad ministrative and scientific/resource analysis functions of the 
Fisheries and Wildlife Service. In addition the Co m mercial Fisheries 
Branch which retained responsibilty for licencing and enforcement of 
fisheries, was to be placed within the Department of Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs. Such a move had been supported by fishermen's groups in 
Victoria for a considerable time. The problem of separating such an 
important Branch from the rest of the Fisheries and Wildlife Service, 
(F WS), caused considerable concern within the fisheries administration, 
and the major industry organisations, the Victorian Professional 
Fisher man's Association, (VPFA) and the Victorian Fishing Industry 
Council, (VF1C ), acknowledged that there were difficulties in having to 
deal with separate agencies. 
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In late 1985 moves were made to return the two fisheries agencies, 
(the F WS and the Commercial Fisheries Branch, CFB, ) back into one 
institution. The problem of co-ordination between separate agencies had 
become significant, as the effective management of the resource relies 
on linkages between 	 the research and the licendhg/enforce ment 
components of the fisheries bureaucracy. 	 The decision to implement the 
recommendation to amalgamate the CFB with the research and resource 
assessment functions of the Marine Science Laboratories, (MSL), was made 
in early 1986. The Commercial Fisheries Branch was to relocate from 
Melbourne to Queenscliff, , the location of the MSL, and the amalgamation 
would create the Marine Resources Management Branch of the Fisheries and 
Wildlife Service. 
The effects of the Tasmanian and Victorian administrative changes 
can be seen as i mportant features within the policy environ ment. 
Responsibilites for specific functions were changed and links within the 
issue community, particularly those informal contacts between industry 
and policy makers, may have altered as a result. The tur moil in the 
Tas manian and Victorian institutions may be a contributing factor 
towards the slow progress of negotitiation over specific resource 
management issues in 1984-85. In contrast to the significant changes at 
the State level, the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry, (DPI), 
i mple mented minor changes to the structure and functions of the 
Commonwealth agency in 1985 and 1986. 
An announcement that the Fisheries Division of the DPI was to be 
scrapped and rena med the Australian Fisheries Service, (AFS), with 
subtle functional changes, was made at the Australian Fisheries 
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Conference in January 1985. The AFS included a new branch devoted to 
"industry services". The Conference also endorsed the creation of the 
National Fishing Industry Council, (NFIC), which was to replace the 
moribund Australian Fishing Industry Council, (AFIC). These bodies are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, and in Appendix 1:2. In 
1986 the AFS underwent further internal change, with a rationalisation 
of the Industry Services section's functions and structure. 
3:5 SUMMARY OF THE POLITICAL, LEGISALTIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL 
BACKGROUND. 
The overlay in responsibility between the Commonwealth and State 
governments for both fisheries and offshore oil and gas policy makes the 
marine resources policy environment particularly complex. This overlay 
raises problems in the co-ordination of policy and resolution of 
conflicts between the different tiers of government. Institutions, or 
other policy structures such as ad-hoc may be established to provide 
points of contact, and mediation, between these tiers. Such moderating 
(or mediating) institutions have increased in importance in 
intergovernmental relations in Australia (Chapman 1985), and include 
the Premiers Conference and more specifically the Minsterial Councils 
responsible for particular policy areas. 
Ministerial councils such as the Australian Fisheries Council (AFC) 
and the Australian Minerals and Energy Council (AMEC) may provide a 
forum for debate and mediation between competing demands from the 
Commonwealth and State governments, and also enable policy to be 
co-ordinated. Such institutions are major actors, even though it is 
argued in this thesis that such inter-governmental bodies fail to 
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adequately involve non-government actors in these deliberations over 
policy. Given the technical nature of marine resources management the 
technical and advisory committees of these Ministerial councils may also 
be important in the interaction over policy. 
The interaction between policy actors is influenced by a number of 
variables which together contribute to creating the policy environment. 
This Chapter has identified the chief variables of the policy 
environment that influence the functioning of the issue communtiy and 
the interaction process, the following chapter examines the development 
of a particular resources policy within this environment. Aspects 
concerning fisheries policy in Bass Strait are examined in detail prior 
to an examination of the interaction over the implementation of the Bass 
Strait scallop fishery Management Regime. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
BASS STRAIT FISHERIES POLICY 
4:1 INTRODUCTION 
The examination of issues arising from the development of fisheries 
policy 	 ilustrates 	 the 	 influence 	 of 	 interaction 	 between 	 resource 
user interest groups and institutional actors 	 on both the policy 
process and policy outco mes. Such fishery policy (contained in 
management plans for specific fisheries) is developed and implemented 
within a broader policy environment which has been discussed in the 
preceeding chapter, co mplicated by the particular features of the 
evolution of Australian offshore federalism. The development of policy, 
and the interaction between the actors comprising issue communities 
concerned with aspects of fishery policy, is also influenced by the 
characterstics of 	 the fishery including the distribution of stocks, 
economic returns, 	 infrastructure provision and finally the historical 
development of the fishery. 
Chapter Four is subdivided into two parts; Part A provides a brief 
review of the fisheries of Bass Strait while Part B concerns an 
analysis of the introduction of a management regime in the Bass Strait 
scallop fishery. Part A begins with a brief survey of the development 
of the Bass Strait fisheries and then provides a more detailed analysis 
of the characteristics of the commercial fisheries of the region. This 
analysis includes details of the main commercial species comprising the 
Bass Strait "catch" , the value of this catch, the nu mber of people 
engaged in fisheries and the characteristics of the fishing fleet, 
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concluding with 	 the distribution of ports and major infrastructure. 
This general overview is necessarily brief and leads into a detailed 
assessment of a particular fishery, the Bass Strait scallop fishery. The 
introduction of a management regime for this fishery provides empirical 
data to examine the influence of interaction between policy actors on 
policy process and outcomes. The discussion which arises out of this 
analysis may provide some utility in the analysis of other issues in 
fisheries policy, a factor that will be examined in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis. 
The second part of this chapter applies the framework of analysis 
developed in chapters One and Two to the empirical data provided by the 
scallop case study. This analysis considers the emergence of the scallop 
"issue community"; particularly how such communities influence the 
pattern of interaction between institutional actors and the interest 
groups. The discussion in this section involves the identification of 
the issue community, the interaction during what may be termed the 
policy process and in the concluding section the influence this 
interaction has on the policy making structure. 
The analysis indicates that the number of actors involved in the 
"issue" was considerable, which lengthened the period of consultation. 
In addition the emergence and processing of the issue of scallop 
management as well as the implementation of the management regime 
involved the complexities of offshore federalism; resolving problems in 
inter-governmental relations, debates over jurisdiction and finally 




FISHERIES RESOURCE BASE AND FISHERIES POLICY 
4:2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASS STRAIT FISHING INDUSTRY 
The development of the fishing industry in Bass Strait is closely 
linked to the European settlement of the islands and coastal margines of 
the Strait (Gil more 1969). Fro m the ti me of the earliest European 
settle ment of the colony of Van Die men's Land, and later that of 
Victoria, fisheries provided an i mportant, if variable, source of 
economic development. An analysis of the development of these fisheries 
emphasises how the industry developed through a continuous broadening of 
resource stocks, with new fisheries being exploited during particular 
periods. The diversification or broadening of the base of the fishery is 
continuing at present, in particular with the atte mpt to develop a 
squid fishery in Bass Strait. 
The first marine resources exploited in Bass Strait were based on 
the extensive seal colonies of Bass Strait Islandsand the whales found 
within the region. The sealers beca me notorious even in relatively 
contemporary accounts, ( West 1851), and wiped out the resource in a 
short period of ti me. The sealing industry began in 1798 and has 
reached its peak in 1806 (Gil more 1969). Interestingly, the seal 
industry provides the first attempt by a government to regulate the 
exploitation of marine resources in Bass Strait; unfortunately this was 
unsucessful and the seal slaughter continued (Robson 1983). By the 1820s 
sealing had ceased to be profitable. 
A similar pattern of resource use occurred in the whaling industry 
in Bass Strait. 	 Whaling developed as a major industry in the 
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early nineteenth century. The value of the industry reaching "a 
maximum of 197,000 pounds in 1838. By 1894 the slaughter of the whale 
stocks, as with the seals, had reduced the value to a mere $700" (sic 
Gilmore, 1969:62). 
Gilmore postulates that the fishery of Bass Strait developed a 
dependence on inshore fishing grounds, giving the industry a distinctive 
"bay and inlet" character in the period following the initial settlement 
of the colonies of Van Diemen's Land (later Tasmania) and Victoria. The 
exploitation of inshore finfish and crustaceans encouraged a growth of 
small ports providing infrastructure in the form of processing 
facilities, wharfage and provedoring for the developing industry. 
Commercial fishing developed in the mid 1800s, although it was not until 
the period following the Second World War that extensive fishing had 
taken place outside the coastal margins of Bass Strait. 
Of the commercial fisheries, the Southern Rock Lobster has been the 
major species exploited. In Tasmania the Southern Rock Lobster of 
"crayfish" has been an important contributor to the value of the Bass 
Strait catch and the economy for many years, "providing a stable level 
of catch and a steady income producer since the early days of the 
colony" (Olsen, 1967:74). The southern rock lobster fishery also 
provided the first conflict between Tasmania and Victoria over resource 
management. In the 1890s the introduction of the crayfish pot in 
Victoria led to problems, as this technique was illegal in Tasmania 
(Harrison, 1977). Eventually the issue was resolved after a lengthy 
dispute, with the cray-pot legalised in Tasmania in 1926 (Harrison, 
1977). 
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The other major fisheries in Bass Strait - the shark, demersal 
fin - fish, scallop and abalone fisheries 	 developed in the period 
between the 1930s and 1980s. 	 Although a shark fishery based on the 
school shark, (Galeorhianus australis), had existed in Recherce Bay, 
southern Tasmania, since the 1880s (Olsen, 1967), it was not until the 
1930s that the shark fishery based on the school and gummy shark 
(Mustelus antarcticus) developed a commercial focus (Macdonald, 1986). 
Attempts to establish a trawl fishery in Bass Strait occurred in 
the early decades of the twentieth century (Gilmore, 1969). 
Commonwealth government sponsored surveys occurred in the years prior to 
the First World War, under the leadership of the Director of Fisheries, 
H.C. Dannevig on the research trawler Endeavour. Dannevig "had little 
faith in the potential of Bass Strait to produce paying quantities of 
demersal or bottom dwelling fish" (Gilmore, 1969:63). The surveys did 
lead to a trawl fishery being established on the east coast of New South 
Wales, extending into eastern Bass Strait south towards Flinders Island 
(Gilmore, 1969). Dannevig's work in western Bass Strait and the Great 
Australian Bight was cut short by the loss of the vessel, Director and 
crew in the south Tasman Sea when returning from Macquarie Island in 
1914 (Gilmore, 1969). 
An inquiry held in Tasmania headed by Professor T.T. Flynn, 
Professor of Biology at the University of Tasmania supported the 
development of outer or deep sea fishing grounds, commenting that 
Tasmanian, and indeed all Australian fisheries, tended to concentrate on 
the local (inner) or middle grounds (Gilmore, 1969). Following this 
inquiry and research by Dannevig, a trawl fishery was established which 
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fished parts of Bass Strait. 	 Early target species included the Tiger 
Flathead (Platycephalus sp . ) . 	 The early experiments with otter trawls, 
based on English patterns, led to early large catches, which soon 
declined (Gilmore, 1969). As the use of the other trawl was restricted 
by sea floor conditions the Danish seining tecnique was introduced in 
the 1930s. 
Danish seining has beco me popularly known as "trawling" in 
Australia (Gilmore, 1969), however it differs from traditional trawling 
as it involves "shooting" the net to encircle the resource. Instead of 
dragging a net held open by boards known as "otter" or trap doors, the 
Danish seine method involves a technique of encircling the stocks with 
the net. This occurs by "shooting" the net after a line, attached to an 
anchored buoy, is fully deployed by the vessel. This line may exceed 
a kilometre in length. 	 Once the net is "shot" the vessel returns to the 
buoy and retrives the "free" end of the line. 	 The net is hauled aboard 
the vessel by winching both lines, attached to each end of the net. The 
catch is trapped in the net as the net is hauled aboard. 
A scallop fishery was first established in the Derwent estuary in 
Tas mania in 1905. Until 1956, when stocks were discovered off the 
Queensland Coast, Tasmania had a monopoly on the catch (Olsen, 1967). 
Scallop beds were discovered off the east coast of Tas mania in the 
1950s, and the Port Phillip Bay in 1963 (Olsen, 1967; Pontin and 
Millington, 1985; Macdonald, 1986). Bass Strait beds were discovered 
off Lakes Entrance in 1970, and beds off north eastern Tasmania and the 
Furneaux group were discovered in 1972 folowing a Tasmanian Fisheries 
Division survey. In 1980 the deeper Bass Strait beds began to be 
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developed, leading to increased, although fluctuating catches (Pontin 
and Millington, 1985; Macdonald, 1986). The scallop fishery is examined 
in greater detail as a case study of policy interaction later in the 
chapter. 
The most recently established fishery developed in Bass Strait was 
that based on two species of abalone. The "black lip" abalone 
(Notohaliotis ruber, and the "greenlip" Schismotis laevigata) are a 
species of marine snail, which inhabits the coastal margins and the 
reefs close to shore (Macdonald, 1986). The abalone industry developed 
in the 1960s and has become a major fishery, with the majority of the 
catch exported to S.E. Asia. The abalone is harvested by diving, which 
limits the effective depth of resource exploitation to approximately 30 
metres, the safe limit for continued diving. 
The existing commercial fisheries of Bass Strait are considered to 
have limited potential for development. New trawl species may provide 
some potential in this fishery, and the possiblity of a cephlapod 
fishery particularly squid in the Strait has been investigated by the 
Tasmanian fisheries agency (Collins, 1986), in conjunction with the 
Commonwealth Department of Primary industry. 
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4 . 3 CHARACTERISTICS OF BASS STRAIT COMMERCIAL FISHERIES 
The characteristics of the resource base and its influence on the 
policy environment has been briefly considered in Chapter Three. It is 
appropriate to identify key variables within the broader "resource base", 
taking this concept at its broadest to include the value of the catch, 
resource users, characteristics of the fishing fleet and infrastructure 
support. The diverse nature of the Bass Strait fishery is evident, 
although interdependence between different sectors of the fishery may be 
important policy considerations. 
4.3.1 Major Commerical Species  
The major fisheries of Bass Strait are those based on the abalone, 
southern rock lobster, scallop, shark, demersal species harvested by 
trawl/Danish seine techniques and squid ( Macdonald , 1986) . These 
species, with the addition of prawns, comprise the major Australian 
commercial catch. 	 ( Jeffrey , 1984 ) , and provide a significant source of 
income both through domestic sales and exports. 	 In Bass Strait the 
three most i mportant co m mercial fisheries are those based on the 
abalone, rock lobster and scallop species; fin fish, at least in ter ms 
of value of the catch, provide neglible income. The major commercial 
fish species are shown in Figure 4. 1, and their distribution in Figure 
4 . 2. 
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Figure 4.1 
Major Commercial Fish Species - Bass Strait 
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Abalone - blacklip 
Abalone - greenlip 
Pseudophycis barbatus  
Mugil cephalus, Aldrichetta forsteri  
Hyperglyphe antarctica  
Seriolella biama  
Arripus trutta  
Nemadactylus macropterus  
Latris lineatus, Latridopsios forsteri  
Platycephalus sp. 
Thunnus maccoyii  
Katsuwonus pelamis, T.• alalunga  
Auxis thazard  
Thyrsites atun  
Hyporhamphus melanochir  
Sillago bassenis  
Hophostelmus atlanticus  
Macraronai novaezealandiae  
Galeorhinus australis  
Mustelus antarcticus  
Jasus novaehollandiae  
Pecten meridionalis/syn fumata  
Equichlamys bifrons  
Chlamys asperrimus  
Notohaliotis ruber  




4.3.2 Levels of Production 
The importance of the crustacean and molusc fishery in Bass Strait 
can 	 be 	 inferred 	 from 	 the 	 statistics 	 for 	 levels of production. 
Unfortunately 	 statistics 	 for 	 the 	 Bass 	 Strait 	 region 	 are 	 not 
separated from state based results. 	 This means that an accurate result 
for Bass Strait is difficult. 	 In addition vessels which landed catches 
in South Australia or New South Wales are excluded. 	 Tasmanian vessels 
which land catches in Victorian ports are excluded from Tasmanian catch 
figures. Due to difficulties in obtaining data, the figures contained 
in the Archer Report (1982) are used. 
Figure 4.3 
Production of Fish, Crustaceans and Moluscs 
Tasmania and Victoria 1980-81 
Tonnes live weight 
Tasmania 	 Victoria 	 Total Aust. 
Fish 	 2527 	 10000 
Crustaceans 	 1553 	 400 
Moluscs 	 7314 	 11400 
Total 	 11394 	 21800 	 150937 
Value of Production ($A'000) 
Tasmania 	 Victoria* 	 Total, Aust. 
Fish 	 3654 	 15500 
Crustaceans 	 8385 	 3000 
Molluscs 	 14476 	 11100 
Total 	 26515 	 29600 	 360899* 
*estimates 	 Source: Archer, 1982 
Given the estimates for Victorian landings and value, Macdonald's (1986) 
estimate of a total catch for the Bass Strait region of between 25,000 and 
30,000 tonnes with a total value of approximately $80,000,000 tonnes is 
an appropriate measure of the significance of the fishery. 
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Using 	 Archer's 	 results 	 the 	 fishery 	 of 	 Bass 	 Strait 	 provides 
approximately twenty two per cent of the production ( live weight tonnes ) 
of the Australian industry, and fifteen per cent of the value of 
production in dolars. 
4.3.3 Numbers of Fishermen  
The problem of gaining accurate statistics on this aspect of the 
resource base is e mphasised by conflicting results fro m different 
infor mation sources. Using state based data is difficult since so me 
of these fisher men, particularly in Tas mania, may not fish in Bass 
Strait, while others particularly from South Australia or New South Wales 
may be ignored in Tasmanian or Victorian statistics. Census data may be 
li mited as it may restrict its classification to skippers, and ignore 
deckhands or crew. A summary of the major data sources folows: 
Figure 4.4 
Numbers of Fishermen 
	
Tasmania 	 Victoria 
Archer Report ( 1982 ) 	 1620 	 1571 
Dept. Sea Fisheries 
(Tas. ) 1984 	 910a 
582b 
Census 1981 	 628 , 	 863 
(a) State Licences \ 
( b) Commonwealth Licences 
4.3.4 Characteristics of the Bass Strait Fishing Fleet  
_ The exploitation of fish stocks near, or along, the rocky coastlines 
within Bass Strait ' 	 has influenced the characteristics of the fishing 
fleet. 	 In common with other areas in Australia the Bass Strait fishery 
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is made up of small vessels, with a majority of boats under 9 metres in 
length. These boats are operated by smal crews, usualy owner-skippers 
and one or two crewmen. 
The table comprising Figure 4.5, folowing, indicates that Tasmania 
has a higher proportion of vessels under 9 metres in length, perhaps 
reflecting the significance of the abalone fishery. The abalone boats 
are smal, trailable, outboard powered "runabouts" usualy between 5-6 
metres in length which operate around the coasts of Bass Strait. The 
"ab boats" have evolved into efficient working/diving platforms, with a 
"Shark Cat" twin huled configuration favoured. 
The smal number of vessels over 18m. in length in both Tasmania 
and Victoria reflects the fisheries base on the inner fishing grounds. 
Very few vessels in either State are equipped for long voyages or 
extended fishing trips. 
Figure 4.5 
Characteristics of the Fishing Fleet 
Tasmania' 
n. 	 % Victoria n 	 % Size 	(metre.-) 
<6 240 36.3 258 30.1 6-U9 78 12.5 248 29.0 9-U12 103 16.5 152 17.8 12-U15 110 17.5 102 11.9 15-U18 68 10.9 70 8.2 >18 27 4.3 26 3.0 
Total n. boats 6262 - 8562 - 
Source: Archer (1982: 179) 
Notes:  
1. Tasmanian figures include vessels licensed for al waters. 
2. Table excludes boats where 3 or more were licensed in the one ownership. 
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4.3.5 Ports and Infrastructure Provision  
The major fishing ports, in terms of home ports for fishermen, 
and/or the locations of infrastructure services such as processing 
facilities and maintenance of wharf areas, reflects the pattern of the 
distribution of the resource stocks. 
The major ports are relatively evenly distributed throughout the 
Strait region. Depending on the resources, the ports may handle several 
species, or concentrate on the landing of a restricted range of fish - 
for example Stanley which is basicaly a crayfish port. 
The major ports are: 
Victoria: 	 Apollo Bay, Portarlington, Port Melbourne, San Remo, Port 
Albert, Port Welshpool, Lakes Entrance, Malacoota Inlet. 
Tasmania: Smithton, Stanley, Devonport, Beauty Point 	 (Launceston/ 
Tamar), Bridport, St. Helens. 
Bass Strait Islands: Currie (King Island, Lady Barron (Flinders Island). 
The location of these ports is indicated in Figure 4.6, folowing. 
ST. HELENS - 
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4.3.6 Summary of Bass Strait Fishery  
The fishery located in and around Bass Strait, while comprising a 
s mall part of the Australian catch, 	 is nevertheless a significant 
contributor to the economy of the region. 	 The economic benefits of the 
fishery are most apparent in the fishing ports, where processing and 
infrastructure 	 activities 	 provide 	 additional 	 employment 	 with 	 an 
important economic multiplier effect. Macdonald's (1986) estimation of 
the total value of the catch fro m the Bass Strait region as 
approximately $80,000,000 indicates the importance of these fisheries to 
the regional economy. 
The diverse nature of the Bass Strait fisheries, and its reliance 
on high value mollusc and crustacean species gives the fishery a 
distinctive character. The •vessels used are generally small, below 10 
m. in length, and utilise grounds which traditionally have been close to 
their home ports. Development of trawl and squid fisheries may involve 
changes in the traditional pattern of fisheries, however infrastructure 
such as ports is unlikely to change. The distribution of ports and 
their associated facilities provides ready access to the major resource 
stocks and reflects the historical dependence on the grounds close to 
the ho me port of the fisher men. It is likely that develop ment of 
existing ports, rather than the creation of new facilities will occur, 
particularly as trawl resources on the continental slope are exploited. 
St. Helens on the East Coast of Tas mania may benefit fro m such 
upgrading, as it currently supports a major fleet of scallops rocklobster 
and shark vessels. 
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The next section of this chapter moves away from the general survey 
of the Bass Strait fishery to consider issues surrounding the 
development and management of the scallop fishery in the Strait. This 
section provides background to the case study on the introduction of a 
management regime for the fishery. 
4•4 THE 	 BASS 	 STRAIT 	 SCALLOP 	 FISHERY: 	 DEVELOPMENT, 
THE RESOURCE BASE AND MANAGEMENT 
The development of a management regime for Bass Strait scallops 
ilustrates the range of issues facing policy makers when they attempt to 
develop and implement policy involving diverse and competing interests. 
The development of the regime was influenced by the external political 
syste m, particularly in ter ms of federal-state relations and 
jurisdiction. The scallop fishery has specific biological 
characteristics that complicate management. Management is also affected 
by the plurality of interests involved and different manage ment 
practices derived from overlapping responsibility, between and within, 
the tiers of government. 
The imporance of the scallop fishery was emphasised in an earlier 
section of this chapter. It provides a significant inco me in export 
earnings and domestic marketing, involving approximately 400 fishermen 
(Macdonald, 1986), with significant multiplier effects. The fishery in 
Bass Strait is based on the commercial scallop, Pecten meridionalis/ 
fu mata, which is distributed unevenly throughout the region. Most 
scallops are harvested fro m beds at depths up to 30 or 40 metres 
although some beds, particularly in Bass Strait, may be deeper. The 
major scallop beds in Bass Strait are located off the Furneaux group in 
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North-east Tasmania, off King Island and the Hunter group in the west, 
offshore fro m Lakes Entrance and in Port Phillip Bay in Victoria. 
Recent discoveries of large beds have been made in Banks Strait between 
the North-east tip of Tasmania and Cape Barren Island. 
The scalop is a bivalve molusc capable of limited movement through 
the jetting Of water through the opening and closing of the shell. 
Harvesting of the scalops is undertaken by towing a "dredge" along the 
sea bed which is then retrieved into the scallop boat by an electric or 
petrol driven winch. 	 Dredging is the main means of catching scalop, 
with small quantities being taken by diving. 	 Diving is restricted by 
depths at which the scallops are found, and the increased "effort" 
needed to gain an econ mic catch. Co m mercial diving is li mited to a 
small area around Jervis Bay on the south coast of New South Wales, 
although some recreational diving does take place elsewhere. Dredging 
has been criticised for causing unnecessary damage to the scalop beds, 
crushing mature fish and destroying juveniles. 	 Dredging is however the 
most economic fishing method. 	 Controls on the type and size of dredges 
are an important management strategy and occur in both Tasmania and 
Victoria, although there is no uniformity in these controls. 
Recruit ment to scallop beds is related to the success of the 
"spatfall" which occurs each season. After fertilisation the scallop 
larvae known as veligers, have a planktonic phase for up to 30 days 
depending on the scallop species. 	 The free floating veligers then 
undergo a change in structure and seek a suitable settlement site. 	 This 
metamorphosis from veliger to immature scallop or "spat" is known as 
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take place at great distances from the site of spawning. 	 This provides 
considerable problems for fisheries managers who wish to estimate rate 
of recruit ment. Research has indicated that the spatfall varies fro m 
year to year, which underpins the boo m/bust character of scallop 
production and contributes to the observed cyclic pattern of catch. 
The fluctuations in scalop stocks have been identified by a number 
of studies, the most recent being that of Harrison (1985). Harrison 
provides catch data for both Tas mania and Victoria for the period 
1970-1983, which illustrates the cycle of catch. This data is graphed 
in Figure 4.7, folowing. 
FIGURE 4:7 
SCALLOP CATCH BASS STRAIT 
----- Harrison (1985) 
MI ME Consultants Report to Bass Strait Task Force (1984 MI 
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The Victoria catch illustrates a more random pattern, typical of 
the fluctuating level of catch observed in the industry, while Tasmanian 
fishermen continued to land increasing catches until 1982 when a severe 
decline occurred. An explanation of this pattern in the Tasmanian 
fishery is that newer beds became utilised, and areas were fished more 
intensively. Harrison's data is generally replicated in other studies, 
(see graph), although minor variations in data have also been observed. 
The implications of this variation in scallop harvest will 
considered in the case study. 	 The variation in scallop catch affect 
management of the resource by influencing the pattern of interest group 
interaction and institutional 	 decision 	 making responses. 	 Declining 
stocks with continued high levels of effort may force a reappraisal of 
management strategies, as pressure from resource users concerned with 
declining returns increases. 	 Pressure on governments and management 
agencies will be higher in periods of low catches than when the fishery 
is in a boom phase. 
Early in the study attention was drawn to the problems of 
developing policy where responsibility was shared, overlapped between 
different tiers of government. While marine resources policy is seen as 
being constrained by these factors, the issue of scallop management 
emphasises specific problems that this overlap may create. Tasmania and 
Victoria utilise different management strategies for the regulation of 
the scallop fishery. The different management philosophies and histories 
have led to problems in gaining agreement at government level over the 
introduction of a management regime for the Bass Strait fishery, and has 
increased tensions between resource users of the two States. 
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Differences in licencing or endorsement procedures and variations in 
gear and catch restrictions between Tasmania and Victoria were seen by 
fishermen as major issues although their importance was down played by 
resource managers. 
4.4.1 Licencing and Operation of the Scalop Fishery 
Tasmania operates an open entry fishery for scallops, where 
fishermen are able to enter and leave the fishery relatively easily. If 
they are not fishing for scallops they are able, with correct licence 
endorsements, to undertake other forms of fishing. Many Tasmanian 
fishermen enter the scallop fishery in boom periods to supplement 
earnings from other fisheries. The rationale behind this management 
philosophy is that in periods of small catches the low yields will deter 
fishermen from continuing in the fishery, and they will switch to other 
stocks. 	 In good years the number of boats will increase, however the 
increased catch will be able to support them. 	 This scheme has some 
problems; 	 the fishermen who remain scalloping during a downturn will 
not return economic catches, and the scheme may create a "part-time 
fleet" which provides problems in management of the resource. 
Victoria manages its scallop fishery according to a strict limited 
entry criteria. Limited entry was initially seen as a means of 
controlling resource exploitation by limiting the number of fishermen 
with access to a particular fishery. Australia was one of the first 
countries to adopt limited entry criteria for an extensive range of 
fisheries (Harrison, 1985), and the limited entry system is now found 
in all States and in a range of fisheries. 	 Victoria manages all its 
fisheries according to this principle. 	 Limited entry, while being 
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successful 	 initialy 	 in 	 controling 	 resource 	 exploitation, 	 fails 	 by 
itself to restrict overfishing unless linked to some controls on fishing 
effort (Harrison, 1985; Kirby, 1982). As technology develops and 
techniques improve, the same number of fishermen can increase their 
effort to dangerous levels, resulting in over exploitation of the 
resource. 
In the Victorian scallop fishery the nu mber of licences are 
restricted and are either endorsed for Bass Strait or Port Phillip Bay. 
The Bay licences number 23, and the open water/Bass Strait endorsements 
number 34. A number (56) of dual licences are available. The Victorian 
fisheries management agencies argue that resource stocks are conserved 
by li miting the nu mber of vessels involved. Additional supporting 
features for limited entry are that it enables fishermen to gain small 
returns in poor years which are offset by large returns in periods of 
good catches. One unintentional feature of a limited entry fishery is 
that the licence increases in value as the period of restricted entry 
lengthens. The licence increases its transfer value, so meti mes to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, which may lead to inequity among 
fishermen. 
• 	 The differences between the Tas manian and Victorian scallop 
management provide a source of potential conflict between resource 
managers and resource users from each State. It is unusual to observe 
what can be viewed as opposing management techniques operating within 
the sa me region or, more particularly, in what is the sa me fishery 
(Harrison 1985). The e mergence of these different approaches to 
resource management has occurred as each State developed strategies for 
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managing the fisheries resources within the limits of its jurisdictional 
competence. This competence was first limited in the 1950s with the 
enactment of the Australian Fisheries Act (1952)-Cth, although as the 
Bass Strait scallop fishery developed in the period 1964-1980 the limits 
of each states jurisdiction were set at three miles from Low water mark. 
The attempt to develop a regime for the scallop fishery of Bass Strait 
coincided with the attempts to implement the OCS fisheries package, 
described in a preceding chapter. The scallop fishery was seen as a 
major fishery that would benefit from administration under a single 
law, reducing intergovernmental conflicts between States and the 
Commonwealth in the management of the fishery. The attempts to develop 
a single fishery in the region raised problems of inter-state relations, 
neither State would forego the administration of the fishery. The 
following section comprises a narrative case study of the developments 
leading to the implementation of the Bass Strait scallop management 
regime. This case study will be analysed in Part B of this chapter. 
4:5 INTRODUCTION OF A MANAGEMENT REGIME FOR THE 
BASS STRAIT SCALLOP FISHERY 
Case studies can either be descriptive or analytical (Richardson 
1982). The former attempt to provide insights into the development of 
public policy through the description of the emergence processing and 
implementation of a particular issue or policy. The latter approach 
examines the development of particular policies by utilising some form 
of analytical framework. The analytical approach adopted in this study 
allows the interaction between different policy actors, contained in the 
empirical data, to be examined in terms of its influence on both the 
policy process and output. 
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The scallop fishery in Australia developed in the early years of 
the twentieth century, exploiting beds discovered in the Derwent estuary 
near Hobart. The f,ishery moved to larger beds in the D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel area south of Hobart as a result of the over exploitation of 
these initial discoveries. Fishing effort in the "Channel" was 
initially li mited by technological restrictions and the introduction of 
some regulations over gear that could be used. 
Increased application of technology, 	 particulary the introduction 
of the internal combustion engine and mechanised winching gear increased 
the level of effort and, in the short term, the level of catch. The high 
level of exploitation resulted in the the depletion of the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel beds. In the 1950s attempts were made to limit 
catches in this area, and to restrict overfishing, however these efforts 
failed due to industry resistance. 
As the D'Entrecasteaux Channel beds were declining fisher men 
discovered scallop beds off the east coast of Tasmania and in Norfolk 
Bay, South East Tasmania. Pressure on the resource stocks eased somewhat 
in the 1950s with a dispersal of fishing effort onto other beds. This 
characteristic pattern of move ment fro m old beds to new beds has 
continued until the present. 
In the late 1950s surveys of Port Phillip Bay indicated the presence 
of scallops, and although the catch was large by present standards, 
little seems to have been done to encourage the establishment of a local 
fishery. The Port Philip bay beds were exploited by Tasmanian fishermen 
in 1963. This date marks the beginnings of the Victorian scallop 
fishery, a local scallop fleet soon beca me established, with purpose 
built craft being launched. 
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In June 1970 a Victorian fishermen discovered extensive scallop beds 
off Lakes Entrance, Gippsland, and by December of that year 68 vessels 
wre working these beds. This discovery gave the Victorian fishery its 
characteristic "Bay" and "open water" structure which became reinforced 
by licence categories. The differences in licensing created tensions 
which exploded in 1985 as pressure on Lakes Entrance stocks increased 
and these fishermen attempted to fish in the "Bay". 
In 1972 the Tasmanian Fisheries Division, Department of Agriculture, 
undertook a large scale survey of Bass Strait and discovered extensive 
scallop beds off the north coast of Tasmania. Tasmanian scallop 
fishermen started exploiting these beds in 1973. 
The period 1972-1980 is characterised by a gradual increase in 
catches from Tasmanian fishermen, with a more characteristic variation 
in catch experienced by Victorian fishermen, (see Figure 4:7). The 
Tasmanian fishermen were able to reduce the effects of periodic slumps 
in catches by moving onto new beds discovered late in the 1970s. 
By the early 1980s Tasmanian fishermen had experienced almost a 
fourfold increase in catch. This amounted to a peak of 1750 t. in 1982 
(Harrison 1985), while the Victorian catch from Bass Strait beds peaked 
at 1248 t. in 1979 (Harrison 1985). These catches attracted a large 
fleet from both Tasmanian and Victorian ports, fishing what became 
known as the "deep water beds" (Pontin and Millington 1985). Prior to 
this period some concern had arisen over the different licensing 
procedures between the Stites of Tasmania and Victoria. Such 
differences, detailed previously, became more visible when the fleet 
from both states worked common beds, the deep water beds in Commonwealth 
"proclaimed" waters outside the three mile State baseline. 
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Tasmanian fishermen claimed that their Victorian counterparts used 
larger dredges, which incorporated features prohibited on Tasmanian 
vessels. Since dredge width has a functional relationship to the size of 
catch, these differences, although disregarded as being significant by 
fisheries ad ministrators, were a focus of industry discontent. The 
Tas manian fisher men were unhappy with the lack of a size li mit on 
scallops landed by Victorian boats and the practice of "soaking" 
scallops in fresh water to increase their size and weight common on 
Victorian vessels. 
The develop ment of deep water beds in areas clearly under 
Commonwealth control increased the role of the Commonwealth in scalop 
fishery management. The Commonwealth Government's role increased as the 
issues surrounding scalop management became more complex. 
In 1981 the creation of the Alied Fisheries  company acted as a 
catalyst for discontent, particularly a mong the Tas manian scallop 
fishery. 	 Allied atte mpted to integrate all sectors of the scallop 
fishery into one operation. Previously the catch, processing and 
marketing sectors acted independently and at times lacked co-ordination. 
While Allied Fisheries' ideals may have been sound and their concept a 
valid one and one that would, in the company's words, revolutionise the 
fishery, the unpredictable nature of the scallop catch beca me an 
important factor in Alied's eventual demise. 
Alied Fisheries  operated through the creation of syndicates which 
brought vessels which, in turn, were licenced to catch scallops. The 
syndicates were made up of investors who were attracted by the promises 
of large returns on initial invest ments. This return was much larger 
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than fisheries managers could consider appropriate for a stable fishery, 
let alone one that was characterised by a widely fluctuating level of 
catch. Many of the Allied syndicates were financed by professional or 
business interest as taxation concessions. The company's use of taxation 
"loopholes" was highlighted by their dependence on primary production 
tax incentives. These incentives required vessels to be commisioned and 
be operational within a specific date, in a much publicised episode an 
Allied vessel purchased its "catch" from other fishermen in order to 
fulfil the criteria for the tax incentives. 
Apart from the problems of relying on a fluctuating resource stock, 
the Allied operation was questioned by administrators who were 
suspicious that none of the the Allied principals had any fisheries 
experience, let alone experience in the scallop fishery. The Allied 
operation became somehat of a "cause celebre" in the Bass Strait fishing 
industry. After the company's operations became publicised, questions 
were raised in both State and Commonwealth parliaments about the 
company. Investigations by corporate affairs officers found evidence of 
the dependence on taxation benefits to return syndicate investments. 
The Allied Fisheries attempt to revolutionise the scallop fishery 
was short .lived. The allocation of licences to the company became a 
contentious point with Tasmanian fishermen who claimed that Allied 
receieved preferential treatment. Given the existing licencing policy in 
Tasmania, Allied had every right to ask for endorsements once it had 
vessels built. In Victoria, given the different policy on licences, 
Alied 	 gained 	 scalop 	 licences 	 by 	 purchasing 	 vessels, 	 sometimes 
transferring the licences to new boats. 
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In 1981-82 the catch from the Lakes Entrance beds began to decline, 
which forced more and more Victorian boats further south into Bass 
Strait. The activities of Allied and the increased visibility of the 
Victorian fleet led to increased agitation by Tasmanian fishermen for 
greater control over "traditional grounds". This pressure led the TFDA 
to approach the Commonwealth DPI over a claim to manage the Scallop 
fishery south of latitude 39°12'. 
In early 1982 the TFDA circularised management options for the 
Tasmanian fishery to all fishermen. This discussion paper was examined 
at a meeting of the Tasmanian Scallop Liaison Committee,(SLC), which was 
an industry-TFDA advisory and consultative body. The SLC pressed for a 
moratorium on the allocation of Tasmanian licences, citing the increased 
activity of Allied Fisheries as a cause for concern. 
In June 1982 the first elements of dissention in the scallop fishery 
surfaced. The Council of the Professional Fishermen's Association of 
Tasmania, (PFAT) passed a resolution oposing limitations on scallop 
licenses unless "proven biological changes to species, or if any danger 
of the species being over exploited occurred". It was precisely these 
factors that had prompted the industry members of the SLC to push for 
the moratorium. 
The confusion in Tasmania was enhanced in July when the Scallop 
Branch of the PFAT, (members of the PF AT who were chiefly scallop 
fishermen) wrote to the newly elected State government Minister 
requesting a freeze on further scallop licences. Interestingly the 
scallop Branch of the PFAT contained several people from the PF AT 
Council which had earlier recommended a removal of the earlier 
moratorium on scallop licence allocation. 
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In September 1982 the Tasmanian and Victorian governments agreed 
in principle to shared management of the Bass Strait scallop fishery. 
Tasmania claimed that until the OCS was implemented, this agreement 
could not be acted upon. 
The SLC in Tasmania recommended the lifting of the moratorium on 
licenses in January 1983, claiming that it was disadvantaging Tasmanian 
fishermen. At the same time the OCS fisheries package was proclaimed, 
but before it could be implemented the Fraser Liberal government was 
defeated in an snap election. The newly elected Commonwealth Labor 
government rejected Tasmania's argument for a line of demarcation along 
latitude 39° 12' S. 
The impact of declining scalop catches became evident in mid 1983. 
The Commonwealth, Tasmanian and Victorian governments became concerned 
over the large number of vesels with scalop licenses, and agreed to the 
introduction of an "Interim Management Regime". This regime was based 
on limited entry criteria and was aimed at conserving resource stocks 
while a longer term proposal could be developed. 
Fishing industry consultative groups were also involved in the 
development of the Interim Management Regime. Tasmanian fishermen asked 
the Interi m Fishing Industry Consultative Panel, (IFICP), which had 
replaced the defunct Australain Fishing Industry Council, (AFIC ), to 
investigate the management of the Bass Strait scalop fishery. The IFICP 
meeting, convened in September 1983, agreed to the Interim Management 
Regime. 
Late in 1983 Allied Fisheries collapsed, with the Co m monwealth 
Minister issuing warnings about the co mpany in parlia ment. 	 Media 
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investigations of the Allied operation led to disclosures of the shaky 
foundations of the company and the links between the principals of 
Allied and other collaped investment proposals. 
In Tasmania the TFDA was under attack from fishing interest groups 
chiefly due to its "mismanagement of the scallop fishery". The Tasmanian 
Minister for Sea Fisheries, Mr. Beswick, defended the TFDA, claiming 
that it had acted in the best interests of local fishermen. Disagreement 
and internal conflict marked the scallop fishing interests' involvement 
in Tasmania. The different groups could not agree over the Interim 
Management Regime or the question of Tasmanian management in Bass Stait. 
This disagreement was cited as one reason why the Tasmanian Minister 
agreed to the introduction of the Interim Regime. The Minister noted 
that this should be regarded as an interim proposal and be replaced by a 
State based regime in the near future. 
The announcement of the interim regime was made in a joint statement 
by the Tasmanian, Victorian and Commonwealth Ministers responsible for 
sea fisheries on 15th November 1983. Access to Bass Strait beds was 
restricted to those fishermen who had fished the area between January 
and November 1983. The SLC in Tasmania supported the introduction of the 
regime and nominated a representative for the Licence Appeals Committee. 
The PFAT meanwhile had voiced opposition to the regime, claiming it 
had sold out Tasmanian fishermen. The PFAT raised the issue of Allied 
Fisheries and claimed that the TFDA had given them favourable treatment. 
The PFAT later announced that it failed to recognise the interim 
regime. To complicate matters further the PFAT created a "special 
committee" to look at the problems of Bass Strait scallop management. 
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Given the differences in viewpoints between the different fisheries 
groups in Tasmania, it is not surprising that the final regime took so 
long to negotiate. 
Continuing discontent with the performance of the TFDA was fuelled 
by claims of corruption and graft in the Authority's operation. A vote 
of no confidence in the TFDA was passed by the PFAT. Under pressure from 
industry and following claims made by the Opposition in parliament over 
the illegalities and low morale within the TFDA, the government announced 
a review of the operation of the Authority. 
The details of the Interim Management Regime were announced in April 
1984, and were to take place from the 23rd April. Prior to the 
implementation of the regime a public meeting was held in Hobart at 
which fishing interest aired grievances over the scallop fishery, Allied 
and the TFDA. The Minister addressed the meeting and criticised the 
industry for its inability to proved consistent and coherent advice to 
policy makers and negotiators. 
In June 1984 the Commonwealth DPI set up the Bass Strait Scallop 
Task Force. The Task Force provided a forum through which opinion from 
major interests could be heard and the influence of a range of variables 
examined. The Task Force worked quickly and produced a Discussion Paper  
on the Bass Strait Fishery in September 1984 (reproduced in Appendix 
1:3). The inclusion of fishermen's representatives in the Task Force 
enabled all sectors of the fishery to contribute to the formulation of 
policy. 
The release of the Discussion Paper enabled the Task Force to hear 
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submissions and visit ports to solicit views on the management of the 
fishery. These views were to form an important part of the Management ' 
Regime discussed in late 1984 and 1985. 
In November the Interim Management Regime was extended until "at 
least mid 1985" by the DPI. The PFAT announced that it had given its 
representatives a blank cheque to negotiate the best deal for 
Tasmanian fishermen in the development of the final management regime. 
In January 1985 the Australian Fisheries Conference recommended the 
setting up of the National Fishing Industry Council, (NFIC), replacing 
the IFICP who had sponsored and organised the Conference. Scallop 
management was discussed at the Conference although the major theme was 
concerned with improving the relationships between fishing industry 
groups and government resource managers. 
A 	 further 	 splintering 	 of 	 the 	 Tasmanian 	 fishing 	 industry 
organisations took place in February 1985, with the creation of the 
Rock Lobster Fishermen's Association. While this group's activities were 
peripheral to scallop management the TFDA was criticised for its neglect 
of other fisheries during its attempts to handle the controversy over 
scallop management. Later the Rock Lobster group pushed for access to 
scallop licenses as an "off-season fishery". 
The TFDA was replaced by the Department of Sea Fisheries, (DSF), 
in February 1985, following the announcement that the government was to 
implement the recommendations of the review of the TFDA, released in 
late 1984. The Review, (O'Kelly 1984), was critical of many aspects of 
the Authority's operation and recommended its disbanding and replacement 
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with a Department of Sea Fisheries. A new director of the DSF, Mr. M. 
Wilson was appointed and announced his intention to improve relations 
with industry bodies. 
The DPI sent out a letter to all Bass Strait scallop fishermen in 
April 1985 informing them of developments in the management of the 
fishery. The letter announced the proposal for the development of a 
draft management plan based on the individual transferable quotas (ITQs) 
by the DPI's Australian Fisheries Service. This plan would be circulated 
for comment and would form the basis for later discussion with the 
States. 
The Victorian fishery, which had generally avoided the heated•
discussion and conflict experienced in Tasmania between 1983 and 1985, 
erupted in mid 1985. With declining catches from the Bass Strait beds 
the Lakes Entrance fishermen pushed for access to the beds of Port 
Phillip bay, closed to them through limitations on their licenses. 
Vessels attempted to fish these waters and were impounded by FWS 
officers. Port Phillip Bay fishermen, greatly restricted by bag limits 
and other controls, were critical of the actions of the Lakes Entrance 
fishermen. The Lakes Entrance protest received coverage on the national 
electronic and print media. 
The management of the Bass Strait scallop fishery was discussed at 
the Australian Fisheries Council, (AFC), meeting in Darwin in July 1985. 
Agreement was reached over a zoning regime in the Strait, based on 20 
mile zones from the Tasmanian and Victorian coastlines. A central zone 
between the two State zones was to be initially managed by the 
Commonwealth and then handed back to the States to jointly manage . This 
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arrangement was facilitated by the announcement that the Hawke government 
was to implement the OCS fisheries package. 
The ratification and implementation of the Management Regime 	 was 
complicated by the development of the "Banks Strait scallop war". This 
"war" was "declared" in the Tasmanian media after the discovery of rich 
scallop beds in Banks Strait, separating North East Tasmania from the 
Furneaux Group, were threatened by Victorian fishermen. The beds were 
outside the three mile baseline proclaimed under the OCS, but inside the 
20 mile Tasmanian zone. Tasmanian fishermen claimed an ammarda , of 
Victorian vessels were steaming southwards to the beds, a claim that 
did not eventuate, although some individual Victorian vessels did fish 
the area. 
The Tasmanian Minister pressed the Commonwealth to close the Banks 
Strait beds, pending implementation of the new Management Regime. The 
Commonwealth Minister agreed to the closure to enable a survey of stocks 
to be undertaken. The closure was extended due to bad weather 
restricting this survey and part of the Banks Strait area was opened for 
fishing in October 1985. 
The Tasmanian scallop fishermen, who had earlier pressed for the 
removal of the Interim Regime, now pressured for the rapid 
implementation of the Management Regime. Under the zoning regime 
Victorian vessels would be unable to fish in the beds as the area would 
be under Tasmanian jurisdiction. A meeting of Tasmanian fishermen was 
called in Launceston to discuss the future of the fishery. This meeting 
of scallop fishermen ended in uproar when a Tasmanian representative on 
the Task Force, John Hammond, criticised his fellow fishermen, claiming 
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that they did not understand the complexity of the political aspects of 
the scallop fishery management. Hammond walked out of the meeting 
called to discuss the impact of the new regime, claiming that continued 
talk of a sole Tasmanian fishery in the Strait was pointless as it was 
impossible to obtain. 
As a result of this meeting a Stanley fisherman, Mr. F. Hursey, 
claimed that much of the problems in the Tasmanian scallop fishery were 
caused by an ignorance of the role of the Commonwealth in the management 
of the fishery. He called for greater emphasis on the role of the 
Commonwealth legislation and the AFS. The Task Force representatives had 
become very aware of these issues and were obviously frustrated that 
their fellow fishermen were critical of their actions. 
The Banks Strait war ended with the limited opening of the beds, and 
a self imposed bag limit by Tasmanian fishermen. Not surprisingly, these 
fishermen claimed that the Victorians fishing these beds were not party 
to this unofficial agreement. Reports of scallops rotting on Melbourne 
wharves due a shortage of processing facilites in Victoria was _ 
publicised by Tasmanian media. 
Prior to Christmas the Tasmanian Department of Sea Fisheries (DSF) 
released a draft management plan the scallop fishery in Tasmanian 
waters. This plan addressed alternative options available for the long 
term management of the fishery and recommended the introduction of 
"catch quotas". These quotas, known as Individual Transferable Quotas 
(ITQ's), are a strategy of resource management that, allocates a total 
allowable catch and divides this total among the number of fishermen 
124. 
within the fishery. Since the quota allocation can be transferred if the 
fisherman does not undertake to catch his full quota the maximum return 
from the fishery can be maintained. A key factor in the ITQ system is 
being able to accurately assess the total allowable catch, or at least 
being able to predict a total catch that can safely be exploited without 
damaging the resource stocks for future years. 
The DSF considered the management of the scallop fishery to be 
undertaken through either the introduction of bag limits, a zoning 
system based on endorsements for different areas or the introduction of 
the ITQ system. The management plan had been discussed with the Scallop 
Liaison Committee with the recommendation that the ITQ system be applied. 
The quota allocated to a vessel would relate to the past fishing 
commitment and current licence endorsements. To qualify for a quota the 
owner of the vessel must have been licensed to catch scallops in the 
area of the management plan, (all waters except the D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel) in 1985, and have landed scallops in any period between 1975 
and 1985. The size of the quota related to "units" allocated according 
to "commitment", "participation" and "performance" criteria. Each of 
these criteria gave a certain number of units, or points, with a maximum 
of 250 points available. 
The development of this Management Plan for the Tasmanian Zone of 
the Bass Strait scallop regime was linked to the agreement made in July 
1985 where the Commonwealth had to approve the 'management systems in 
each of the extended zones prior to the regime's implementation. In 
Victoria the limited entry system and a restriction between "bay" and 
"open water" licences was to be maintained. Tasmania's system of 
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multiple endorsements had led to a large number of vessels having 
scallop licences. Fisheries managers were concerned that with such a 
large fleet levels of resource exploitation needed to be controlled if 
the fishery was able to survive the characteristic fluctuations in 
catches. Although the Tasmanian Plan opposed "bag limits" as less 
satisfactory option than the introduction of quotas, the former was 
eventually adopted after fishermen opposed the ITQ proposal. 
The summer closure of the Bass Strait scallop season was announced 
on Boxing Day by the Commonwealth Minister for Primary Industry. The 
closure to remain in force until discussions were held with the States 
to determine the most appropriate date for the reopening of the Bass 
Strait beds. 
Problems in the Victorian fishery continued to receive political 
and media attention. Following the impoundment of Lakes Entrance vessels 
after they attempted to fish in Port Phillip Bay in contravention of 
their licences, the Lakes Entrance fishermen continued to agitate for 
access to the Port Phillip Bay fishery. The fishermen claimed that they 
were unable to meet financial commitments due to the downturn in the 
catches from the beds in Bass Strait. In April 1986 the Victorian 
(Liberal Party) Opposition claimed that the State government should 
provide financial assisstance to the Lakes Entrance fishermen during 
the current downturn in the catch. The decline of the beds adjacent to 
Lakes Entrance had encouraged some of these Victorian vessels to fish in 
the Banks Strait area during the "scallop war" in October of the 
previous year. 
The opening of the scallop season on May 12 (in Tasmanian waters) 
was announced by the recently appointed Minister for Sea Fisheries, Mr. 
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Ray Groom in mid April. Groom, a former Minster in the Fraser Federal 
government and more recently advisor to the Premier of Tasmania, was 
appointed to the position following the re-election of the Gray 
government in February 1986. The announcement of the opening of the 
scallop fishery also indicated that the D'Entrecasteaux Channel and 
Norfolk and Storm Bays would remain closed. Negotiations were 
continuing, according to the Minister, between the Tasmanian, Victorian 
and Commonwealth governments over the implementation of the Managment 
Regime. 
Folowing 	 a week after the announcement of the opening of the 
Tasmanian waters, (at this stage not including the extended jurisdiction 
proposed under the scallop regime), the Commonwealth Minister announced 
that the Bass Strait beds would remain closed until a decision had been 
reached regarding the OCS agreement and the management of the scallop 
fishery. Mr. Kerin, the Commonwealth Minster for Primary Industry, 
expected this decsion in mid May, with beds likely to be opened soon 
after the agreement had been ratified. The Tasmanian Minister announced 
that as a result the opening of the scallop fishery would be postponed 
a month. 
The following month marked a period of intense industry and 
government interaction particularly in Tasmania. The Tasmanian Scallop 
Fishermens Association (TSFA ), which had emerged as the major industry 
group at this stage of negotiations, supported the Tasmanian government 
decision to postpone the opening of the scallop season until June. This 
decision was made following surveys of the Banks Strait beds, and the 
continuing negotiations over the implementation of the management 
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Regime.Extending the closure would increase the size of the scallops and 
increase the possibilty of the political settlement over the management 
of scallop when the Regime would be ratified. 
The introduction of a bag limit as the major restriction on the 
fishery was opposed by the operators of larger vessels. The bag limit, 
linked to the length of the vesel and limited to a maximum of 140 bags, 
arose out of the failure of the ITQ plan to gain endorsement from the 
Tasmanian government. John Hammond, (a Flinders Island fisherman), 
criticised the bag limit stating in the media that "it wouldn't matter 
whether you had the Queen Mary out there, you would still be limited to 
140 bags per trip". Hammond claimed that the bag limit unfairly 
penalised the larger vessels which had higher operating costs by 
reducing the return per trip. 
This criticism of the bag limit was rejected by the head of the 
scallop commodity group of the Tasmanian Fishing Industry Council, 
(TFIC ), Mr. Bob Lowth. Lowth was also president of the TSFA which had 
supported the Ministers decision regarding the bag limit. Lowth claimed 
that the introduction of the bag limit was a way of giving the fishery 
some stability, and viewed the opponents of the bag limit, the 
owner/operators of larger vessels, as a "minority group" who were "out 
of step" with the majority of scallop fishermen. The TSFA continued to 
meet concerning the management of the scallop fishery, with discussion 
chiefly centred around the impostition of a "trip limit", the number of 
trips a fisherman could make to the Banks Strait beds in one week. 
The Tasmanian Minister for Fisheries, (Mr. Ray Groom), announced 
that Tasmanian control over the extended scallop fishing zone was 
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expected to be finalised by the ti me the scallop season was to 
be open, that was by June 12 1986. In the announcement the Minister 
also stated that restrictions and regulations• would only apply for the 
1986 season, as a detailed assessment of management options was to be 
undertaken in this interim period. In announcing the bag limit as the 
major restriction 	 on the catch, Mr Groo m rejected industry calls 
for 	 the i mpostion of trip li mits. The Minister said existing license 
holders would be eligible to fish in the zone when it was proclaimed, 
however he stressed that there would be no need to fish to protect an 
entitlement for future years. This latter announcement was aimed at 
reducing the number of vessels to those committed to the fishery at the 
current time, yet not preventing those who did not fish from gaining 
future endorsements. 
In late May the Tasmanian media announced "a reluctant agreement" 
between scallop fisher men over the introduction of voluntary trip 
limits. The government had not implemented the TSFA initiative of trip 
restrictions, possibly because it was not universally accepted through 
the industry. The TSFA had originally proposed one trip per week, with 
the compromise alluded by the media concerning the introduction a 
voluntary two trips per week restriction. The TSFA e mphasiseci the 
"gentleman's agreement" nature of the compromise, admitting that they 
were powerless to enforce the limit, and were relying on their members 
to accept the limit. As the goverment would not act on this initiative, 
the TSFA emphasised its commitment to the conservation of the fishery, 
and advertised its position in the media. As part of this, the TSFA 
published a definition of the "scallop week", two trips were to be 
undertaken with the "first landings being taken between Sunday AM  and 
the last landings no later than Sunday PM" (sic. ). 
129. 
The Bass Strait Scallop Management Regime was implemented, as 
foreshadowed, in early June 1986. The implementation of the regime was 
announced by a joint statement from the Commonwealth, Tasmanian and 
Victorian Ministers responsible for fisheries. This statement announced 
the regi me as the first stage of the gradual i mple mentation of the 
fisheries package of the OCS as it applied to specific fisheries or 
regions. The announcement made on the 6th June enabled the scallop 
season to open as planned in the middle of the month. 
As the scalop season opened the issue of licences and endorsements 
for the extended Tasmanian zone emerged. Applications for endorsements 
had to be made to work the Banks Strait beds; an area which was to be 
the focus of the fishery in the 1986 season, given the abundant fish 
available. Fishermen who had not gained the appropriate endorsements 
before leaving port were warned they risked losing their catch and other 
penalties by fisheries patrol officers, 	 policing the opening of the 
season in the zone of extended jurisdiction. 	 As a result some vessels 
chose to remain in port. The TSFA caled the licencing problem a "storm 
in a teacup" stating that given the number of vessels wishing to fish 
the area delays in processing the licenses were inevitable. 
The Banks Strait beds provided good catches and the season was 
forecast as being the best ever, with fishermen and processors geared 
to handle an increased volume of shellfish. The opening of the season 
was accompanied by an almost jingoistic fervour in the Tasmanian media. 
"They're ours" was one notable headline in a continuation of the 
"jingoism" of the scalop "war" of October 1985. The media detailed the 
TSF A as the major industry group, stressing the good relations the 
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Association had developed with the Department of Sea Fisheries and the 
Minister for Sea Fisheries. 
The opening of the season and the potential of greatly improved 
catches and returns for the fishery provided the fisheries managers with 
one more problem. 	 Sales or transfers of scalop licences were frozen to 
"stop profiteering through the sale 	 of recently granted licences", that 
was those endorsements granted to fish in the Banks Strait area. 	 The 
Minister announced that all applications for licence transfer were to be 
referred to a licence review panel. The large number of endorsements 
held by Tasmanian fishermen, and the ready access to scallop licences 
under the open entry, multiple endorsement system in the State had 
concerned fisheries managers from both the Commonwealth and Victoria as 
well as in Tasmania. This issue was one that was obviously going to 
provide an important focus for the future management of the Tasmanian 
fishery. The problems of an increased abundance of the resource stocks 
artificially inflating the value of the licence were apparent in the 
freezing of license sales. Given the widely published ai m of the 
Tasmanian Department of Sea Fisheries and the Minister to reduce the 
number of Tasmanian scalop licences, and reduce the number of vessels 
operating in a fishery characterised by fluctuating catches, it is 
possible that the next "round" of interaction between the resource user 
groups and the adminstrators would concern this issue. 
The development of a comprehensive management plan for the 
Tasmanian scalop fishery was begun in July 1986. The development of a 
management plan was announced by the Minister who reiterated the 
importance of consultation between the resource users and the government 
131. 
in the development of the proposed plan. This plan was to provide long 
term management of the fishery, replacing the restrictions in place for 
the 1986 season. 
The implementation of the Management Regime for the Bass Strait 
scallop fishery provided a zoning syste m, based on twenty mile 
baselines, under the provisions of the OCS agreement first discussed 
nearly a decade previously. The Victorian zone was to be managed 
according to the limited entry principles of the scallop fishery under 
that states jurisdiction, the Tas manaian zone under the interi m 
regulations 	 comprising 	 officialy 	 enforced 	 bag 	 limits 	 and 	 industry 
initiated voluntary trip li mits. The "central zone" between these 
State zones was to be handed from the Commonwealth to the States of 
Tasmania and Victoria to jointly manage once agreement was reached 
between the States. 
Indications in late July 1986 were that this agreement was unlikely 
to be easily reached, e mphasising once again the i mportance and 
influence of "offshore federalism" on the development of fishery policy. 
Where jurisdictions overlay, inter-governmental conflicts over management 
issues, the policy process and and even policy output are difficult to 
resolve within existing institutional structures. When, as this 
narrative has shown, interaction also involves interest groups it is not 
surprising that the issues take a considerably long period to resolve. 
The following sections provide an analysis of the interaction over the 
issues of scallop management, applying the framework developed in 
Chapter Two to the empirical data. 
PART B 
ACTORS, INTERACTION AND ISSUES 
4:6 	 APPLYING THE ISSUE CO M MUNITY MODEL TO THE 
BASS STRAIT SCALLOP MANAGEMENT REGIME 
The development and implementation of the Bass Strait Scallop 
Management Regime, in response to issues which emerged concerning the 
management of the fishery, provides an empirical base from which to 
analyse the develop ment of a particular aspect of marine resources 
policy, that of the impact of the interaction between different actors 
on outco mes, and on the develop ment of specific structures to 
facilitate this interaction. This analysis incorporates two, related, 
sections. The first concerns the identification of what may be termed 
the "scalop fishery" issue community and the second the analysis of the 
extent and influence of interaction within this co m munity during 
different phases of the policy process. 
The 	 identification 	 of 	 a 	 particular 	 issue 	 community 	 is 	 both 
relatively easy, and yet at the sa me ti me co mplicated by the fluid 
nature of interest group dynamics and the variability of institutional 
responses to group pressures. Grant Jordan provides an evocative, if 
not inaccurate, description of the "elastic nets" (1981) of the 
interaction process. The issue community was seen by Richardson and 
Jordan (1979) to comprise the institutions and groups that were closely 
involved with specific policy areas and which interacted together to 
develop policy through the "operating understandings" (1979:100) within 
the policy process. 
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The 	 delimitation 	 of 	 such 	 communities 	 is 	 complicated 	 by 
definitional problems associated with the use of the terms issue and 
policy interchangeably in describing such communities (see Chapter Two). 
Jordan (1981) professes an unhappiness with the term policy community  
arguing that it should be used to describe the range of groups that 
could (as opposed to those that do) interact with institutional actors. 
Sharpe (1985) describes such an issue community as comprising actors as 
the Ministers and the central institutions, subsiduary depart ments, 
interest/pressure groups and other actors including the media and 
politicians. As is clear from Chapter Two, Sharpe's defintion of such a 
community can be readily adapted to the particular complexity of policy 
making in the overlaying jurisdictions of the Australian federal system, 
(see Chapter Three). Sharpe states that through the separation into a 
two [or three] tiered federal sytem of "government- in effect [leading 
to] the absence of a 'centre'... provides especially advantageous 
conditions and incentives for policy networks to flourish" (1985:373). 
The interaction between me mbers of what can be ter med the 
scallop-fishery issue co m munity, (co mprising, fro m the analysis 
undertaken in Chapter Two, the institutional bodies responsible for 
developing and i mple menting scallop fishery policy and the major 
resource user groups) takes place within the broad parameters, defined 
loosely, of the policy process. This process was briefly analysed in 
Chapter Two, where the policy process was seen to comprise three phases. 
These phases correspond to the emergence and processing of issues and 
the implementation of policy. 
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The final section of the chapter provides a summary of the 
impact of interaction between the members of the issue community on the 
development of scallop policy. This allows the development of some 
preliminary conclusions regarding the validity, of the hypothesis; that 
the failure of existing structures to adequately involve the non 
institutional members of the issue community in the process of policy 
formulation fosters the creation of structures that incorporate the 
major non-institutional actors. 
4:6:1 The Scallop Management Issue Community  
The narrative has highlighted the multiplicity of actors, both 
institutional and non-institutional, involved in interaction over issues 
arising out of the development of a management regime for the scallop 
fishery in Bass Strait. Although the narrative has, through its focus 
on the the interaction between interest groups and institutional Actors, 
identified an extensive issue community, it is reasonable to expect to 
find that there were actors, both institutional and interest groups, 
that did not appear within the narrative, yet that had an interest or 
concern over issues raised during the period the scallop management was 
an item on the issue agenda. These less visible actors include those 
interest groups on the fringe of the issues of scallop management, for 
example the organisations representing the scallop processors or the 
fishermen's groups that were forced into the arena to as a result of the 
widening of the scallop conflict. As the issues broadened in scope these 
"fringe" groups sought to protect their interests that were, (in the 
main), secondary to the main issue. A good example of such a group is 
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the Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fisherman's Association which sought access 
to scallop licenses for its members to enable them to undertake an 
"off-season" fishery following the closure of the rock lobster season. 
There have been a number of arguments developed in the literature 
to explain the variations in the level and extent of interest group 
interaction. It is claimed that groups with well defined links with the 
major institutional actors, for example the department's recognised 
client groups, may not wish to risk losing this status by entering the 
more public domain restricted to the "outsiders" (Scattschneider 1960, 
Richardson and Jordan 1979). A second reason for this pattern of 
involvement may reflect on the nature of issues (see Chapter Two), where 
there may well be confusion within the community over what is at issue. 
(Schattschneider 1960, Stringer and Richardson 1980). This confusion may 
be alleviated through an increase in the "scope" of the interaction 
occurring as the issue becomes more "visible", increasing the 
"intensity" of interest group involvement (Schattschneider 1957). A 
final explanation relates to the dynamic nature of the interest group 
organisation, groups may wax and wane depending on their successes or 
impact in the issue community. The interest group is dependent on a 
range of variables both internal, and external. Internal variables 
include leadership and the organisation of the group's membership to 
less tangible factors such as political aptitude and linkages within the 
other members of the community. External variables include the perceived 
legitimacy of the group, the representativeness of its opinion and 
other factors such as its "behaviour" in the public arena, or to a 
lesser degree in the private domain of the policy process, for its 
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ability to influence the processing of issues and, through this, the 
development of policy. 
In analysing and deli miting a particular issue co m munity one 
is drawn to Church's observations on resource tax policy (1985). These 
issues are more fully explored in the following chapter, (Chapter Five), 
however the proble ms identified by Church are worth considering. 
Church, commenting on the problems of making observations on policy, 
states that making such observations 
is akin to characterising a photograph - 	 it 	 represents 	 an 
instantaneous freezing of ti me ... pit is interesting in itself 
but tells little of why or how the scene was created or what 
comes before or after it. Nevertheless photographs, are important 
historical documents in converying 'objective facts of what has 
taken place and the selection of the instant provides insight 
into both the conte mporary scene and the photographer. 
(Church 1985:1) 
In this case the "photographer's insight" has been explored earlier in 
the study, (see Chapters One and Two), and the preceding narrative 
while not removing the problems of "freezing" an essentially dynamic 
process, li mits distortions of the type considered by Church. It is 
accepted that any analysis of the policy process cannot remove these 
problems. 
The delimitation of the issue community can best be facilitated 
by the development, of an inventory of actors involved in the emergence, 
processing and implementation phases of the policy process. Such an 
inventory can be useful, even though there may be problems associated 
with the identification of groups that may be less visible in the 
interaction process. A further proble m arises in the ter ms of 
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providing a 	 suitable typology through which to organise the inventory. 
The choice of any typology involves a so mewhat arbitary decision 
regarding the criteria on which to orgaise the inventory. In this case 
the criteria used were the organisational characteristics and operating 
practices of the actors. This was useful as it highlighted the dichotomy 
between institutional agencies or structures and interest groups and was 
based on the functions of the actors. The inventory, forming Table 4:8 
folowing, is enlarged upon in Appendix 1:2, where detailed descriptions 
of the major actors from within the issue community are made. 
Two factors e merge fro m the inventory. The first is the large  
nu mber of interest groups, and institutions identified within the 
inventory, the second is the significance of inter-govern mental and  
government-industry consultative bodies. 	 The presence of the such 
institutions reinforces the initial 	 pre mise that interest groups are 
involved in the aspects of the process of fisheries policy development, 
although these structures may not be designed to act as forums for the 
interaction between interest groups and institutional actors. The 
inter-governmental bodies operate at defined level and may have a 
limited capacity for responding to the interaction of interest groups. 
Government-industry consultative bodies may lack influence as they do 
not incorporate the institutional actors. Given that both these 
structures have li mitations in facilitating interaction they are 
nonetheless i mportant actors in the network that arises out of the 
interaction within the issue community. 
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Figure 4:8 
inventory of Policy Actors involved in the Development 
of the Bass Strait Scallop Manaqement Regime 
Administrative Agencies 
Australian Fisheries Service, Dept of Primary industry,. 
Canberra 
Commercial Fisheries Branch, Dept of Agriculture & 
Rural Affairs, 1985; F. & W.S. 1986 
Dent of Sea Fisheries, formerlY tne TFDA, Tasmania 
Commonwealth-State Consultative Bodies 
Australian Fisheries Council 
Standing Committee of the AFC 
South Eastern Fisheries Committee 
*Bass Strait Scallop Task Force 
Commonwealth-Industry Organisations 
Australian FishinS industry Council, 1960 
Interim Fishing Industry Consultative Panel, 1984-85 
National Fishing IndustrY Council, 1985 
• National Fisherm ,=n's Association 
National Industry Association 
National Fish Processors & Marketers Ass.h 
Fishing Industry Policy Council of Australia (FIP(7A) 
*Bass Strait Scallop Task Force 
State GovernmPnt-IndustrY Organisations 
Victorian Fishing industry Council 
Tasmanian Fishing IndustrY Council, est. June 1935 
Tasmanian ScalloP Liaison Committee 
Fishing "Umbrella" Groups 
Victorian Professional Fishermens Association 
Professional - Fishermens Association of Tasmania 
Australian Fishing IndustrY Council - Tasmanian Branch 
Fishing Interest Groups 
Tasmanian Scallop Fishermens Association 
Tasmanian Rock Lobster Fishermens Association, est.185 
Lakes Entrance ScalloP Fishermens Association 
Port Phillip Bay Scallop Fishermens Association 
Fish Processors and Marketing BO dies 
Tasmanian Fish Processors and Exporters Association 
Victorian Fish Who  and Processors Association 
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The nu mber of actors and the co mplex inter-govern mental or 
industry consultative bodies reinforces the impact of the overlays in 
jurisdiction in the Bass Strait region, (the co mplexities of "offshore 
federalism") and the characteristics of the resource base discussed in 
Chapter Three. The development of the Bass Strait scalop fishery in the 
waters off the Victorian coast, and off the northern coast of Tasmania 
led to the organisation of fisheries groups in each State. As the 
fishery moved later into the "deep water" beds north of Flinders Island 
these groups became conscious of differences in operating practices 
between the two States. The fishing industry groups from Tasmania and 
Victoria were active me mbers of the issue co m munity and in the 
identification of problems in the mangement of the fishery, elaborated 
in later discussion. 
The 	 particular 	 character 	 of 	 inter-govermental 	 conflict 	 during 
the evolution of offshore federalism in the period 1952-1980 increased 
the importance of inter-governmental moderating institutions such as the 
Fisheries Council and explains the existence of such bodies within the 
inventory. The inventory also indicates clearly that the structure of 
the resource user interest groups replicate, or confor m to, the 
separation of responsibiltities for policy making between the different 
levels of government. Matthews (1976, 1980), claims that the existence 
of a federal political system encourages interest groups to develop a 
si milar federal structure providing access points to both State and 
Commonwealth governments. The existence of shared responsibility for 
policy may enable an interest group to play one government off against 
the other, or conversely allow the institutions to confuse the area of 
responsibility between the tiers of govern ment so that the interest 
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group is unable to identify the appropriate institutions responsible. 
The narrative indicates that such a situation occurred fro m ti me to 
ti me; for exa mple, the Tas manian fishing interests were adept in 
appealing to the Commonwealth when their proposals-Iver ignored by the 
Tasmanian government, while the Tasmanian administrators argued that it 
could not act due to external constraints posed by the 
inter-governmental character of the issues. 
The 	 existence 	 of 	 the 	 overlaying 	 responsibilty 	 for 	 scalop 
policy and management may contribute to the emergence of the issue 
co m muntity policy style (Richardson 1982). Critics of the overlays 
between Commonwealth and State responsibilties in policy areas, such 
as Sawer, argue that such overlays confuse and cloud the political 
responsibilty for these policies to a degree unacceptable to the 
funda mentals of a West minster syste m (RCAGA 1976). It is the 
fragmentation that arises out of this clouding of responsibilities which 
facilitates, in Sharpe's (1985) view, the develop ment of the issue 
co m munity through the additional loci that arise in the interaction 
network. In a policy environ ment where several jurisdictions share 
responsibility for policy the institutions, depart ments and agencies 
have more in common with each other between the tiers of government than 
with institutions fro m within the sa me tier. This shared concern, 
together with the development of linkages with specific interest groups, 
also enhances the development of issue communities, with the aspect of 
"common concerns" central to Richardson and Jordan's thesis (1979). 
As the inventory is a static view of the issue co m munity it 
contains some anachronisms due to the extended time taken in the 
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process of developing and implementing the regime. There is overlap 
between actors involved in the early phases of interaction and who may 
have disappeared in later phases of the process and those actors 
that emerged in these latter stages. While it can be reasonably expected 
that there may be variations in interest group involvement for a number 
of reasons (see earlier discussion) the inventory also shows that these 
dynamics are repeated in some degree in the changes wrought to the 
institutional membership of the issue community. 
These changes occurred chiefly as a result of institutional 
restructuring, most graphically indicated in the creation of the 
Department of Sea Fisheries with the demise of the TFDA in Tasmania, and 
the separation of the Commercial Fisheries Branch from, and eventual 
return to, the FWS in Victoria (see Chapter Three). The development of a 
revamped Commonwealth government-industry consultative body (NFIC) in 
1985, leading to the creation of TFIC as an electoral college for NFIC 
indicates that the structure of such quasi-institutional actors within 
the issue community also displayed considerable change. 
The impact of these changes on the interaction process can be 
overstated, as individuals 	 representing these actors generaly remained 
the same, 	 (particularly at the State level with fewer personnel 
changes than in the Co m monwealth AFS) and the institutional 
structure of the issue community remaining relatively intact. State and 
Commonwealth Fisheries agencies retained a strong presence in the 
community throughout the period of interaction over scalop management 
even if they appear at times wearing a different "labels". 
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A major limitation in the inventory is that it does not show 
the association between different actors, the network through which 
interaction is carried out. This problem arises out of the freezing of 
a dynamic process, (part of the "snapshot" effect mentioned by Church, 
1985), and through the presentation of any such inventory as containing 
discrete classes. The narrative of the emergence, processing and 
implementation of the scalop management regime (the preceding section) 
supports the issue community model's premise that the interaction within 
the policy process is an essentialy dynamic phenomenon. 
Further 	 analysis 	 of 	 the 	 impact 	 of 	 interaction 	 and 	 the 
development of a network can be enhanced by examining the linkages that 
emerge between members of the issue community. Since the creation of a 
community is dependent on the emergence of close relationships between 
institutional and non-institutional actors such linkages are important 
features of this particular policy "style". The linkages between members 
of the issue community occur at two levels. The first is the formal, the 
contact made through shared membership of consultative bodies at the 
institutional level, or though interest group involvement in the policy 
machinery. In Tasmania the Scallop Liason Committee, SLC, is a good 
example of such a formal linkage, as is the Task Force at the regional 
level. The second type of interaction occurs through the informal  
linkages, those which take place outside the formal arena of the policy 
machinery and include the private contacts made between members of the 
community that may have a significant bearing on the actions taken in 
the formal arena. 
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The researcher is faced with so me proble ms in identifying the 
network of interaction that defines the issue community. Formal linkages 
can be defined with some degree of accuracy, although in some cases, for 
example the creation of co-opted membership, formal linkages may not be 
as readily identified. Such problems in analysing the grey area of the 
i mpact of quasi or ad-hoc  formal bodies have to be acknowledged, 
although the informal sector linkages provides greater problems. These 
linkages are sometimes impossible to determine although other studies in 
widely differing areas of public policy have stressed the significance 
of these contacts. 
Insight 	 into the potential 	 influence of the infor mal linkages 
was gained during interviews which provided some indication that this 
for m of contact is i mportant both between me mbers of different 
institutions and between these policy makers and representatives of 
interest groups. Two instances from the research interviews support 
this pre mise. The first case concerned an interview with a fisheries 
biologist who, during the course of the interview, took a phone call 
fro m a fisher men over licence fees, ( an area outside that the 
individual's responsibility ). The fisherman had telephoned the biologist 
as a result of contact made in the past. The second case involved 
interviews with senior fisheries administrators who recognised their 
ability to maintain contact with industry leaders as an important aspect 
of the development of fisheries policy. One administrator went as far as 
to say that the "system" only worked because he knew who to contact both 
in government and in the industry. Lower level staff, particularly those 
working in research, and therefore visible to the fishermen, were able 
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to target key fishermen. Fishermen, conversely, were able to identify 
key adminstrators and the staff they had the most contact with, those 
concerned with licensing and enforcement. 
The 	 folowing 	 discussion 	 attempts 	 to 	 identify 	 the 	 linkage  
network that emerged as a result of interaction over the development and 
implementation of the Bass Strait Scalop Regime. Although this network 
was at its maximum during the period that the issue was being processed, 
this interaction was, fro m earlier discussion, also i mportant in the 
emergence of the issue, helping the agenda setters identify problems in 
the management of Bass Strait scalops. In the post implementation phase 
interaction was chiefly concerned with practical issues concerned with 
fishing effort restictions and stock conservation measures as opposed to 
the constitutional or intergovernmental issues that had consumed a 
greater part of the early agenda. 
An examination of the network formed by the linkages between 
the different actors emphasises the interdependence within the issue 
community. These linkages can be depicted graphicaly, although like the 
inventory of actors, such a diagram provides a static view of what is 
essentially a series of dyna mic relationships. Such a diagra m is 
nonetheless 	 useful 	 in 	 identifying 	 the 	 components 	 of 	 the 	 issue 
co m munity that are unable to be depicted in the inventory. Of 
particularly use is the depiction of the linkages between the interest 
groups and the institutional actors that create the particular set of 
operating understandings (Richardson and Jordan 1979) integral to the 
emergence of such a policy style. The linkages between the members of 
the scalop issue community are depicted in Figure 4:9, folowing. 
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The network, 	 (with the linkages between actors shown as 
double headed arrows) clearly 	 highlights several factors that are  
regarded as important influences on the pattern of interaction, 	 and the 
operation of the policy process. 	 The diagram reinforces the existence 
of a multiplicity of interest groups and non institutional actors and 
the existence of the tripartis m in the political and ad ministrative 
sectors evolving out of the overlays in jurisdiction concommitant with 
the character of Australian offshore federalism. 
Figure 4:9 
The Scallop Management Issue Community Network 
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At the centre of the network is the Bass Strait Scallop Task 
Force. This body, with membership including representatives from the 
State and Commonwealth bureaucracy and industry groups from Tasmania and 
Victoria, provided a link between the different groups concerned with 
the issue(s) and also, most significantly a forum for the interaction 
process. The Task Force provides the clearest case of the incorporation 
or co-optation of these interest groups into the formal policy process 
and in doing so created a structure that overca me many of the 
disadvantages of the existing policy framework. 
The 	 government-industry consultative bodies, IFICP, and later 
NFIC, were concerned with issues surrounding scalop management, (with 
IFICP supporting the introduction of the Interim Management Regime in 
1983), however these bodies lacked membership from the State fisheries 
bureaucracies and so had little chance of resolving these issues. The 
formal inter-governmental bodies, at both Ministerial and administrative 
levels, while particularly influential in the functioning of the issue 
agenda and in the implementation of the Regime, were conversely unable 
to co-opt the interest groups. As a result the Task Force had 
considerable success in focussing debate on the develop ment of a 
management regime and achieved a great deal in providing a forum where 
all actors could discuss problems and resolve conflicts that arose out 
of these issues (Byrne 1985). 
The Task 	 Force for mat overca me many of the traditional 
grievances of the fishing interest groups. These grievances arose from 
the claims that governments plan the management of the resource without 
reference to the fisher men's concerns. One can argue that such 
grievances need to be put into context; fishermen were welcomed by al 
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agencies to comment on 	 aspect of fisheries management that concern 
them, the problem for fisheries managers was how to encourage this 
input. The grievances usually arose when restictions on fishing 
effort, or specifically on levels of catch, were implemented. The Task 
Force, through its industry membership from (both catch and processing 
sectors) and its visits to the ports of the region, reduced these 
traditional grievances, even if as the narrative indicates the fishermen 
still held at times a deep-seated mistrust of government actions. The 
Task Force forestaled the claim that fishermen had been ignored in the 
develop ment of mange ment options, although it is clear fro m the 
narrative that Task Force representatives had difficulties in convincing 
their fellow fisher man of the political realities surrounding the 
introduction of the scalop regime. 
The Task Force enabled the fishermen's representatives to gain 
insights 	 into 	 the 	 political, 	 administrative 	 and 	 legislative '.) 
constraints familiar to fisheries managers but perhaps underestimated or 
largely ignored by the fishermen (Byrne 1985). For the reasons discussed 
thus far, the co-optation of interest groups and the creation of a 
formal policy structure that occurred with the introduction of the Task 
Force in 1983, can be seen as a major develop ment in the issue 
communtity. The operation and structure of the Task Force is considered 
in more detail in Appendix 1:2, and its significance in the interaction 
policy process and the development of 	 is exa mined briefly in the  
concluding section of this chapter. 
As the issues surrounding the manage ment of the Bass Strait 
scalop fishery developed the 	 web-like network the 	 membership of the 
148. 
issue community also underwent some predictable changes. Some of these 
changes, concerned with variations in the "relatively small universe" 
of major interest groups, (Richardson and Jordan, 1979) have already been 
considered in earlier discussion, however the decline of broad based 
industry groups and their replacement with interest groups concerned 
with a single fishery is particularly interesting. Although the 
co-existence between an umbrella group, the VPFA, and the scallop 
fishermen's interest groups at Lakes Entrance and in Port Phillip Bay 
had occurred for a considerable period in Victoria, the break up of the 
existing industry umbrella organisation (the PFAT ) occurred in Tasmania 
during the period that the scallop issue was on the agenda. Part of 
this decline in the influence of the broad based PFAT organisation can 
be directly linked to the emergence of new, break-away groups concerned 
with single fishery issues such as scallop management and also to 
factors external to, and outside the PFAT's control, including the move 
to a fishing industry council, TFIC, in Tasmania. 
The internal forces contributing to the decline in influence of 
the PFAT, traditionally the fishermen's lobby group in Tasmania, were 
first, the emergence of the Scallop Branch within its own organisation 
and later, the emergence of the TSFA, reducing the PFAT's authority to 
speak as the voice of the scallop fishery. Part of this decline of was 
due to its organisational basis, branches based on ports tended to find 
it difficult to gain consensus on the management of a single fishery 
given the potential for variations in resource stocks or vessel numbers 
that occur in different areas. In the scallop fishery this has tended 
to raise conflicts between fishermen from different areas in the State, 
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(for example a serious dispute occurred between St. Helens and the 
Channel scalop fishermen over the management of the Tasmanian fishery). 
Both factors reduced the abilty of the umbrella organisation to provide 
a consistent view on scalop management, (see narrative). 
The external forces contributing indirectly to the decline of 
the PFAT included the formation of NFIC. The development and structure 
of NFIC is interesting, particularly in ter ms of industry-govern ment 
consultation on policy, although it is beyond the scope of this analysis 
to look at the topic in detail. In the attempt to overcome the problems 
of the defunct AFIC organisation, avoiding a structure that replicated 
existing bodies, NFIC comprises three constituent associations. These 
associations represented the catch, the processing and marketing and 
finally the service sectors and had members from each state. NFIC (in 
effect a "peak council") was elected from members from each of the 
constituent associations, 	 with each State containing at least one 
representative. 	 As a result of these developments the Department of Sea 
Fisheries in Tasmania, (DSF ), sponsored a meeting of fishermen which 
agreed to set up the Tasmanian Fishing Industry Council, (TFIC), which 
co mprised eight fishery co m modity groups, (scallops, rock lobsters 
etc. ) and a ninth, the PFAT. TFIC would provide the representatives to 
the NFIC organisation and provide the first integrated industry council 
in the state. The introduction of commodity groups contributed to the 
decline of the PFAT as it no longer was the major group in the Tasmanian 
fishing industry. 
While the Victorian fishing industry groups re mained relatively 
stable during the scalop management debate, the downturn in the Bass 
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Strait beds off Lakes Entrance provided some conflict between these 
groups. This conflict arose through the attempts of Lakes Entrance 
fishermen to fish in the highly restricted scallop fishery in Port 
Phillip Bay. While this dispute did not fundamentally alter the structure 
of linkages or the make-up of the issue community it does indicate that 
multi-faceted issues may lead to a range of interactions. As shown in 
the Tasmanian experience, disputes occurring within the industry groups 
make it difficult to develop policy as the larger concerns are ignored 
while the particular isues are dealt with. 
The identification of the 	 actors comprising the issue community 
through the inventory of actors involved and the development of the 
formal, (or identifiable) linkages between these actors is one aspect of 
the analysis of the interaction process. The effectiveness and impact 
of non institutional actors in the phases of the policy process, 
(associated with the emergence, processing and implementation of the 
Management Regime for the Bass Strait scalop fishery) is also important 
in the analysis of this interaction. This aspect of the analysis 
comprises the folowing section. 
4:6:2 The Policy Process, Interaction and the Development of the Bass  
Strait Scalop Management Regime 
This section is concerned with examining the extent, and influence 
of interest group involvement in the phases of the policy process 
concerning the emergence and processing of issues and the implementation 
of policy concerning the management of the scallop fishery in Bass 
Strait. 
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Earlier in the study (see Chapter Two) it was argued that the 
policy process can be separated into different phases and that the level 
of interest group interaction will vary 	 between the different phases of 
the process. 	 It was postulated that while an issue can emerge through 
the actions of a single, or a relatively small number of groups with an 
interest in the issue, the placing of the issue on the agenda encourages 
other groups to become involved. While the processing of issues provides 
the possibility for the maximum level of input from interest groups, the 
implementation phase of the process is usualy perceived as being firmly 
under the control of institutional actors. An exception to this 
generalisation occurs when interest groups are recognised as important 
agents in the fine-tuning of policy following the decisions made by 
institutions regarding the policy content. 
The analysis of the emergence of the issues surrounding scallop 
management in Bass Strait indicates that these issues were placed on the 
agenda in a relatively straight forward manner and yet, at the same 
time, this phase of the process displays the complexity which arises out 
of the existence of multiple, and overlaying jurisdictions, and 
responsibilties for fisheries policy. In a very real sense the the 
emergence of the scalop management on the agenda occured at two levels, 
with the scallop management problems initially emerging within the 
Tasmanian fishery contributing to the later agenda-setting by the 
Commonwealth. The "problem" of scalop mangement was multi-faceted, 
which also contributed to the complex process of issue identification 
and emergence. 
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The problems in 	 the Bass Strait scallop fishery which were 
initially publicised by Tasmanian fishermen, and which contributed to 
the emergence of the "issue", included a period of a sharp decline in 
catches, the introduction of the Allied Fisheries fleet, the shift of 
the scallop fishery in Bass Strait into deep water beds off the Furneaux 
Group bringing Victorian and Tasmanian vessels into the same grounds, 
and the perception of fishermen on differing restrictions, particularly 
differences in dredge size and scalop size-limits between the vessels. 
These issues emerged in conjunction with a disatisfaction among the 
Tas manian fisher men over the actions of the Tas manian Fisheries 
Development Authority, (TFDA), in its management of the Tasmanian 
scallop fishery. Part of this disatisfaction emerged out of the handling 
of the Allied Fisheries issue and the continued "encroach ment" of 
Victorian vesels, (with, incidently, correct Commonwealth endorsements) 
on what were regarded as the "traditional" fishing grounds of the 
Tas manian fleet. These issues were i mportant to the fisher men but 
disregarded by the Tasmanian government as lacking substance, or even 
within the competence of the State to resolve. 
The second "level" of the e mergence of the issue occurred in 
November 1983 when the Commonwealth government introduced the Interim 
Management Regime. This regime was introduced as a result of government 
concern at all levels, both commonwealth and State over the future of 
the fishery (Pontin and Millington 1985). The intervention of the 
Co m monwealth followed increasing proble ms in the fishery and an 
inabilty, or reluctance, of the two States to resolve these issues 
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without the active participation of the Commonwealth,( see pp. 113-116). 
The November 1983 decision introduced a limited entry fishery and placed 
the issue of a longer term management regime firmly on the agenda, with 
the Tasmanian government reluctantly agreeing to the interim regime but 
stressing that it was an interim measure. 
It is obvious that some of the problems central to the management 
of Bass Strait scallops had existed for a considerable period prior to 
the introduction of the Interim Regime. An important aspect of the 
emergence of issue is the impact of issue definition, that is the 
decisions made by institutional actors over which issues are placed on 
the agenda (see Chapter Two). Richardson and Jordan (1979) along with 
several other writers, Schattschneider (1960), Downs (1972), Stringer 
and Richardson (1980), see the institutional actions associated with the 
definition of issues as an important stage in the emergence of issues. 
The placement of a particular issue on the agenda over alternatives, for 
example the introduction of an Interim Regime instead of the 
restrictions on Victorian vessels demanded by Tasmanian fishermen, may 
have great influence on the pattern of interaction or more significantly 
the final policy outcome. 
In analysing the impact of interest groups on the emergence of the  
issue of scallop management, (accepting that the introduction of a 
mangement regime considered indirectly, but did not address some of the 
fishermen's concerns identified earlier ), the interest groups were 
therefore active in the identification of problems, and can be credited 
with some influence on the placement of the issue on the agenda. The 
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assessment of this influence must take account of the actions of the 
institutional actors, and particularly the effect of the overlays in 
jurisdiction which gave the emergence of the issue two stages. 
The problems in scallop management, resulting from the variations 
in catches due to the biological and oceanographic influences on the 
fluctuations in recruitment, are well known and acknowledged by 
fisheries managers. The interaction over issues of management initiated 
by the fisheries interest groups was successful in politicising the  
issue, (see narrative), and enhancing the emergence of issues concerning 
Bass Strait scallop management onto the agenda. Although one must 
acknowledge the importance of institutional actors in the development of 
the Regime, without the strong and persistent pressure applied by some 
industry groups it is doubtful whether the format of zoning forming the 
basis of the regime would have originated. Lack of agreement between 
the States forced the introduction of the Commonwealth's second option 
(zoning) as opposed to a single line of demarcation between the 
fisheries (Pontin and Millington 1985). 
The declaration of the Interim Management Regime marked the formal 
entry of the Commonwealth into the interaction process, and also the 
beginning of the second phase of the policy process, the processing of  
the issue. Earlier analysis (see Chapter Two) has argued that this phase 
of the policy process is the focus of interest group interaction, where 
a maximum number of groups will be involved due to the increasing 
visibilty of the issue. The empirical evidence supports such a 
proposition as one can detect an increase in the interaction between 
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different actors following the entry of the Commonwealth in November 
1983. Interaction between actors was further enhanced with the 
development of the Bass Strait Scallop Task Force in 1984. Between the 
publication of the Task Force Discussion Paper in September 1984 and the 
announcement of the agreed zoning scheme of management in July 1985 the 
interaction process emphasised the problems associated with processing 
issues that concern multiple jurisdictions. The processing of the issue 
at one level (i.e. attempting to gain agreement between the States over, 
fisheries management) was greatly influenced by other factors, for 
example the presence of external unresolved constitutional issues, (the 
state of play with the OCS). 
As can be expected important influences on the interaction between 
interest 	 groups 	 and 	 the 	 institutional 	 actors occurring during the 
processing of the issue of scallop management reflected action 
undertaken in earlier stages of the policy process. The multiplicity of 
actors involved in this particular issue community relates to the 
particular pattern of issue emergence. Scalop management problems first 
surfaced in Tasmania and then became the concern of the Commonwealth and 
Victorian governments. A related factor was the impact of issue 
definition on interaction, clearly seen in the ,persistence of interest 
groups pressing isues that were outside the agenda guidelines set by the 
institutions. An example of this is the continued claim by Tasmanian 
fishermen for the line of demarcation in the fishery to extend to the 
39°12' Lat. S. baseline, an issue that was never considered due to the 
strong rejection of such a boundary by Victoria. 
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An explanation of this behaviour by interest groups can be found in 
the literature. It is recognised universally that the interest groups 
lack the expertise and organisational base, let alone the legitmacy and 
authority, (to be considered in a following section) held by the 
institutional me mbers of the issue co m munity. This may lead to 
problems for the interest group in defining what the problem is about 
(Schattschneider 1960, Stringer and Richardson 1980). Increasing the 
number of institutions increases the potential conflicts over what is 
the issue, (reinforcing the need for moderating institutions) but also 
contributing to a " muddying of the waters" of issue definition. The 
processing of issues  may therefore be co mplicated in a policy arena 
containing multiple actors. 
The introduction of the Task Force has been highlighted in the 
discussion as an important initiative that resolved many of the major 
problems associated with developing fisheries management policy. 
During this period the Task Force was able to reduce the scale of the 
issue communtity by incoporating representatives of all major actors and 
create a small forum where key issues could be negotiated. The Task 
Force was able to facilitate interaction; it is i mpressive how in less 
than six months this body prepared a discussion paper, and in less than 
a year had agreement on the basis of the management regime. Prior to 
this the issue had been on the Commonwealth initiated agenda for six 
months with little visible progress towards resolution of the problems. 
(It will be clear that the proble ms of 	 the scallop fishery had been 
extensively canvassed 	 and that the issue had emerged in Tasmania at 
least two years prior to this). 
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The 	 for mation of the Task Force provided a focus for the 
processing 	 of particular aspects of the management of the 'resources, 
placing the major inter-govern mental conflicts and interest group 
concerns into the context of the development of mechanisms, that would 
enable what were essentially two radically different manage ment 
approaches, for the fishery to be managed under the OCS agreement. 
It will be apparent fro m the previous discussion that the 
lack of cohesion between the interest groups within the isssue 
community led to a particularly complex, and at times convoluted pattern  
of interaction during the processing of the issue. Apart fro m the 
differences between management strategies between the States, which 
influenced interest group goals and responses, the scallop fishery was, 
like any other fishery, separated into different sectors, and could not 
be viewed as a necessarily unified entity. The different sectors within 
the industry were likely to have different perceptions of the issue. The 
division of industry interest groups between the catch, processing and 
the marketing sectors increased the number of actors within the issue 
community and may increase the potential for disputes between sectors. 
This adds potential for a destabilisation of the co m munity to occur 
during interaction as each sector atte mpted to gain support for its 
view. 
The case study highlighted the particular lack of cohesion within 
the catch sector during the processing of the issue. The narrative 
ilustrated clearly that different groups, and even members of the same  
group, provided different, (and at times conflicting) advice to policy 
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makers during the processing of the issue. This lack of cohesion arose 
from a range of factors. As could be expected specific individuals or 
interest groups were more politically active or concerned with industry 
matters than others. Even within groups however there may well have been 
internal differences and responses to issues. The PFAT executive, Council 
and Branches found it difficult to coordinate a single organisation 
based view on scallop management. The differences in interest group 
responses over the processing of the issues may originate at the lowest 
level in the organisation, (c.f.  . the dispute between the St. Helens and 
Channel branches of the PFAT). This difference in local political 
activity or interaction enhaced the regional and major inter-state  
rivalries between the interest groups within the issue community. 
A final factor was important in the assessment of the impact of 
interest group interaction in this phase of the policy process. It was 
clear that the complexity of the issue led to the development of 
a relatively large issue community, although much of this complexity 
arose from the particular patterns of offshore federalism. Thus the 
structure of the issue community was linked to the multiple and 
overlaying jurisdictions that were contained within this federal system 
and responsible for resource management. This enhanced the dichotomy 
posed in the processing of the issues between the interaction between 
institutional actors and the interaction initiated and maintained by the 
interest groups, generally outside this strata of institutional decision 
making. Interest groups, not unexpectedly unsuccessful in gaining access 
to the formal inter-governmental bodies, were able to fully participate 
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in the processing of issues within the Task Force. 	 The success of the 
Task Force emphasised how important such frameworks or structures can be 
in this phase of the policy process and in policy development generaly. 
The interaction between different actors that arose following the 
place ment of the issue on the agenda, reinforces the utility of the 
issue community model in the analysis of policy interaction. Given the 
existence of a complex political framework, simple consultation between 
a single institution and a s mall nu mber of interest groups, ( what 
Hogwood (1986 ) cals a single group policy community ) could not take 
place. A second factor was that the multiplicity of actors further 
complicated the pattern of interaction, making the resolution of issues 
less likely in existing policy making frameworks. A final influence on 
the interaction network and the level of interest group interaction was 
the lack of certainty for much of the period that the issue was being 
processed over the implementation of the OCS fisheries package. 	 When 
the legislative 	 and constitutional components which set - the parameters 
of the policy process were ill-defined an extensive period of 
interaction is likely to occur as policy that can be sabotaged ( in this 
case by legal or constitutional action) will tend to be avoided 
(Richardson and Jordan 1979). 
The implementation of the scalop mangement regime, (foreshadowed 
in the announcement of agreement reached over a zoning scheme in July 
1985), occurred in mid June 1986. The delay between. the . announcement of 
the agree ment and its i mple mentation is significant in this 
phase of the policy process and is linked to both the operation of the 
interaction network and the characteristics of the policy environment. 
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Earlier 	 discussion 	 has 	 emphasised 	 the 	 control 	 over 	 the 
implementation process wielded by institutional actors. Such controls 
arise as implementation of policy, in contrast to interaction over less 
well defined issues, and occurs as a result of some legislative and/or 
political legiti macy conferred on a particular institution to act to 
establish and maintain (i.e. to implement ) the policy. This legitimacy 
or authority within the legislative system is not shared by all members 
of the issue community and may be an important influence in determining 
the fate of interest group interaction. 
Given the legiti macy and authority 	 conferred on 	 certain 
institutional actors during implementation the proposal was advanced 
earlier in the thesis that such institutional controls may be expected 
to reduce the level of interest group interaction at this phase of the 
policy process. The primacy of institutional actors, deriving from a 
number of factors including the perceptions held by non-institutional 
actors, the delegation of legislative responsibilities and finally the 
expertise in management and administration, may lead to restrictions on 
the level of interest group interaction during other phases of the 
policy process, but the implications of such controls are likely to be 
most apparent in the latter stages of policy development. 
The empirical data provided some support for this proposition. In 
the period July 	 1985-3une ' 1986 decisions and negotiations at an 
institutional level 	 were the major factor in gaining the ratification 
of the earlier agreement. It is also clear however that interest groups 
were involved in interaction with these institutions in this period. 
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Interaction 	 first 	 arose 	 out 	 of 	 the 	 Banks Strait 	 "Scalop 	 War" 
and later over the implementation of regulations over the conduct of 
the fishery in the zone of extended Tasmanian jurisdiction. Although the 
former period, the "scallop war" was important in maintaining pressure 
on the government actors to prepare the zoning scheme for assent, the 
latter example is more characteristic of interest group involvement in 
this phase of the policy process. Such interaction can be seen as the 
fine-tuning of the policy, perceived as an important role of interest 
groups and one that characterises the close relationships between 
interest groups and institutions particular to the issue community 
policy style. 
As the decision to implement the Scallop Mangement Regime was 
linked to the announcement of the intention to also implement the 
fisheries package of the OCS, (facilitating the arrangements integral to 
the zoning scheme), the two were closely related, and formed a key 
factor in this stage of policy process. Decisions to implement the OCS 
package increased the delays in the ratification of the scallop Regime, 
delay that was increased by the Banks Strait dispute. The closure of 
the Banks Strait beds by the Commonwealth, following direct 
representation from the Tasmanian Minister for Sea Fisheries, reinforces 
the importance of institutional actors in the implementation process. 
The implementation of the Scalop Management Regime may be viewed 
as concluding 	 a 	 lengthly 	 and 	 complex 	 interaction 	 process. 	 This 
interaction, 	 involving a multiplicity of actors, is greatly influenced 
by the particular constraints posed by the overlays in jurisdiction 
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emerging from a shared federal - state responsibilty for fisheries 
policy. The interaction following the introduction of the zoning Regime 
reinforces the view that the implementation of a particular policy is 
not necessarily the conclusion of the particular agenda item, but merely 
one point in an almost continuous operation of the policy cycle (Hogwood 
and Peters 1983). The next phase of the long running interaction over 
issues surrounding scallop management in Bass Strait, the development of 
a management scheme for the shared "central" zone is likely, as 
foreshadowed by the Tasmanian Minister in July 1986, to take a long 
period of time. 
4:7 	 INTEREST 	 GROUPS, 	 INSTITUTIONS 	 AND 	 INTERACTION: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FISHERY POLICY 
- SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding Chapter has attempted to provide an analysis of the 
impact of interaction on the development of a specific fishery policy. 
This analysis was undertaken by first considering the main features of 
the fisheries resource base of Bass Strait, followed by the detailed 
description and analysis of a case study of the introduction of a 
scalop fishery Management Regime. 
	
The analysis has identified an inventory comprising 	 a large number 
of interest groups and institutions involved in interaction over the 
management of the scallop fishery; actors which make-up a relatively 
large and complex issue community. The interaction taking place within 
this issue community is further influenced by the parameters which form 
existence of constrained by CO 
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are they able to accomodate ti5 C interaction, 
interest groups in policy making. 
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The introduction of the Bass Strait Scallop Task Force provided a 
framework for the resolution of the compex issue of scallop management. 
The Task Force, unlike any other structure within the fishery policy  
community, contained "representatives from industry and government . . . 
( and was) designed to increase consultation between all groups" ( Pontin 
and Millington 1985:4 - emphasis added ) . As a result the Task force is 
seen as an example of an institutional response to the increasing level 
of interaction within what can be termed the issue community. 
The Task Force provides an example of the internalising debate 
and encouraging interaction towards some formal structure identified 
by Richardson and Jordan ( 1979 ) as occuring during the policy process 
associated with the emergence and functioning of the issue community. 
T hes structures are seen as encouraging the interest groups to adopt 
the set of "operating understandings" ( Richardson and Jordan 1979 ) that 
allow the resolution of complex issues and which facilitates the 
development of policy. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
BASS STRAIT OIL AND GAS POLICY 
5:1 INTRODUCTION 
The discovery and development of the offshore oil and gas fields of 
the Gippsland Basin in Bass Strait gave great impetus to a range of 
issues surrounding marine policy. An earlier Chapter (Chapter Three) has 
discussed how questions of jurisdiction and federalism arising from 
Commonwealth State inter-governmental relations over the territorial 
sea and continental shelf have been influenced by the discovery and 
development of offshore hydrocarbons resources. The Bass Strait 
oil and gas fields contain the largest oil reserves so far discovered in 
Australia and has gas reserves second to the North-West Shelf field, off 
North-West Western Australia. The strategic and economic significance of 
the contribution of the Bass Strait fields to providing partial 
petroleum self-sufficiency, and the impact of the exploration and 
petroleum production industries on the national and regional economy 
emphasise the importance of policies concerning the management and 
exploitation of these resources. 
The development of any offshore hydrocarbons project involves 
extensive lead times between the initial "spudding in" of a "wildcat" 
well (the commencement of drilling an initial well in an exploration 
programme) and production following discovery of commercial quantities 
of hydrocarbons. The financial risk and large investment involved in 
such projects encourages the industry to support stability in the policy 
environment, enabling them, in their view, to make long term planning 
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decisions. Discussion in Chapter Three has indicated that the policy 
environment concerning resources policy in the territorial sea underwent 
significant changes (characterised by the term evolution), during the 
period 1965-1980, although hydrocarbons policy, in terms of the 
principles of permit allocation, production licensing and taxation 
generally remained stable through the same period. The election of the 
Hawke government in 1983 raised the possibility the first real changes 
to these policies, particulary through the decision of the government to 
implement the Resource Rent Tax, (RRT ), and later to introduce a system 
of cash bidding for offshore titles. 
The pattern of policy development experienced in the evolution of 
Bass Strait policy has been replicated in other offshore areas, a 
particularly relevant comparison is with the the United Kingdom sector 
of the North Sea. Liverman, (1982), argues that British policy for 
North Sea gas, and later oil, went through a series of phases 
corresponding to changes in policy direction. The first phase in the 
North Sea policy occurred through the establishment of a legal framework 
and offshore licensing system, contributing to a "fast build up of 
production" (Liverman 1982:450). The second phase occurred as policy 
changed to enable a higher proportion of the profits of production to be 
channelled into the British Exchequer, through changes in licensing 
policy and the establishment of British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) 
by the Wilson Labour government in 1974. Following the defeat of the 
Labour government in 1979 a third phase occurred with the Thatcher 
Conservative government maintained the policies regarding license 
allocation, "apart from reducing the role of, and planning to introduce 
private capital into, BNOC" (Liverman 1982:450) 
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Turning to an analysis of Bass Strait hydrocarbons policy, the 
following chapter is organised into two parts. Part A provides an 
overview of the resource base and its development, including a brief 
history of hydrocarbons exploitation in the region, and the issues that 
arise out of the atte mpts to provide policies governing this 
exploitation. These isssues concern first the allocation of title to 
exploration permits and production licenses, and second the development 
of a taxation regime for the production from this resource base. 	 The 
Bass Strait 	 experience differs fro m North Sea policy in that the 
interaction pattern involves overlays in responsibilty for policy 
between the tiers of government in the Australian federal system. Part A 
of the Chapter concludes with a description of the introduction and 
eventual implementation of the Resource Rent Tax (RRT ) and cash bidding 
policies by the Hawke government between 1983 and 1985. Both issues 
concerned the attempt to increase the level of economic rent returned to 
the government, and provide a useful empirical basis from which to study 
interaction between different actors. 
Analysis 	 of 	 the 	 interaction 	 between 	 the 	 industry 	 interest 
groups, exploration co mpanies and institutuions responsible for 
development and implementation of policy comprises the second part of 
the chapter. Following the deli mitation of the inventory of actors, 
comprising the issue community, the network of linkages between these 
actors is exa mined. This is undertaken to investigate the validity of 
the study's hypothesis on the development of institutional structure 
that reflect the involvement of non-institutional actors. 
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PART A 
RESOURCE BASE AND POLICY ISSUES 
5.2 HISTORY OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENTS IN BASS STRAIT 
The presence of hydrocarbons in the coastal margins bordering Bass 
Strait had been postulated as a result of discoveries made following 
European settlement. Oil "seeps" on the beaches and low lying coastal 
lands near Cape Otway in the West, and in Gippsland in the East, were 
discovered in the late 1800s ( Wilkinson, 1983). There was considerable 
debate over the geologic origin of some of these deposits, with early 
discoveries of "hydrocarbons" in the South Australia - Victoria border 
area in the 1920s later identified as being from a vegetable or plant 
source. This added weight to scientific opinion of Australia's low 
hydrocarbon prospectivity. 
As a result it was not until the successful discovery of oil in the 
Rough Range, near Exmouth Gulf in Western Australia, that the Australian 
oil search gained impetus. 	 The Rough Range discoveries in 1953 led to 
further exploration, 	 with oil and gas being found at Moonie in 
Queensland and on Barrow Island in Western Australia respectively 
(Conybeare, 1972). The success of these programmes encouraged the 
exploration of other Australian sedi mentary basins, and wells were 
drilled onshore in the Gippsland region. Condensate (oil and gas 
mixture) was found in these wells, but not in sufficient quantities to 
make the wels commercial (Wilkinson, 1983). 
The existence of these sedimentary basins in offshore Bass Strait 
encouraged geologists to consider these areas as potential sources of 
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hydrocarbons. 	 (See Figure 5.1 following). 	 However the technological 
limitations posed by drilling offshore in the late 1950s meant that any 
effective programme of exploration was limited. The potential of Bass 
Strait was greatly offset by the extre me wind and sea conditions 
experienced in the region and driling technology at the ti me was 
limited, and impracticable for what is reputedly one of the roughest 
straits in the world. 
Figure 	 5:1 
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Serious contemplation of the offshore basins did not occur until 
Lewis Weeks was hired as a consultant for BHP (Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company Limited ). Exploration, however continued to gain pace onshore 
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in a number of sedimentary basins. 	 A number of the larger Australian 
companies such as BHP joined in the search, which had until this period 
been undertaken by smaller operations such as Woodside Oil (Wilkinson, 
1983). The decision by BHP, a mining and steel making conglomerate, to 
enter the search for oil has been shown to be related to the successful 
discoveries in the 1950s (Trengove, 1975). BHP decided to investigate 
the potential of the onshore sector of the Sydney Basin, a sedimentary 
structure near the company's steel interests. 
As part of its project development BHP employed Weeks as a 
consultant. Lewis Weeks, an eminent U.S. petroleum geologist, recently 
retired as chief geologist with Standard Oil (NJ) quickly dismissed the 
Sydney Basin proprosal as unproductive ( Wilkinson, 1983; Trengove, 
1975). Weeks asked the company geologists accompanying him if BHP was 
really interested in finding oil, and was referred to the company's 
general manager (Trengove, 1975). Weeks advised the company that oil 
could be found in Australia, but that the areas with the best potential 
were the offshore sectors of the Otway and Gippsland Basins (Trengove, 
1975). Weeks added that the technology to tap these reserves 
successfully was rapidly advancing, and would no doubt be available by 
the time the company was ready to drill. 
Weeks considered that the Gippsland Basin was the most productive, 
and encouraged the company to survey the area prior to drilling. BHP 
acted quickly on his advice, 
... and secured titles to some 63,000 square miles of the sea 
bed from the governments of Victoria, Tasmania and South 
Australia. 	 Weeks was retained as a consultant and a new 
subsidiary, 	 Haematite Exploration (Pty Ltd) - later called 
Haematite Petroleum (Pty Ltd) - was established in order to 
qualify for taxation deductions (Trengove, 1975:208). 
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The size of the original BHP title can be seen in Figure 5.2 below. 
Later the company surrendered much of the tenement as the administration 
of the exploration programmes became finalised. (See Chapter Three for 
political-legal framework and later in this• chapter for discussion on 
work programme system). 
Figure 5.2 
Source: Leigh (1970:222) 
Weeks had convinced BHP that the surveys of the Bass Strait 
prospects would first enable the company to assess the area's potential 
and second, but more importantly, enable it to negotiate a successful 
"farm-out" agreement with a major oil company. The "farm-out" would 
enable BHP to join with a partner who would provide expertise and 
finance needed to bring the fields "on stream" in the event that the 
exploration wells provided commercial strikes. Weeks felt that the 
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negotiations over the "farm-out" agreement would be stronger if the 
seismic and magnetometer surveys were completed and that data was 
available for potential bidders. (Wilkinson, 1983; Trengove, 1975). 
The Bass Strait seismic and magnetic surveys were of considerable 
expense, and on a scale never before undertaken in Australia (Wilkinson, 
1983). The co mpany felt that this outlay would be reduced by the 
Commonwealth government's 50 per cent subsidy under the Petroleum Search  
Subsidy  legislation. This legislation had been enacted to encourage 
exploration for oil by providing an offset mechanis m for expenses 
incurred in the exploration for oil by providing an offset mechanism for 
expenses incurred in the exploration phase. Trengove indicates that 
after completing the surveys, BHP suffered the effects of the first of 
many policy changes in the oil and gas sector, when the subsidy was 
reduced to 30 per cent (1975). The survey results were extre mely 
promising, and Weeks urged the company to enter into a joint venture 
with an interested party. 	 The successful bidder in these negotiations 
was ESSO (Australia). 	 The ESSO geologists were aware of the 
significance of the data obtained by BHP, as they had been involved in 
s maller onshore ventures previously in the Gippsland region. The 
ESSO-BHP agreement for Gippsland, a 50-50 shareholding, with ESSO acting 
as manager was subsequently extended into agreements for further 
exploration by the consortium in the Otway and Bass Basins. 
The driling programme in the Gippsland Basin commenced in December 
1964 and is re markable for two reasons. Not only did the first 
"wildcat" well to be "spudded in" strike gas, but the drilling occurred 
in the deepest water yet atte mpted. The spudding in of the East 
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Gippsland 1 wel (later renamed Barracouta 1) took place on the 30th of 
December 1964, and was folowed by "a gas blowout on the 18th February. 
The drillship Glo mar III had struck gas at 4321 feet" (Trengove, 
1975:210). Trengove reports the general manager of BHP as saying "we 
were looking for oil and I guess we were just about as surprised as 
anyone when we found gas. We were at a bit of a loss to know what to do 
with it" (1975:210). 
ESSO-BHP followed the Barracouta discovery with a further gas 
strike in the Marlin field. 	 The driling programme continued, moving 
onto the Kingfish and Halibut structures between 1967 and 1968. 	 A 
successful oil strike at Kingfish was followed by the discovery of the 
largest reserves of oil in Bass Strait in the Halibut structure. 	 The 
Halibut 	 and 	 Kingfish 	 fields 	 formed 	 the 	 basis 	 for 	 the 	 Australia 
indigenous crude oil production, 	 followed by later 	 discoveries at 
Fortescue, Cobia, Bream and Flounder. 	 The location of these fields is 
shown in Figure 5.3 below. 
Source: Wilkinson (1983:92) 
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The history of the drilling progra m me in the Gippsland Basin is 
tabulated in Figure 5.4. 	 The table contains some interesting features 
which reinforce discussion in later sections. 	 The long "lead time" for 
exploration wells to be brought "on stream" is emphasised, as is the 
effect of external policy on the exploration programme. The slowing 
down of the development of oil exploration in the period 1972-77 is seen 
to reflect the effects of the oil shocks  brought on by the OPEC crisis 
which led to the subsequent raising of the world price while the 
Gippsland producers were restricted to a set price until 1975, ( see 
later discussion ) . This pricing restriction was in force until 1975 as 
a result of agreements signed in 1969, based on a five year formula from 
the time production was brought on stream. A second, and not to be 
underestimated, factor was the impact of uncertainty of the Commonwealth 
government's attitude over offshore sovereignty. 
From 1972 to 1977 the issue of offshore federalism and jurisdiction 
was at its height, ( see Chapter Three ) . The lapsing of the Five year 
pricing policy in 1975 with the introduction of parity pricing  were also 
important in influencing the Bass Strait exploration programme. The 
table co mprising Figure 5.4 is useful in reinforcing the i mpact of 
external policy issues on the oil and gas exploration programme. 
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Figure 5:4 




Name/Number 	 Date 
Barracouta 1 	 Feb. 1965 	 spudded in Dec. 1964 
Marlin 	 1966 
Kingfish 1 	 Apr. 1967 
Halibut 1 	 May 1967 
Kingfish 2 	 1968 
Kingfish 3 	 1968 
Snapper 	 1968 
Tuna 	 1968 
Flounder 1 	 1968 
Flounder 2 	 1969 
Flounder 3 	 1969 
Bream 2/3 	 1969 
Mackerel 	 1969 
Cobia 1 	 1972 
Flounder 4 	 1974 
Cobia 2 	 1977 
Kingfish 6/7 	 1977 Mackerel 	 1977 	 on stream 
West Halibut/Fortescue1/2 	 1978 
Fortescue 3/4 	 1979 
Tuna 	 1979 	 on stream 
Cobia 2 	 1979 	 sub-sea production facility 
West Seahorse 1 	 1981 
West Seahorse 2 	 1982 
Bream 1 	 1982 
Bream 5 	 1982 
Sperm whale 	 1982 
Tarwhine 1 	 1982 
Wirrah 1 	 1982 
Yelowtail 	 1982 
Flounder 	 1983 
Basker 	 1983 
Whiting 	 1983 
Manta 1 	 1984 
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The oil-search in Bass Strait developed new impetus in the 1980s. 
Declining output predicted from existing wells in the 1990s encouraged 
increased levels of drilling, helped no doubt by favourable pricing 
arrangements. The drop in the world price of crude oil, (reducing the 
price paid for the Australian marker, Saudi light crude), led to 
significant price falls under the parity syste m. Added interest in the 
Bass Basin in Bass Strait resulting in a major survey and drilling 
progra m me occurred in 1984-85 and resulted in the discovery of 
condensate and a major gas discovery at the Yolla 1 well. The Yolla 
results encouraged the consortium, headed by Amoco, to undertake further 
driling. 	 These wels were dry or produced uncommercial flows of oil or 
gas. 	 The programme was suspended folowing the decline, to record low 
levels,of oil prices. 
The Gippsland Basin remains the most significant area of offshore 
oil and, to a lesser extent, gas production in Austalia. 	 A heavy 
invest ment in infrastructure, including pipelines and processing 
facilities in the region increases the "value-added" effects of the 
resource, benefiting both the Victorian and Commonwealth governments. 
The integrated oil and gas production system that has evolved in Bass 
Strait is ilustrated in Figure 5.5, folowing. 
Figure 	 5.5 • 
Source: McKay(1485:34) 
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This production syste m evolved as a result of the drilling 
programme described above. This programme was undertaken within a 
management !regime concerned with the legal-administrative mechanisms 
governing allocation of titles and the pricing of production (which also 
involved the level of royalty and excise pay ments). The following 
section examines the allocation of titles, including the work programme 
system in detail. 
5.3 THE ALLOCATION OF OFFSHORE TITLES: EXPLORATION PERMITS AND 
PRODUCTION LICENCES 
Prior to the ESSO-BHP drilling programme in the Gippsland Basin, 
offshore titles were allocated in the Bass Strait region under a range 
of legislation. 	 Only Victoria had enacted special legislation dealing 
with "undersea resources". 	 The extensive per mit (See Figure 5.2) 
legislation 	 in 	 Tasmania 	 and 	 South 	 Australia, 
mining 	 "rights". 	 The 	 special 	 problems 	 of 








originally allocated to 	 BHP 	 was awarded under existing 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 	 The 1967 Agreement enabled the 
Commonwealth and the States to concurrently administer the area, without 
initiating a constitutional dispute. The allocation of per mits and 
production licences is an i mportant aspect of the exploration and 
production process. It is particularly relevant given the introduction 
of changes to the existing system in 1985 which are discussed as a case 
study later in this chapter. 
Fro m the first allocation of per mits in mid 1960s to mid 1986 
petroleum exploration permits were allocated using a system of "work 
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programme" evaluation. 	 In early 1985 the Commonwealth government 
attempted to introduce a system of "cash bidding" (sometimes also known 
as "cash bonus bidding") which was defeated in the Senate when first 
introduced, but was subsequently passed when the Bil was reintroduced. 
Cash bidding was restricted to the Timor Sea and modifications were made 
to existing work progra m me bidding, which as , its title suggests, 
involves the allocation of titles on the basis of the drilling (or work) 
programme developed by the company, joint venturers or consortium. Cash 
bidding revolves around an "auction" for the per mit area, with the 
highest bidder gaining "the acreage". 	 The cash bidding issue will be 
discussed in depth in the case study. 	 It is worthwhile examining 
briefly, the key features of permit alocation under the work programme 
system, as it is one of the important sources of contact between the 
corporate interests and the policy making or management institutions. 
The allocation of an exploration per mit is the first stage of an 
offshore 	 driling 	 programme; 	 it 	 is 	 ilegal 	 to drill without gaining 
title to a permit area. 	 A permit is made up of a number of blocks, a 
key feature of the permit allocation system. 	 Blocks are defined by 
longitudinal and latitudinal parameters, as offshore areas are "divided 
into graticular blocks, each measuring five minutes of latitude by five 
minutes of longitude" (Crommelin, 1974:479). The number of blocks per 
per mit varies, as a result of the obligation on pre mit holders to 
relinquish fifty per cent of the blocks at every permit renewal. Blocks 
which have been awarded production licences are exempt from the 
relinquishment process. 
The process of permit allocation begins with the release of permit 
areas. 	 The co mpany may engage in disucssions with the agency 
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responsible for permit allocation, over the proposed release. 	 This 
discussion may be informal prior to the placement of a formal bid for 
the permit acreage. 	 This is done through a letter sent to the 
"designated authority" 	 and gives a formal intention to apply for a 
permit. 	 The second stage of the process involves a formal meeting 
between the exploration company and the agency, usually between senior 
policy advisers and company representatives. At this stage the Bureau 
of Mineral Resources or the Department of Resources and Energy may be 
involved, although for Gippsland permits, the bids are placed with the 
Oil and Gas Division in the Office of Minerals and Energy. The bids are 
then evaluated according to the criteria established for the 
work programme system, and the successful tender is announced. At a 
later stage the agency or institution responsible for management of the 
permit may approve variations to the original permit conditions, 
particularly in terms of farm-in or farm-out agreements. 
The allocation of the permit is initially for six years, and can be 
renewed at five yearly intervals. 	 At the completion of the first time 
period the permit is reviewed and half the blocks relinquished. 	 The 
reason for the turnover of acreage is to ensure that the maximum 
drilling programme continues with the relinquished blocks aggregated 
where possible into new permits. 
Problems in this system are perceived as occurring when the permit 
is due for renewal. 	 A company, for a variety of reasons, may not wish 
to relinquish prospective blocks. 	 This can pose difficulties in the 
management of the programme; 	 companies may be all too willing to 
offload unproductive blocks, retaining the "highly prospective areas" 
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for the future. This poses problems for the development of new permits, 
as few companies wil be interested in unproductive permits. 
The criteria used to deter mine the successful tender in a work 
programme system are' to a degree arbitrary. -It is the perceptions of the 
senior policy makers on what criteria constitutes a "better" programme 
that is a key factor in the allocation of the acreage. Such assessments 
include the proposed driling programme for the permit area, the make-up 
of the consortiu m and its financial backing, 	 the experience the 
consortium has, 	 and given the Foreign Invest ment Review Board 
guidelines, the Australian "content" is ownership of the consortium. 
Critics of work programme allocations argue that the system leads to a 
wastage of finance, as overbidding or the progra m mes is likely. 
Overbidding occurs when companies put forward ambitious work programmes 
which restricts further operations as little financial support is 
available for extra drilling, or where a progra m me inovlves a large 
commitment in drilling in an area of only marginal prospectivity. Cash 
bidding is seen to be "open" and allows a more realistic (i.e. market 
forces) level of bidding. 
If during the exploration programme commercial quantities of either 
oil or gas, or both (condensate) are discovered the permit holders can 
apply for a production licence, the only legal way in which oil and gas 
can be produced commercialy offshore (Crommelin, 1974). 
A Cro m melin states, "a per mit holder who discovers oil or gas 
within the per mit area is entitled as of right to the grant of the 
licence in respect of the discovery" (1974:482). The production licence 
applies to a location, 	 (a group of nine blocks). 	 The licence 
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conditions, particularly the royalty payments, vary, depending on the 
number of blocks chosen within the location (Crommelin, 1974). This 
alocation process is found in the amended petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Amendment Act 1980 (Cth) which part of the Offshore Constitutional 
Settlement oil and gas package discussed in Chapter Three. 
5.4 OIL AND GAS ROYALTY AND EXCISE POLICY 1964-1984 
The evolution of policy concerned with the pricing, royalties and 
taxation of Gippsland Basin hydrocarbons has been seen as the single 
most significant issue facing the Australian oil and gas industry. 
Wilkinson claims that "what was visible right from the start of offshore 
work in 1964 was the question of pricing of Bass Strait oil and its 
subsequent effect on the whole industry in Australia" (1983:127). He 
adds that "when oil was found at Kingfish and Halibut in 1967 birth was 
given to the greatest tangle of all - the Bass Strait oil pricing 
policy" ( Wilkinson, 1983:116). This section surveys the initial 
develop ment and subsequent modifications to this policy. This 
discussion wil place the introduction of the Resources Rent Tax (RRT) in 
context. 
Previous 	 discussion 	 has 	 stressed 	 that 	 the 	 initial 	 offshore 
develop ments in Gippsland took place prior to the enact ment of 
legislation governing the administration of resource exploitation. 	 The 
develop ment of pricing policy si milarly lagged behind the drilling 
programme, being initated after  the introduction of the administrative 
regime formed by the 1967 Agreement, (see Chapter Three), and folowing 
confirmation of the large reserves in the Halibut and Kingfish fields. 
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Once significant reserves of crude oil were confirmed the joint 
venturers in Gippsland (ESSO-BHP) entered into negotiations with the 
Commonwealth government over the pricing and royalties payable for this 
oil. Existing policy under the search subsidy legislation gave 
incentives of 65 cents a barrel, (world prices were approximately 
US$1.80), and aimed at encouraging exploration in the marginal fields at 
Barrow Island and Moonie (Wilkinson, 1983). The large return expected 
from the Gippsland fields forced the Commonwealth government to 
reappraise this policy, as it would be exorbitantly expensive if 
transferred to the new fields (Wilkinson, 1983). 
The Gorton government negotiated a pricing and royalty policy with 
the joint venturers. The announced pricing policy was separated into 
two distinct time periods. The first was from the date of commencement 
of production from the Gippsland fields to 17 September 1970. 
(Gippsland production commenced 8 October 1969). The second period was 
from 17 September 1970 to 17 September 1975. Industry sources pushed 
for a fixed price for the indigenous crude, ironically in the light of 
later developments, not taking the government option of a floating price 
tied to parity with world prices. The price agreed to was A$2.06 a 
barrel, and as this was well above the current world rate the 
exploration, partners "were well pleased" (Wilkinson, 1983:118-119). 
At the time of these negotiations between the companies and the 
government in 1968, the participants could not predict the first oil  
shock of the early 1970s, when OPEC (the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) pushed, the world price to US$2.18 a barrel in 1971. 
Wilkinson says of the failure of the Australian industry to predict this 
change: 
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It is an episode of misjudgement the producers prefer to forget, 
but it does give an indication of the often co mplex and 
everchanging relationship between the explorers, producers and 
the Australian govern ment of the day. It also indicates the 
inherent uncertainty in prediction (1983:119). 
Royalties to be paid on Gippsland crude involved the introduction of: 
a system of overriding royalty .payable to the State ... 	 The 
rate was negotiable between 1 and 2.5 per cent. 	 These 
royalties were however to be over and above a basic 10 per cent 
of wel head value royalty on production which would be divided 
equally between the State and Co m monwealth ( Wilkinson, 
1983:125). 
Following the price rise in 1971 the price set for Australian 
indigenous crude began to fall behind parity with world rates. This gap 
was further eroded during the major oil crisis of 1973-74, (the second  
oil shock) when OPEC greatly increased its prices. APEA, the Australian 
Petroleum Exploration Association, concerned with the effect this revenue 
gap had on continued exploration in Australia, pressed the government for 
changes to the 1971 formula. APEA argued that the situation was leading 
to a falling off in drilling and exploration ( Wilkinson 1983). APEA's 
view is reinforced by the Gippsland drilling history discussed earlier in 
the chapter. 
Pressure mounted for changes to the system of pricing of crude oil 
fro m Gippsland. In Septe mber 1975 advice to the then responsible 
Minister, (Mr. Connor), from the Department of Minerals and Energy was 
that new discoveries should receive full i mport parity pricing 
(Wilkinson, 1983). 	 Prime Minister Whitlam announced changes to the 
pricing formula in September 1975. 	 "All oil discovered after this date, 
referred to as "new oil", would receive world parity prices" (Saddler, 
1981:129). 	 The Gippsland producers, ESSO-BHP, were disappointed in this 
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policy as the large reserves were classified as "old oil". 	 The smal 
increases for "old oil" "bitterly disappointed ESSO-BHP" ( Wilkinson, 
1983:141). Saddler states "that ESSO and BHP continued to demand an 
increase in the price for the oil they had discovered in the 1960s" 
( 1981: 129). 	 A further change in policy was announced in the 1975 
Budget delivered by Treasurer Bil Hayden; 	 the government "decided to 
impose an excise of $2.00 a barrel payable by the refineries" 
( Wilkinson, 1983:143). 
Following the defeat of the ALP government in December 1975, the 
Fraser government instituted an inquiry into petroleum pricing and policy 
by the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC ). The Fraser government 
lifted the $2.00 excise for any fields discovered after August 1976 to 
encourage increased exploration. The completed IAC inquiry was not 
released by the government for 12 months "to the chagrin of the whole 
industry" ( Wilkinson, 1983:145). When the report was released, the 
government "partially accepted the IAC's recommendations for a gradual 
move towards import parity for reserves already found" (Wilkinson, 
1983:145). 
In 1977 the Liberal - NCP government announced further alterations to 
its oil policy. The Minister for Trade and Resources, Mr. Anthony, 
announced increases in the pricing of Gippsland crude to world parity 
"for the first six million barrels produced from each field per annum or 
a proportion of the production for each year - whichever was the 
greater" ( Wilkinson, 1983:145 ) . New developments would receive 
immediate import parity prices for most of their production.. 	 These 
arrangements 
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took effect from the 17th August 1977 and were to apply until 
the 30th June 1981. The Government promised to review the 
situation before 1981 to decide the rate at which the 
progression to full import parity should be effected after that 
date (Wilkinson, 1983:147). 
In 1977, during the Budget Speech, the then Treasurer, Mr. 
Lynch, foreshadowed the introduction of resource rent taxes for petroleum 
and uranium mining (Bambrick, 1979). The "Australian Labor Party, at 
its conference in Perth in 1977, supported the idea of an 'additional 
profits tax' for the mining industry" (Bambrick, 1979:35). The 
additional profits tax became the basis for the RRT policy within the 
ALP's platform. 
Folowing 	 strong 	 pressure 	 from 	 industry 	 sources the 	 Fraser 
government was forced to announce: 
... that [it] had shelved plans for a resources rent tax on 
crude oil and uranium production ... The decision had taken 
into account the possible adverse effect of such a tax on 
exploration and development decisions and on investor 
confidence (Bambrick, 1979:35). 
This announcement was made in July 1978. The removal of the RRT proposal 
from the Liberal- NCP govenment's agenda was followed by the introduction 
of import parity pricing to indigenous production in the August Budget. 
This increase in the price paid for indigenous crude, and yet another 
shift in pricing policy, was aimed at encouraging the development of 
further exploration, and to help alleviate "the government['s] budgetary 
problems" (Bambrick, 1979:35). 
The Budget decision meant "that all indigenous crude from then on 
[would] be 	 priced to the 	 refiners at 	 import 	 parity" 	 (Wilkinson, 
1983:15)). 	 This led to increases for the consumer, but also had the 
effect of 
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increas[ing] the revenue which the government derives from 
every barrel of oil produced, by what was, in effect, a massive 
increase in the levy (Saddler, 1981:131). 
The third oil shock experienced through political instability in 
Iran in the late 1970s had important influences on both world oil 
supplies and pricing policy of crude in Australia. 
The reduction in Iranian production led to OPEC increasing the world 
price of crude oil. In July 1979 the Commonwealth government 
outlined new levy arrangements which [it] had been working out 
over the previous 12 months, aimed at tightening up any 
loopholes in producers' gains from Bass Strait ( Wilkinson, 
1983:152). 
Saddler argues: 
that although ... [the changes in pricing policy] were complex 
in detail, the basic purpose of this alteration was to 
particularly decouple the price received by the companies from 
import parity (1981:131). 
The 1979 decision introduced a "complex, multitiered levy system" 
( Wilkinson, 1983:152), as the basis for pricing policy. These  
arrangements only related to what Wilkinson calls "parity oil" that part 
of production which attracted import parity pricing. The introduction of 
a levy criteria based on rate of production was complex, and is 
summarised as follows. 	 A field producing less than 2 million barrels 
had the levy rating at $3.00 per barrel. 	 Where commercial production 
was between 2 million and 15 million barrels the levy was set at $3.00 
plus 75 per cent of the increase in import parity after 30 June 1979. 
The final tier concerned fields producing more than 15 million barrels 
(only Kingfish and Halibut) where the levy was $3.00 a barrel plus the 
increase in import parity price on 1 January and 1 July 1979. 
(Wilkinson, 1983:152). 
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The complexity of this pricing formula was criticised by the 
Opposition, who drew attention to the effect the arrangements had on 
increasing the Government's windfal in revenues ( Wilkinson, 1983). The 
ALP proposed the introduction of an RRT in place of the tiered levy 
system. The RRT was seen as a simple, neutral tax that would not 
penalise exploration or deter investors. 
The introduction of parity pricing to "new oil" gave impetus for 
increased development in Gippsland. The decline in drilling and 
development experienced in the mid 1970s was arrested, and commitments 
to develop the Fortescue and Flounder fields can be seen to be derived 
from changes in pricing policy. 	 Higher returns from existing production 
provided finance to support marginal development. 	 The 'Fortescue  
controversy' highlights the importance pricing arrangements have on 
petroleum developments. 
The Fortescue field was discovered late in 1978, and was originally 
thought to be an . extension of the Halibut field. 	 (It would therefore be 
an "old oil" field. ) 	 ESSO-BHP discovered differences in crude 
composition which encouraged them to believe they had discovered a new 
field. 	 A "step out" well from the original well ( West Halibut) was 
drilled quickly to further assess the "strike". 	 The geologic proof was 
submitted to the BMR , who' supported the view that Fortescue was a 
separate field, and therefore entitled to parity pricing ( Wilkinson, 
1983). This decision was in part the reason given by the joint 
venturers in their commitment to develop the marginal Flounder field, as 
increased revenue was achieved from the Fortescue decision. 
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Increases in world price for "Saudi light crude" (the Australian 
pricing benchmark or base ) occurred in November 1979.  The price 
increased from US$18.00 a barrel in July 1979 to US$24.00 a barrel in 
November, and then to US$26.00 in February 1980 ( Wilkinson, 1983). In 
early 1980 the price rose again to US$30.00, with an almost immediate 
increase to US$32.00 as a result of OPEC pressure. In January 1981 this 
increase in the benchmark was transferred to indigenous crude. 
In early 1983 the election of the Labor government led by Mr. Hawke 
placed the issue of oil pricing onto the agenda, as the ALP included the 
introduction of the RRT in the petroleum sector as part of its platform. 
Prior to the election OPEC dropped the price of its "marker crude" back 
to US$29.00, and also placed ceilings on production. During the 1983 
election campaign 
both major parties pledged to drop Australian parity price in 
line with any OPEC price cut, but the Labor Party went further 
and pledged to eli minate the $3.13 increase in the levy 
introduced ... in January 1983 ( Wilkinson, 1983:162). 
The oil industry waited anxiously for the Hawke government's policy 
on the pricing of oil to be announced. The contrast between the "crash 
through or crash" style of the Whitlam government and the more pragmatic 
approach adopted by the Hawke Cabinet is clearly highlighted in the 
changes to oil policy. Senator Walsh ( Minister for Resources and 
Energy ) announced the commitment to an RRT , but 
suggested that it would not be worked out until 1984, and he 
• reiterated 	 that 	 the 	 details 	 would be discussed with the 
industry 	 and 	 individual 	 States 	 before 	 implementation 
( Wilkinson, 1983:162). 
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In June 1983 the Govern ment announced changes to the levy 
arrange ment for excises on "old oil". The existing levy sche me 
contained ano malies known to the industry as "black holes", which 
concerned the large increase in excise experienced following minor 
increases in production. The Minister, Senator Walsh, felt that these 
"black holes" were a "disincentive to co mpanies to increase their 
production" (Wilkinson, 1983:162), and claimed a final solution would be 
implemented with the RRT. Due to the time taken to implement the RRT an 
interi m measure of revising excise scales was undertaken, and 
implemented from 1 July 1983. 
The interim scheme can be summarised as folows. Production up to 
315,000 barrels a year would be levy free. Between 315,000 and 629,000 
barrels a levy of 5 per cent of current Bass Strait import parity prices 
would be imposed. 	 Production of between 629,000 and 1.26 million 
barrels would draw a 15 per cent levy. 	 The scale would rise in 
approximately 600,000 barrel increments to production above 3.77 milion 
barrels, which would attract a levy of 87 per cent of Bass Strait parity 
price (Wilkinson, 1983:163). 
The discussion of the development and succession of policies over 
the pricing of Bass 	 Strait crude oil in Australia illustrates the 
complexity associated with the maintenance of a pricing policy. 	 The 
continual "tweaking" of the system over 20 years emphasises a form of 
"disjointed incrementalism" (Lindblom 1979) as a model most appropriate 
to describing the policy process. External forces such as OPEC policy 
and world "oil shocks" are also important influences on these policies. 
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The introduction of the RRT provides a case study of the 
interaction between policy actors. The preceding section has indicated 
at times that industry had influences on policy direction, the most 
striking example is the opposition to the Fraser government's RRT 
proposal. The commitment to consult, negotiate and debate the RRT with 
the industry was made clearly by Senator Walsh soon after the 1983 
election. This contrasts with the almost ad hoc policy developments of 
the Fraser years, which while providing huge windfalls, necessarily led 
to complex adjustments to cover "loopholes". 
The ALP's acceptance of the RRT proposal was enhanced by the view 
that resources (crude oil particularly) should provide benefits to all 
Australians. A suspicion of the intentions of oil coprporate interests 
which permeated the Whitlam Cabinet, and particularly the perceptions of 
Whitlam's Energy Minister, Mr. Connor, was replaced by a desire to 
deliver rent more equitably to society (Saddler, 1981). The RRT was 
perceived as a vehicle by which benefits of offshore oil discoveries 
could be shared by the companies, the Government, and, indirectly of 
course, the Australian people. 
5:5 OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS POLICY - 	 A RESOURCE RENT 
TAX AND CASH BIDDING FOR TITLES: A CASE STUDY 
The resource rent tax and cash biding issues which form this case 
study of policy interaction concern the Commonwealth government's desire 
to increase the revenue it gains from offshore oil and gas developments 
(Bambrick 1985). 	 Although the oil and gas interests, corporate bodies 
and the 	 main industry group, the Australian Petroleum Exploration 
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Association,  ( APEA ) , tended to treat the issues of a Resource Rent Tax, 
(RRT ) , and Cash Bidding as separate, and indeed as mutually exclusive 
( APEA 1984 ) , the Commonwealth government and the Minister(s) s ) for 
Resources and Energy ( Senator Peter Walsh 1983-84, Senator Gareth Evans 
84-86) saw the two issues as closely related, both aimed at increasing 
the rent or return from offshore developments. 
Much of the interaction related to differences between the major 
actors over first what the issues were, and second their effect on the 
exploration and production sectors of the petroleum sectors. APEA saw 
the RRT as a production tax that would act as a disincentive to further 
offshore drilling, not withstanding the government's claim that the 
neutral character of the tax would not detract companies from 
undertaking drilling programmes. APEA , likewise, viewed the cash bidding 
proposal as an "upfront" taxation impost that would reduce the financial 
reserves available for a company's drilling programme. This claim was 
countered by the government who argued that the cash bidding policy 
would reduce the dissipation of rent occuring through the tendency for 
overly ambitious work programmes to be proposed for highly productive 
acreage. 
These differences in perception were important influences on the 
interaction pattern within the issue community which developed following 
the emergence of these issues. Different patterns of interaction were 
experienced between the RRT and cash bidding issues. In both issues, 
however, this interaction between the oil and gas interest groups and 
the institutional actors had an important influence on the policy 
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output. Specific components of each of the revenue issues were modified 
as a result of the interaction between the industry groups and the 
institutions. 
The structure of the issue community is itself important in the 
interaction process. Given the particular character of offshore 
petroleum revenue policy (discussed briefley in Chapter 3, and in more 
detail in a preceding section of this Chapter), the Commonwealth 
government has pre-eminence in this policy area. The revenues gained 
from royalties are shared between the Commonwealth and the States, (for 
example the Gippsland royalties are shared 60/40 between the 
Commonwealth and Victorian governments), (Stevenson 1977). As 
will become clear in the following discussion, the Commonwealth 
government wished to apply a similar RRT to onshore petroleum resource 
projects, but opposition from the State governments forestalled this 
option. The resistance of the State governments to the implementation of 
the RRT for onshore projects reduced the number of institutional actors 
involved in the interaction process, with obvious effects on the pattern 
of interaction. 
The partisan character of both issues is also an important feature 
to identify early in the case study, as it influenced the interaction 
within the issue community. Previous discussion has identified 
the support for the concept of the RRT as being shared by both major 
political parties at different times, although the Australian Labor 
Party, (ALP), had a stronger commitment to the implementation of such a 
tax, and included it in the party's platform. Interestingly, although 
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the Liberal Party had considered imposing a RRT in the late 1970s, this 
party was critical of the Hawke government's decision to implement such 
a tax. The partisan character of the issues also meant that interaction 
was initiated as a result of pre-emptive institutional action, (from the 
Minister of Resources and Energy) rather than as a result of interaction 
initiated by user groups for changes to policy. 
Discussion 	 in 	 the 	 preceding 	 Chapter 	 dealing 	 with 	 fisheries 
policy has highlighted a different pattern of issue emergence. The 
petroleum revenue issues emerged directly from actions by the newly 
elected ALP Commonwealth government and interaction was initiated as a 
result of the decisions of the government to introduce these policies. 
Although the government (or, more specifically, the Minister) wanted to 
treat the two issues within the one package, the oil and gas interests 
groups wished to separate the two, first resolving what was perceived to 
be the major  issue (the RRT), and then negotiating on the less 
important, (in terms of the oil explorers perspective), issue of cash 
bidding. 
Interaction over these petroleum revenue issues focussed on the RRT 
from May 1983 (following the announcement that the Hawke goverment 
intended to implement the RRT ) to the release of the RRT policy in June 
1984. Folowing the implementation of the RRT the interaction focused on 
the cash bidding proposal which continued into late 1985 when 
legislation was finally passed. The cash bidding legislation that was 
passed applied to a limited area, much restricted in scope from its 
original intention, with a modified work programme bidding system, to 
remain for the majority of offshore waters in Australia. 
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The Resources Rent Tax,  emerged from academic research carried out 
by Dr. Ross Garnaut and Professor Anthony Clunies-Ross. The publication 
of a paper entitled "Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of 
Natural Resource Projects" in the Economic Journal  (1975) raised 
considerable debate, both in the academic community, the mining and 
petroleum sectors and government. Given the fact that the issue emerged 
from within the academic community, and that it heralded a radical 
departure from existing mineral or resource taxation practices, it was 
subject to a level of scrutiny, both theoretical and practical, that 
seldom occurs over policy proposals. 
The original proposal by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross has been extended, 
and criticised, by a number of writers following the publication of the 
original paper, (for example see Garnaut, 1981, Ball and Bowers, 1984, 
Hockley, 1984, Fane and Smith, 1986). The RRT emerged from the 
primary "objective of Garnaut and Clunies Ross ... to design a tax that 
would have little effect on production and investment decisions while 
raising as much revenue as possible" (Ball and Bowers 1984:93) The RRT 
as proposed by the original authors was adopted by the New Guinea 
government, (called the Additional Profits Tax) and applied to 
Bouganville and the OK Tedi mining projects (Ball and Bowers 1984). 
The RRT is a relatively straight forward concept and this simplicity 
is one of its benfits for the taxation of natural resources projects 
according to supporters of the tax (see Emerson 1980, Saddler 1981). As 
Ross Garnaut stated: 
The tax is assessed by accumulating net cash flows at a 
specified 	 interest 	 rate 	 (the 	 threshold 	 rate) 	 and 	 taxing 
positive accumulated value at a specified rate. Net  cash flows 
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are subject to tax from time the time that accumulated value 
becomes positive. Provision is made for the recoupment of 
investment or of cash losses incurred after the RRT has been 
first paid. Should the net cash flow be negative in any year 
after the first liability for RRT, the accumulation process 
recommences and no tax is payable until the accumulated value 
of the net cash flow, from the first year of negative cash flow 
is again positive. (1981:31) 
The RRT therefore has two parameters, 	 first the concept of a tax 
threshold under which no tax would be paid and second a tax rate at 
which the revenue payable would be assessed once the threshold had been 
passed. 
The RRT proposal was claimed by its authors to be a neutral tax, 
concerned with raising revenue from the rent or return gained from the 
profits of the project. As such it was claimed that the impostion of an 
RRT could never cause an desirable investment to become undesirable 
in the eye of the investor (Garnaut 1981). Ball and Bowers, critics 
of the RRT concept, claim that whether this objective of neutrality "has 
been designed into the actual RRT implemented by the Australian 
government is another matter" (1984:93 - see also Fane and Smith 1986). 
Ball and Bowers see the RRT as a tax on risk taking, claiming that it 
unfairly penalises the companies that would offset the losses of 
unsucessful drilling with a sucessful strike, a key aspect of APEA's 
opposition to the imposition of the RRT. 
Following the publication of the RRT proposal the Liberal-National 
Party coalition government was attracted to the RRT concept, with the 
then Prime Minster, Mr. Fraser, and the Treasurer, Mr. Lynch, supporting 
such a policy. The Treasurer indicated that the RRT had merit as a means 
of raising revenues on the large, excess (windfall) revenues gained from 
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Gippsland production due to the introduction of import parity pricing, 
IPP, and the subsequent rise in the world price for crude. The RRT was 
not part of the government's platform and was withdrawn from the agenda 
when opposition from the mining lobby intensified. The mining industry, 
including the petroleum sector, argued that the introduction of the RRT 
would have a disatrous effect on investor confidence during what was 
called the "resources boom", and also disputed the neutrality of the 
tax. 
The flirtation with the RRT by the Fraser government was 
shortlived. Although the proposal was seen as a means of gaining 
windfall revenues from the increases in parity prices to offset 
budgetary problems the issue was never really considered once the extent 
of the opposition of the States and the industry became known. Instead 
of introducing the RRT the Fraser government made further adjustments to 
the revenue formula, described in an earlier section. 
Although the L/NP government withdrew the proposal to introduce the 
RRT, the ALP had endorsed the concept and had placed it on the party's 
platform following the biennial ALP conference in 1977. This, in 
theory, meant that a future Labor government was committed to the 
implementation of the RRT. Following defeats in the elections in 1977 
and 1980 a Labor government was elected, led by Mr. Hawke, in March 
1983. Both Labor and Liberal parties had announced similar policies of 
reducing crude parity prices in the light of a decline in the world 
price during the election campaign, (see previous section). The RRT was 
therefore on the agenda and the mining and petroleum industry groups and 
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organisations waited for the announcement from the government regarding 
its intentions in this area. 
Unlike the anatagonistic relationship that had developed between 
the previous Labor government (1972-75), led by Mr Whitlam, and the 
mining and petroleum sectors, the Hawke government adopted a pragmatic 
approach, following its major platform of conciliation and consensus. 
Other issues took the attention of the newly elected government and the 
first announcement of the government's intention to implement the RRT 
was made in May 1983. The announcement indicated that the RRT would be 
implemented to take effect from July 1st 1984, and the Minister for 
Resources and Energy, Senator Walsh, emphasised that the RRT would not 
be implemented without extensive consultations with industry and 
corporate groups. 
The ability of the Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Walsh, 
• to instil oil industry confidence in the the government is important as 
many of the companies were wary of the possibilty of a return to the 
uncertainty of the Whitlam era where the industry was attacked by the 
Labor government and the policy environment was under stress by 
challenges to existing claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction in the 
territorial sea. The achievements of the Hawke government (and Walsh in 
particular) in providing a stable base for the relationship between the 
government and the industry is emphasised by the the fact that "much to 
the amazement of many oil companies who had suffered under the Whitlam 
governemnt in the mid 70s, Senator Walsh translated the ALP platform 
into a workable arrangement for the oil industry" (Australian 25/3/85). 
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In June 1983 the Australian Minerals and Energy Council, (AMEC), met 
for the first time since . the election of the Hawke government. A MEC, the 
Minsterial Council responsible for inter-governmental coordination of 
minerals and energy policy, discussed the Commonwealth's decision to 
implement the RRT. The opposition of some States forced the Commonwealth 
to redirect the RRT towards offshore resources, (where they retained 
pre-emeninence in revenue policy), rather than involve lengthly 
litigation with the States over the introduction of the tax for 
terrestrial resources. As a result of this meeting the RRT would apply 
to offshore oil and gas but not coal as the Commonwealth had originally 
proposed. 
Late in December 1983 the Commonwealth Government released a 
Discussion Paper on Resource Rent Tax in the Petroleum Sector. This 
paper contained a descriptions of the RRT, its component variables an 
the effect the RRT was perceived as having on the exploration industry. 
Industry was invited to comment on this proposal. In reply to this 
paper, BHP published its response titled The Resource Rent Tax: Risk  
and the Drilling Decision in January 1984. BHP argued that the 
imposition of an RRT may well encourage "low risk" investments by 
companies rather than the companies undertaking oil exploration. BHP 
stated that "given Australia's below world average potential for oil 
discovery the present "new oil" policy is necessary to ensure a 
satisfactory level of exploration. If a resource tax had already been in 
place the Jabiru well may not have been drilled". (Bambrick 1895:27) 
Industry sources were, (according to media accounts) critical of 
the lack of discussion over the merits of the RRT over other systems of 
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revenue policy. The discussion paper did not provide any alternative 
options, regarded by the industry as locking them into interaction over 
the specifics rather than the general area of petroleum revenue policy. 
The industry claimed that the government had overlooked the most 
important issue, that being "what level of taxation is appropriate to 
attract the level of exploration needed to maintain a sufficient level 
of indigenous oil production?" (Aust. Fin. Review 24/1/84) 
In January the Australian Financial Review published a series of 
articles on the RRT proposal, giving both Government and industry 
viewpoints, and placing the tax debate in the context of Australian 
federalism. These articles, titled "the oil-tax minefield" were written 
by Rick Wilkinson, a specialist writer on petroleum policy. The first 
article outlined the history of the RRT, the second gave the 
Commonwealth government's case for the RRT drawing attention to the 
opposition, or wariness from the States over the impact such a tax would 
have on their position in petroleum revenue raising This opposition has 
been seen as a major influence on the limitation of the RRT to offshore 
areas. The third article in the series detailed the views of the 
petroleum industry with the series concluding with an assessment of the 
problems associated with the implementation of the tax by the proposed 
date of 1st July 1984. 
The publication of the third article by the Financial Review  
coincided with the meeting between Senator Walsh and the 
representatives of the oil industry and individual companies called as a 
result of the release of the discussion paper. This meeting on the 24th 
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January 1984 is dicussed in more detail in a folowing paragraph. 	 The 
oil industry viewpoint expressed in the Financial Review argued that the 
present system of excise, royalties and tax, although not perfect, had 
taken 10 years of interaction to develop and was a suitable framework 
for the industry to operate within, given the high risk parameters in 
the oil exploration business. The industry, it was claimed, was against 
changing the tax regime as it would create a period of instabilty which 
would have the effect of creating uncertainty and therefore be a 
disincentive to undertake an exploration progra m me. The instabilty 
caused by the changes to the tax syste m would destroy the stable 
environment needed by the industry to make investment decisions (Aust. 
Fin. Rev. 24/1/84)- 
The imposition of a tax regime to cover projects that had been 
developed and production brought "on stream" under previous, and 
opposing, tax structures to the RRT was questioned by the industry in 
this article. The retrospectivity of the proposed RRT was seen as unfair 
as many projects were developed as a result of conditions that were very 
different to the parameters of the proposed tax. Other commentators had 
argued that the i mpostion of rent taxes had usually preceded the 
development of projects and that this attempt by the government to 
impose a RRT on pre-existing developments was without precedent. 
The concluding article in this series on the RRT argued that the 
time frame alowed for industry input was too short and that the agenda 
should be reset to give ample time for goverment scrutiny of the oil 
industry analysis of the tax, prepared in response to the original 
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discussion paper. This fourth article is illuminating for its perceptive 
comments regarding the interaction process; 
the 	 industry 	 finds 	 itself 	 in 	 a 	 cleft 	 stick. 	 The 	 oil 
co mpanies main thrust to Senator Walsh and the 
Treasury is that the whole idea should be abandoned 
and the present system left well alone. However once 
the industry is drawn into a discussion of how to 
make the RRT fit, the assumption is that the new tax 
will be brought in [and] there is no further thought on 
the broader questions of whether it is the most 
suitable regime in the long term. 
(Aust. Fin. Rev. 25/1/84 
Folowing 	 the 	 release 	 of 	 the 	 government 	 paper preliminary 
discussions were held between the Minister and the industry, (see 
above). This meeting, held on the 24th January 1984, was described as 
being a "round table" on the RRT proposal. Industry submissions on the 
December paper, which BHP had already published, were tabled. This 
meeting is important as it indicates the major actors in the interaction 
network and, more specifically, the key members of the issue community 
which arose over the RRT issue. The major petroleum industry 
organisation, APEA, was present as was the mining industry umbrella 
group, the Australian Mining Industry Council, A MIC. The following 
individual companies attended (all with extensive interests in offshore 
and/ or onshore oil and gas developments); Woodside, ESSO, BHP, CSR and 
SANTOS. Also at the meeting with the Minster were representatives of the 
DRE and the Treasury. 
The National Times  reported that although "each company was asked 
to prepare a paper in response to the Government's December discussion 
paper at the actual January meeting each company representative was 
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given five minutes to talk, after which the meeting 	 degenerated into a 
bogged down discussion on exploration offsets, 	 according to one 
participant" (Nat. Times 2-8/3/84). A statement released by the Minster 
following the meeting announced that the discussion had led to an 
"appreciation by each side of the other's point of view". 
The result of this meeting was to enable the Commonwealth 
government to release a further paper, on the basis of the discussion 
with the industry on the incorporation of the exploration offsets for 
unsuccessful drilling in the RRT. This paper was entitled Effects on 
Exploration of a RRT with Full Exploration Loss Offsets.  This paper was 
released in mid-February 1984. Following this paper, and as a result of 
the January discussions, APEA published Key Arguments Against a  
Resources Rent Tax.  APEA circulated this paper to all members of federal 
parliament in March 1984, hoping to influence the Opposition and 
Democrat MPs to oppose the RRT when it was introduced as legislation. 
The annual APEA Conference, regarded as the largest and most 
important gathering of the oil and gas industry in the Southern 
Hemisphere, was held in Hobart in April 1984. The issue of the RRT was a 
key topic among the major speakers. The keynote address was delivered by 
the Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Walsh. The Minister, in 
announcing government policy objectives for the adminstration of the 
petroleum exploration programme in Australia, drew attention to the 
major issues concerning the industry (the RRT and the cash bidding 
proposal). The Minister recognised the impact of "the substantial 
political 	 and 	 technical 	 difficulties [that) would 	 be encountered 	 in 
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applying the policy onshore. By the end of January [1984] it was 
apparent that these difficulties would jeopardise or preclude the 
intended commencement date - 1 July 1984. An intention was then stated 
to restrict the tax initially to offshore areas" (Walsh 1984:8). 
Senator Walsh's address indicated that the industry opposition to 
the RRT was not as uniform as it may have been expected. He disputed the 
claim that the industry was totally opposed to the introduction of the 
RRT, stating that "industry opposition to the tax is not, as as most 
reports suggest, monolithic. At least five companies with substantial 
petroleum interest have supported the principle. Even recent APEA 
advertising has been directed against any extra or different tax on 
'new oil', not against a rent tax per se" (Walsh 1984:8). 
Although many of the delegates to the APEA conference may have 
expected the Minsister to announce the proposed format of the RRT, 
Senator Walsh "hoped to be able to present those options (alternative 
forms of the RRT, including different offsets/subsidy factors), 
necessarily with details of tax, threshold and subsidy rates to 	 the 
industry next week" (Walsh 1984:8) 	 Walsh was critical of the industry's 
"apparent indifference to the offsets/subsidy proposal. 	 I say apparent 
indifference because by no means all companies have offered an opinion 
(sic). Those which have seem to place little or no value on the subsidy 
proposal" (Walsh 1984:8). 
Senator Walsh foreshadowed that if the industry did not support the 
inclusion of an exploration subsidy the government would consider a no 
subsidy proposal, but with a lower rate of tax than would otherwise be 
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applied (Walsh 1984). The Minister announced to the APEA conference 
delegates that he proposed to offer the industry the option of a lower 
tax rate and/or higher thresholds without subsidy, or a higher tax rate 
and/or lower thresholds with a subsidy. 
The format of the RRT was announced in a 
Senator Walsh and the Treasurer, Mr. Keating. 
18th of April 1984, announced the release of a 
joint press statement by 
This statement, on the 
paper entitled Outline  
   
of a Greenfields Resource Rent Tax in the Petroleum Sector.  This paper 
summarised the proposed arrangements of the RRT, providing a focus for 
the interaction between interest groups and the government. Interaction 
from this period was centred on the fine tuning of the parameters of the 
tax, although some industry groups still warned of the disastrous 
effects such a tax would have on the exploration industry. The Bulletin  
(1/5/84) warned of the potential disruption that the RRT would cause to 
the drilling programme while the Business Review Weekly (5-11/5/84) 
stated that the "level of impost" was looming as the main issue between 
the oil and gas industry and the government. The BRW article reported 
that the tax rate was seen as the key component of the RRT by the oil 
explorers, citing comments by Bob Foster, a petroleum policy negotiator 
and analysist, of BHP. 
Following a final round of industry negotiation as a result of the 
proposal released in April, the final character of the RRT was announced 
in a further, detailed, joint statement by the Minister for Resources 
and Energy, Senator Walsh, and the Treasurer, Mr. Keating, on the 27th 
June 1984. This statement, which detailed the mechanisms and operation 
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of the RRT was titled Resource Rent Tax in "Greenfields" Petroleum  
Pro'ects, (see Appendix 2:3). The term greenfields may seem tautological 
in reference to offshore areas, however it does emphasise that the tax 
would only apply to new projects in areas that were not covered by 
existing production licenses, that is the RRT was excluded from the 
Gippsland and North west Shelf production areas. The imposition of a 
greenfields RRT occurred as a result of considerable industry opposition 
to the implementation of the tax to existing licence areas. 
The statement announcing the imposition of the RRT from the 1st of 
July set the parameters of the tax which were the focus of considerable 
industry interaction in the previous months. As expected the key 
features of the tax, the tax rate and the threshold, were announced in 
the statement. The threshold was to be set at the Commonwealth long term 
bond rate, (at the time of the negotiations set at 14 per cent) plus 15 
pecentatge points. The tax rate, the focus of key industry groups, was 
set at 40 percent. The impact of the interaction process on policy 
output can be seen in the differences between the outline proposal 
(April) and the statement of June. In the April paper the government 
proposed a threshold of the long term bond rate plus 10 percentage 
points and a tax rate of 45 percent. The government admitted in the July 
statement that its original position had been modified by the 
involvement of industry groups in negotiations over the issues. 
The involvement of industry groups was not uniform, nor were the 
responses of these actors similar, during the interaction that occurred 
over the structure of the RRT. APEA's opposition to the RRT meant that 
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individual companies, 	 less opposed to the imposition of the tax, 
undertook direct negotiations with the government. These individual 
companies had as their rationale the commitment of the government 
to impose the RRT and the claim that as such a tax was likely to be 
inevitable given the complex revenue policy that had pre-existed. BHP, 
having made a strike in the Timor Sea in the Jabiru field, which, at the 
time, looked highly prospective, was concerned that the parameters of 
the RRT should not reduce the viability of this development. BHP's 
interest in the parameters of the tax led to meetings with the Minister 
for Resources and Energy, attended by other corporate interests engaged 
in the offshore oil search. Such meetings were responsible for the 
setting of the tax rate at a level that was lower than originally 
forecast by the government. It has been argued that BHP were encouraged 
to negotiate over the RRT, and to focus on the tax rate, as the Jabiru 
discovery looked as if it would reach the production threshold soon 
after the Jabiru wel became operational. 
The statement of 27th June 1984 reinforced the failure of the 
Commonwealth's attempt to introduce the RRT for all offshore permit 
areas. Earlier strong opposition from the States and industry had made 
the RRT an offshore, rather than total taxation system. Further 
opposition restricted the RRT to greenfields projects. Such developments 
were those 
offshore areas where the Commonwealths's Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act  applies, other than specified areas which will 
continue to be subject to excise and royalty arrangements. The 
excluded areas are those covered by production licences granted 
before 1st July 1984, and the permit areas from which those 
licences were drawn - specifically the Bass Strait and North 
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West Shelf production licence areas. 
(DRE Statement, June 1984) 
It is evident from published material and records of parliamentary 
debate in Hansard that the Commonwealth government would have liked to 
apply the RRT to the existing fields of Bass Strait, however opposition 
to this proposal from the industry, the State governments and Opposition 
parties in the parliament, particularly in the Senate, (which was to be 
crucial in the cash bidding issue) forestalled such an option. 
On the 1st July 1984, following the introduction of the RRT, the 
new oil policy was officially abandoned. This policy had guaranteed 
producers full import parity prices for post 1975 discoveries, with no 
additional tax to the royalty and the company tax. In place of what 
had been termed the "new oil policy" the government announced the 
introduction of an oil excise for existing offshore fields 
In October 1984 the announcement of a reduction in the level of 
excise for underdeveloped fields discovered before September 1975 was 
welcomed by the industry. September 1975 marked the date for major 
changes in revenue policy for petroleum, including the granting of 
parity pricing for fields discovered after this date (the new oil 
policy) which encouraged the development of new fields. Since these 
undeveloped fields were excluded from the RRT, and, given the the then 
high level of world prices, the industry, (particularly ESSO as the 
Gippsland production area manager), supported the government's decision. 
ESSO later announced plans to develop the small Bream oil field with 
the construction of a production platform. 
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Although the State governments had been non-committal, or had 
rejected outright the concept of an onshore RRT, negotiations continued 
between the Commonwealth and individual States over petroleum revenue 
policy. The Commonwealth was keen to introduce a single taxation regime 
for the petroleum sector covering both the onshore and offshore 
production areas. As part of the continuing negotiations with the State 
governments, the Commonwealth and Western Australian governments reached 
an agreement over the development of a Resource Rent Royalty (RRR) to 
replace the complex royalty and excise system previously in place. The 
RRR was designed as a revenue measure for the Barrow Island production 
field, and was seen by the Commonwealth as a basis for the introduction 
of similar RRR, if the other States agreed with the system, in other 
areas. 
The key aspects of the "Barrow Island" RRR were announced in a 
press release on the 25th June 1985, jointly made by the Premier of 
Western Australia and the Commonwealth Minister for Resources and 
Energy, Senator Evans. The RRR would would be be implemented as a result 
of the Commonwealth removing its crude oil excise and the State 
government removing its ad valorem royalty, (based on the value of the 
production). Revenues raised by the RRR would be shared on a ratio of 
75/25 between the Commonwealth and the Western Australian governments. 
The statement announced that the RRR arrangements had been discussed 
with, and approved by, WAPET, the operator of the Barrow Island field. 
The DRE statement said that this "new arrangement is an outstanding 
example of what can be achieved through co-operation rather than 
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competition between State and Federal governments" (DRE 49/85:2). The 
announcement stressed the benefits; to the operating company through 
reductions in the rate of tax and added that WAPET had recognised the 
overall advantages of the new system and had co-operated fully in what 
was regarded as a major petroleum taxation reform. 
The RRR was to be implemented through changes to both State and 
Commonwealth legislation, expected at the time to be underatken later in 
the year (1985). The DRE stated that although the Western Australian 
legislation would only apply to the Barrow Island field, "the 
Commonwealth legislation would be general in nature offering all States 
to follow Western Australia's example by introducing a resources rent 
royalty" (DRE 49/85:2) 
In October 1985 legislation for' a RRR was introduced into 
Commonwealth parliament. This legislation, the Petroleum Revenue Excise  
Bill No. 2 1985, aimed at solving a number of problems, including the 
question of who has the prime impost in levelling taxes against (oil) 
producers: the States, on the one hand, with their royalty charge, or 
the Commonwealth, on the other, with its excise" (Aust. Fin. Rev. 
18/10/85). The implementation of a RRR was seen as reducing the burden 
on producers, and by utilising a profits based tax regime, avoid 
reducing the viability of production operations. Under the Bill 
introduced in October the "Federal government will waive its crude oil 
excise wherever a State government produces an 'acceptable' RRR which it 
is prepared to share with the Commonwealth in an acceptable manner" 
(Aust Fin. Rev 18/10/ 85). 
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Following a seminar convened by APEA in February 1985, at which 
industry and government representatives discused offshore oil and gas 
policy, APEA published a major policy document. This publication, 
Petroleum Policy in Australia: The Exploration Industry's Perspective is 
reproduced in Appendix 11:4. This paper gives APEA's position on the 
RRT , to which it was critical as it felt that such taxes were counter to 
the incentives needed to encourage offshore developments. The paper 
outlined the organisation's position on cash bidding for offshore titles 
which, following the resolution of issues surrounding the RRT, was now 
firmly on the 'agenda. 
As was discussed in an earlier section, the traditional method of 
allocating offshore titles in Australia followed what has been termed 
the work programme system. The permit was allocated to the company or 
consortium that was assesed as having the best programme of exploration 
for the permit on offer. The assessment of the work programe includes 
a number of criteria, although critics of the system claim that it is 
ambiguous and arbitary in its operation, relying on some unquantified 
notion of a best programme. This assessment is undertaken by the 
designated authority, (the State government institution responsible for 
the day to day administration under the OCS petroleum package and the 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts), except in the waters of the Timor Sea 
around the Ashmore and Cartier Islands, where the Commonwealth 
government has direct jurisdiction. The Commonwealth's jurisdiction in 
the Timor Sea is an important factor in the subsequent interaction over 
the cash bidding issue, as will be discussed later.T he potentially 
highly prospective Jabiru field is located near the Ashmore and Cartier 
Islands (Burmester 1985). 
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The intention of the Commonwealth government to proceed with the 
introduction of a cash bidding system for the allocation of offshore 
acreage was announced in the release of a discussion paper in January 
1984. Senator Walsh emphasised the commitment of the government to 
introduce the system at the 1984 APEA conference, and stressed that "the 
system we have proposed would only apply to an extremely small 
proportion of the offshore area - the most highly prospective offshore 
areas and those vacant areas known to include petroleum discoveries" 
(Walsh 1984:4). 
The cash bidding policy was introduced into federal parliament as 
an ammendment to the existing Petroleum (Submerged Lands) legislation in 
early 1985. This legislation had as its major focus an alteration of 
the allocation mechanism for titles, where the title was to be evaluated 
according to an competitive biding or auction system. The highest 
bidder for a particular permit would secure the title. The government 
saw this as increasing revenue from highly prospective areas and giving 
a greater return to the Australian people for allowing "private 
companies exclusive rights to explore and develop petroleum resources" 
(Emerson, 1984 - original emphasis). The government also saw the cash 
bidding system removing inequities from the allocation process and 
improving the abiltity of productive resources to be exploited by those 
groups most able to do so. The oil and gas interests, almost 
predictably, saw the proposal an additional, up-front cost, objecting on 
the grounds that it ocurred before any return was likely from the 
drililing, and second that it would reduce the financial reserves 
available to the company to carry out its programme. 
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These factors, APEA claimed, would lead to a decline in the 
offshore drilling programme due to the increased investment needed to 
put up a successful bid. The oil industry claimed that this expenditure 
would have to be deducted from the finance available for the exploration 
programme. The government instead argued that the cash bidding policy 
would save unnecessary expenditure on costly . work programmes where 
initial expectations were not reinforced by the drilling results. The 
industry's opposition to cash bidding was a crucial factor in the 
pattern of interaction and the partisan and parliamentary actions that 
followed. 
The government argued that the cash bidding proposal had benefit in 
several areas. The auction system gave the successful bidder greater 
freedom in the planning of the exploration programme. The removal of 
restrictions posed by the need for companies to follow work programmes 
and of unnecesssary intervention by institutions in supervising these 
programmes, were seen as positive aspects of the proposed system. The 
oil companies could also alter the programme on the basis of information 
gained from the early drilling results which were not able to be made, 
if the work programme system was administered correctly. 
The government saw the cash bidding system as removing the 
dissipation of rent caused by over ambitious work programmes as one of 
the benefits of the system. Companies exploring marginal areas under the 
work programme system may be committed to extensive expenditure through 
these programme bids while under the cash bidding system the government 
claimed that the bids in these areas would be lower, given the 
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availabilty of data and assessments of prospectivity that were available 
to the industry. The final argument that goverment used was in 
response to the industry's claim that the system would not work 
effectively. It pointed out that the system was used in allocation of 
titles in offshore areas in the USA, Canada and the United Kingdom. 
The government announced its intention to proceed with the cash 
bidding issue (through legislation) at the APEA conference in March 
1985. At this conference the proposal was opposed by APEA who argued 
that it was "another form of taxation in a country where taxes on the 
industry are among the highest in the world". APEA's concern was that 
the cash bidding policy affected the exploration phase of the oil search 
or resource development process which could have greater disincentive 
effects than a production tax which could be offset by the revenues 
gained through the sale of the production. Although the Bill was passed 
by the House of Representatives, opposition from the Liberal-National 
Party and Australian Democrat Senators was evident. This opposition 
meant that the passage of the Bill through the parliament was doubtful 
as the government lacked a majority in the Senate. 
On the 28 March 1985 the second reading of the Petroleum (Submerged  
Lands) (Cash Bidding) Ammendment Bill - the Cash Bidding Bill - began in 
the Senate. Debate was adjourned; however prior to the adjournment the 
Opposition and Democrat Senators had given notice that they opposed the 
Bill. Debate resumed on the 14th May when the then Democrat spokesman, 
Senator Jack Evans, argued strongly in support of APEA's position. With 
the agreement of the government, (through the Minister for Resources and 
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Energy, Senator Gareth Evans), the APEA information was incorporated in 
the formal record of debate. On the following day, 29 March 1985, debate 
concluded with the Democrat Senators combining with the Liberal/National 
Party to defeat the Bill. The oil and gas groups and companies where no 
doubt pleased with this result; however Senator Gareth Evans announced 
that the legislation may be reintroduced at a later date. 
Senator Evans continued discussions with the industry and the 
Liberal, National and Democrat political parties following the defeat of 
the cash bidding Bill. Changes in the Senate membership following the 
1984 half Senate election, where newly elected Senators took their seats 
in July 1985, was an important factor in the Commonwealth government's 
strategy. The election of Norm Sanders, a Democrat Senator from 
Tasmania, who replaced the defeated Jack Evans as Spokesman on Resources 
and Energy, was an important development. Sanders had lived and worked 
in the United States and was seen as being receptive to the cash bidding 
propoal by senior government advisors. It is likely that the government 
was aware of Sander's views on multinational oil companies and his 
involvement in environmental battles attemtpting to stop the erection of 
platforms off the Californian coast (N. Sanders pers. comm. ). 
In reintroducing the cash bidding Bill on the 6th November 1985 
Senator Evans stated that 
the 	 government 	 is 	 reintroducing this Bill following further extensive examination of alternatives to cash bidding, and in 
particular attempts to identify suitable modifications to the 
traditional work programme bidding system. The end result of 
this evaluation, reinforced by industry's response to the 
proposed modification to the work programme system, has been to 
confirm in the government's view that, where competition is 
expected to be high, the cash bidding system is the most 
efficient and equitable means of awarding petroleum exploration 
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and exploitation rights. 
(Hansard 6/11/85:1622) 
The government therefore proposed to introduce cash bidding for 
highly prospective offshore acreage, retaining the work programme system, 
albeit modified by what has been described as the dry hole agreement, 
for other areas. The government argued that in highly prospective areas 
cash bidding was more appropriate according to a range of criteria 
including "economic efficiency, equity and administrative simplicity" 
(Hansard 6/11/85:1624). 
In his second reading speech Senator Evans summarised the major 
modifications proposed to the work programme system; 
in 	 summary the proposed modifications which reflected many of the suggestions industry made earlier in the year, would require 
applicants to identify the minimum guaranteed "dry hole" 
exploration programmes and separate "supplementary" work 
programmes tied to the initial exploration 
(Hansard 6/11/85:1623) 
Cash bidding was initially intended to be implemented in areas soley 
administered by the Commonwealth. Extension of the system to the 
offshore adjacent areas of the States and Northern Territory was not to 
occur until a review of the system (after a two year period) had 
•ocurred. The initial area offered for cash bids was the adjacent area 
surrounding the Ashmore and Cartier Islands in the Timor Sea. 
The debate in the Senate produced a significant ammendment from the 
Democrats, who after opposing the initial cash biding Bill in May split 
in their support of the new Bill (The Age 13/12/85). The Democrats moved 
an ammendment to include a two year "sunset clause" in the Bill which 
meant that the cash biding system would be given a two year trial 
period. The Age  reported that in the Senate 
216. 
debate over the cash bidding bill was bitter at times with the 
Opposition condemning those Democrats who changed their votes 
from 	 May 	 and 	 gave 	 the 	 legislation 	 the 	 green 	 light" 
(13/12/85) 
Although 	 passed, 	 controversy 	 continued 	 over 	 the 	 Bil. 
Accusations of double dealing during the period between the initial 
defeat of the Bill and its subsequent re-introduction were levelled at 
the Democrats by the Opposition. Opposition MP's argued that the 
Democrats had agreed to support the cash bidding Bill in return for 
stronger Commonwealth intervention in environmental policy issues, 
chiefly the renewal of Tasmanian export woodchip licenses. This 
accusation was initially denied by both the Democrats and the Government, 
although subsequently Senator Sanders admitted in an interview published 
in The Mercury in April 1986 that he had attempted to gain concessions 
from the government in return for support for the cash bidding issue. 
The passage of the cash bidding Bill through the Senate and its 
subsequent assent enabled the government to prepare to offer five highly 
prospective permits in the Timor Sea for cash bids. Late in 1985 the 
first permits to be offered under the modified work programme system  
were gazetted. These six permits were all in Western Australian waters 
and were areas that had been relinquished from initial permits. The 
applications for these permits were to close in April 1986. Permits for 
unallocated acreage in the Gippsland and Ot way Basins in Bass Strait 
were released in early 1986. Per mits for areas in the 
Bass Basin in Bass Strait using the modified work programme system were 
expected to be released in mid 1986. 
The announcement of the first successful cash bid for a permit in 
Australian waters was made in mid July 1986. This permit, one of five in 
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the Timor Sea available for bidding, attracted one bid and was located 
75 km southwest of the Jabiru discovery. 
The period 1983-84 had witnessed the greatest changes to the 
revenue/taxation regime for offshore hydrocarbon resources since the 
initial development of the Gippsland revenue agreements. The interaction 
between the institutions responsible for introducing and implementing 
this regime, and the interest groups affected by the revenue policy 
changes, is analysed in the following section. 
PART B 
ACTORS,INTERACTION AND ISSUES. 
5:6 ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVENUE POLICY IN THE OFFSHORE OIL 
AND GAS SECTOR. 
The processing and implementation of the RRT and cash bidding 
policies 	 indicates 	 that 	 first, 	 oil 	 and 	 gas 	 interest 	 groups 
were important actors in the policy process, 	 and that second, 
interaction between these interest groups and institutional policy 
actors had an important, if at times varying, effect on the policy 
output. The inclusion of corporate bodies, the oil exploration 
companies, in a broad definition of "interest groups" may be queried, 
however this follows the proposal made by Wootton (1970), that such 
bodies may be regarded as representing a particular "interest" in policy 
making. 
One can usefully apply the issue community model . as a means of 
contributing to the analysis of the development of these petroleum 
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policies although the pattern of interaction experienced may reflect 
conditions that are unique to these particular issues. The pattern of 
interaction, and indeed the structure of the issue community identified 
in this analysis can be compared with the interaction and issue 
community that arose out of the development of the fishery policy 
examined in the preceding Chapter, and provides an alternative empirical 
basis for the examination of the hypothesis proposed on the development 
of particular structures in the policy environment. 
Interaction between the actors involved in the issues surrounding 
the development of the RRT and/or cash bidding policies incorporate two 
variables; the inter-relationships between actors and the effect that 
this can have on policy development (the issue community thesis), and 
second, the extent to which the interest groups were able to influence 
the policy output. The second variable involves an analysis of the 
policy process, incorporated and discussed in some detail by Richardson 
and Jordan who indicate that the emergence of an issue community policy 
style, (1979, see also Jordan, 1982) is closely related to the 
interaction 	 between 	 interest 	 groups 	 as 	 policy 	 is developed 	 and 
implemented. 
The following sections examine these variables and follow a similar 
structure to that employed in the previous chapter. The identification 
of the issue community and the examination of linkages between members 
of the community precedes an analysis of the interaction during the 
• three phases of the policy 	 process identified in Chapter Two. These 
phases correspond to the emergence and processing of issues and the 
not fragmented into multiple interest groups. This 
was emphasised by the fact that the industry had 
organisation, the Australian Petroleum Exploration 
which was able to • contribute significantly to the 
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implementation of policy. 	 The examination of the passage of the issue 
through the policy process occurs because the interaction between 
interest groups and institutions takes place within this process, and 
that the parameters of the process, including agenda control, can have a 
significant impact on policy output. 
5:6:1 The RRT and Cash Bidding Issue Community. 
Unlike the fisheries issue community examined in the previous 
chapter, which involved a multiplicity of actors, the interaction 
surrounding the RRT and cash bidding issues involved a small number of 
highly organised and potentially powerful organisations and groups. 
These actors had strong views on the direction policy should take. 
Unlike the fisheries interest groups the oil and gas industry, while not 
always unified, was 
lack of fragmentation 
a powerful umbrella 
Association, (APEA ), 
interaction process. 
Although APEA's importance in the interaction over the RRT and cash 
bidding issues cannot be underestimated, (see previous discussion), it 
is equally important to emphasise that the oil and gas companies, some 
of whom were major forces in the Australian exploration industry, did 
not necessarily support the APEA line of argument. This was particularly 
obvious over interaction on the RRT issue. This is not unexpected, given 
the breadth of opinion in such a community. The• groups which make up 
the umbrella organisation may not necessarily support the views 
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expressed by the larger organisation, as identified in the previous 
fisheries case study. 
APEA's prime position within the issue communtiy as a major 
industry spokesman is evident. APEA undertook much of the lobbying of 
the Government, Opposition and Democrat politicians, although individual 
companies were also active, albeit less visibly in interacting with 
other members of the issue community. It is evident that from the APEA 
conference in April 1984 that industry opinion on the RRT was not 
monolithic, nor united in its support for APEA's position of total 
opposition to the tax. While the cash bidding issue was more generally 
opposed by the industry, again the issue community was divided as APEA 
and individual companies negotiated over the issue. These negotiations 
resulting in the modifications to the work programme system and the 
restrictions of cash bidding to the Timor Sea permits. 
The issue community comprised a number of other actors as well as 
APEA and the individual oil and gas exploration companies such as BHP, 
ESSO or WAPET. Although the same actors were involved in each issue one 
should refer to issue communities given that the RRT and cash bidding 
issue were treated by industry, if not by government, as separate 
issues. The membership of the issue community can be identified from the 
previous narrative although it is more convenient to delimit it as an 
inventory, simply listing the institutions and interest groups involved. 
Using a similar typology to that employed in the previous case study, 
the inventory is organised into classes using criteria which separates 
the actors on the basis of their function, and to a certain extent, 
their structure. 
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The inventory includes first the adminstrative agencies responsible 
for 	 offshore 	 oil 	 and 	 gas 	 policy, 	 second, 	 the 	 co-ordinating 
inter-governmental bodies, third the industry umbrella groups and 
finally the individual companies. The choice of these classes is some 
what arbitary, (see previous chapter), but it does enable a delimitation 
of the actors to be made as well as conforming to a 'public - private 
continuum" of policy actors following the classification developed by 
Curnow and Wettenhall (1981), and Hague, Mackenzie and Barker (1975). 
Figure 5:6 
InventorY'of Oil and Gas PolicY Actors 
Government 
Commonwealth 
Department of Resources and Energy (DRE) 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and 
(BMR) 
Geophysics 
Victoria Oil and Gas Division, Office of Minerals and Energy, 
. Department of Industry, Technology and Resources 
Tasmania 
Department of Mines 
Commonwealth—State Consultative Bodies 
Australian Minerals and Energy Council (AMEC) 
Offshore Petroleum Joint Authorities: Cth—Victoria 
Cth—Tasmania 
InduStrY Organisations 
Australian Petroleum ExPloration Association (APEA) 
Australian. Mineral Industry Council (AMIC) 
Oil and Gas Companies 
Broken Hill ProprietorY Co. (BHP); GiPPsland joint 






The inventory comprising Figure 5:6 reinforces particular features 
of the policy environment in which oil and gas policy is determined and 
discussed previously. Given the Commonwealth government's particular 
responsibility for determining revenue policy for offshore petroleum 
resources the issue co m munity, and the interaction within this 
community, is dominated by this tier of government. Although the State 
governments were involved in negotiations in the early phases of the RRT 
issue, the RRT was a Commonwealth government initiative and interaction 
re mained focussed at this level. The involve ment of the Western 
Australian government in the development of what was termed the Resource 
Rent Royalty, (RRR), also known as the Barrow Island agree ment, 
e mphasises the i mportance of the States in this policy area. The 
negotiations over the RRR in particular and the RRT specifically, 
illustrate the i mpact of inter-govern mental relations in offshore 
petroleum policy. 
The influence of offshore federalism has been discussed elsewhere, 
(see Chapter Three and earlier in this Chapter ), with the inventory 
reflecting the overlaying responsibilities between Commonwealth and 
State 	 governments in the administration of these resources. The effect 
of this particular aspect of Australian federalis m 	 in providing the 
potential for inter-governmental tensions in the management of resources 
in the territorial sea has emphasised the importance of coordinating or 
moderating institutions (Chap man 1985), (see Chapter Three for a 
discussion of the 1967 Petroleum Agreement, the 1973 Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act and the OCS). Much of the intergovernmental disputation which 
arose over these tests of sovereignty was resolved through moderating 
institutions. These institutions such as the Pre miers Conference or, 
223. 
more particularly, the Ministerial Councils such as AMEC, serve to 
channel formal discussions between the tiers of government over policy. 
This brokerage role adopted by the moderating institutions in 
resolving inter-governmental tensions or disputes may also be utilised 
by Commonwealth or State institutions. Although it is reasonable to 
expect that the oil and gas interest groups such as APEA, or even the 
individual companies, would have a sound knowledge of the political and 
legislative process, these institutions may have to resolve conflicts 
between competing or differing groups. This brokerage role is less 
evident in this case study than in the interaction over the scallop 
fishery as much of this interaction occurred at the informal level, 
discussed in detail subsequently. Other factors which may have 
contributed to a decline in brokerage between different groups include 
the pattern of issue emergence. The Commonwealth government placed the 
issues on the agenda which as well as focussing debate on specific 
issues, (a cause of some complaint within oil and 	 gas interest groups), 
reduced 	 the possibility of interaction on general issues of resource 
taxation. Such discussion of the range of taxation regimes available for 
offshore petroleum resources would no doubt heighten differences within 
the non-institutional actors. 
The location of the major offshore oil and gas projects in 
Australia also influences the structure of the inventory and also the 
membership of the issue community. The State governments of Victoria and 
Western Australia are the administrators of the major production areas 
comprising Bass Strait (the focus of this study) and Barrow Island and 
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the North West Shelf respectively. The co mplexity of inter - state 
interaction (a major aspect of the interaction over the scallop fishery 
issues) is lacking in this case study, although as Prescott (1982) 
considers a major discovery of hydrocarbons on a boundary between the 
States, (i.e) along the 39°12' Lat. South baseline in Bass Strait, would•
be bound to create a slight "flurry" of interaction between the 
governments concerned. 
The 	 complexity 	 of 	 the 	 issue 	 community 	 is reduced 	 since 
responsibiltity 	 for policy making is less clouded than in fisheries 
policy. 	 Revenue policy for offshore petroleu m policy products is 
determined by the Commonwealth although the ad valorem royalties from 
production are shared with the States, as deter mined by the 1967 
Agreement (Stevenson 1977, ACIR 1984, Church 1985, - see also Chapter 
Three). 
The final feature of the inventory worth commenting on is the fact 
that the nu mber of non-institutional actors is relatively s mall. 
Although there are a large number of corporate interests active in the 
oil search in Australia, few of the m are major figures in these 
developments. Given the high risks involved in the oil search many of 
the projects are operated by consortiu ms, with relatively few large 
corporate bodies such as BHP, SANTOS or WAPET operating as individual 
permit or joint production license holders. 
The linkages between the different actors for ming the issue 
community are important, and 	 fundamental to the process of interaction. 
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Although it is difficult to represent the dynamic nature of this 
process, the depiction of the network arising from the 
inter-relationships between actors can provide a means of analysing the 
linkages within the community, indicating interaction over the 
particular issue(s) on the agenda. The problems in developing and 
depicting such linkage networks are discussed in some detail in the 
preceding Chapter, however it is worthwhile reiterating the distinction 
between interaction through the formal linkages as opposed to the 
informal links between the institutional-political sector and the 
industry or resource user groups. While the former networks can be 
identified, one can only postulate at the impact of the latter type of 
linkages. Given the specialised nature of the industry and the similar 
expertise shared between administrators and corporate actors, links are 
no doubt made between industry and government. The Oil and Gas Division 
of the Office of Minerals and Energy, (Victoria), encourages secondments 
for its staff to and from industry to enhance co-operation, and is an 
example of how such informal linkages can be developed. 
The network that arose out of the interaction over the RRT/ cash 
bidding issues is depicted in F ig . 5:7, following. The network is based 
on the formal interaction identified in the preceding description of 
the interaction over these issues, although it is likely that, in 
addition to this formal network, there were extensive informal contacts 
between the office of the Minister for Resources and Energy and the 
industry. The interaction and the interrelationships between actors are 
shown through arrows, this diagram is an analytical device rather than 
an attempt to show the relative influence of any actor or groups of 
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actors. 	 Evidence tends to indicate that the negotiators from BHP were 
particularly active in atte mpting to reduce the tax rate of the RRT , 
however it is beyond the scope of this study to provide an assessment of 
the relative i mportance of each of the groups or non-institutional 
actors on the policy process or policy output. 
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The network identified in Fig. 5.7 involves a range of actors 
including, as is clear fro m the preceding case study, the media, 
political parties, the acade mic co m munity as well as those actors 
readily identifiable with the issues; the government and bureaucratic 
actors responsible for resource management and the resouce user groups 
or companies affected by these management decisions. The focal point of 
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this network is the 	 office of the Minister for Resources and Energy, 
rather than a specific policy structure. The Minister for Resources and 
Energy was responsible for the introduction of the issues onto the 
political and policy agendas and the management of the cash bidding 
legislation through parliament. The existence of a particular focus of 
industry interaction provided by the Minister for Resources and Energy 
is an important feature of these issue communities. 
The network indicates the linkages that arose out of the 
interaction concerning the emergence, processing and implementation 
phases of the policy process. The complexity of the linkages in the 
community arises in part from the legislative dimension of the cash 
bidding issue. The implementation of the cash bidding proposal, through 
ammendments to existing legislation, involved interaction between the 
government and other political parties within the parliament. In 
addition the partisan character of both issues, (the RRT was developed 
as part of the ALP party platform), incorporates actors such as the 
party conference 
actor had limited 
important agent in 
in the issue community. It is clear that this latter 
impact in the interaction process, however it was an 
the emergence of the issue. 
The inclusion of the academic community in the network occurred as, 
unlike the scallop fishery case study, the RRT and cash bidding 
issues receieved considerable attention from this set of actors. This 
academic interest and attention arose out of the origins of the Garnaut 
and Clunies-Ross proposal for a RRT in an academic journal, and the 
ecomonic and political significance of the proposed policy changes. The 
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case study has indicated that the the issue had extensive media 
coverage, most notably in what can be regarded as the specialist mining 
or financial press. 
The network also incorporates the major petroleu m and mining 
industry groups such as APEA and AMIC. APEA's role in representing the 
petroleum exploration industry has been discussed previously. AMIC, the 
Australian Mining Industry Council, although combining with APEA on a 
submission to EPAC, (the Commonwealth government's Economic Planning and 
Advisory Council), was less 'concerned with either the RRT or cash 
bidding once the constitutional difficulties of applying the policies on 
shore became apparent. These constitutional constraints arose out of the 
unwillingness of the States to impose RRT for onshore petroleum or, of 
concern to AMIC, for coal mining. 
The 	 industry 	 groups, 	 including 	 the 	 individual 	 exploration 
companies, were, unlike the fishery groups in the previous case study, 
consistently active in the interaction process. This does not imply that 
this issue community was any more unified, indeed APEA's position as 
industry voice was under mined so mewhat by individual co mpanies 
negotiating directly with the Minister for Resources and Energy. 
It does indicate, however, the emergence of an issue community policy 
style. This interaction re mained focussed between govern ment and 
industry groups, 	 not involving inter-governmental interaction, 	 (either 
Ministerial or administrative) 	 to the same extent as observed in the 
scalop management case study. 
The differences in opinion between industry groups may have been 
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less apparent than in the issue community which developed around the 
fisheries issues examined in the previous chapter, however it is 
important to note that there was a lack of co-ordination between 
APEA and some of its member companies. Dissention among the industry was 
first apparent following the APEA conference in 1984, where the 
Minister for Resources and Energy (Senator Walsh) drew attention to the 
involvement of several companies in direct negotiations with the 
government. The involvement of BHP in the RRT negotiations and, later, 
WAPET in the development of the RRR, indicate the problems faced by 
industry organisations in accurately representing all aspects of 
industry opinion. In the petroleum exploration industry the attitudes of 
the small and medium sized companies (an classification widely used in 
the industry) may not be held to the same degree by larger, more 
financially independent companies. 
APEA tended to gain more commited support from the smaller 
companies in it campaign against the implementation of the proposed 
changes to petroleum revenue policy. Support from the smaller operations 
was given to APEA' stand on the RRT, however the smaller companies 
were particularly supportive of APEA during the cash bidding 
interaction. These companies tend to rely more heavily on the advice and 
lobbying provided by APEA than the larger companies whose size, 
financial base and technical or research expertise (including policy 
analysis) gives them independence from the industry organisation. This 
independence may lead to individual companies providing different input 
into the policy process, and, as was experienced in the interaction over 
the RRT, becoming involved in negotiations when the industry association 
had remained opposed to the tax. 
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The reduced level of involvement from the State governments (or 
their administrative agencies) is a particular feature of this issue 
community. The reduced level of interaction by the States enabled a 
lessening of the frequent problems of coordination, and reduced the 
time taken for implementation in a policy area that involves overlays 
in responsibility between the tiers of government. Although the 
opposition from the States forestalled the Commonwealth government in 
it's attempt to introduce a "blanket RRT" for all petroleum production 
(and originally coal as well), the introduction of the RRR legislation 
indicates the importance interaction between the tiers of government in 
the development of petroleum revenue policy. 
The reduced impact of the States meant that the interaction process 
occurred between the Minister for Resources and Energy and the 
industry (at key times the interaction involved individual companies. 
There are a number of reasons for this style of interaction and the 
institutional structure which fostered it. A major reason is that only 
two States at present have offshore production facilities (Victoria's 
Gippsland Basin fields and Western Australia's Barrow Island and 
North-West Shelf ). Once the RRT was restricted to the offshore petroleum 
exploration, a decision made quickly after the meeting of AMEC, the 
involvement of the States was less significant. A key factor in 
contributing to the State's opposition was the fact that their 
ad valorem royalties derived from production would be replaced by a 
revenue share of the RRT. 
The existence of overlays in responsibilty between the tiers of 
govrnment in Australia over marine resource policy has been highlighted 
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in this study. The argument that these overlays enhance the interaction 
process, (Ziegler 1980), are less clearly shown in this particular case 
study, as the Co m mon wealth moved to reduce the level of 
inter-govern mental interaction over the tax. Given the history of 
tension between the Commonwealth and the State governments over issues 
of jurisdiction and sovereignty in the territorial sea, (see Chapter 
Three) the decision to restrict the RRT to offshore petroleum resources 
may have been made to restrict the potential disruption caused by 
attempting to impose the RRT as a total taxation (including onshore 
production) system. This action would have inevitably lengthened the 
period of interaction past the government's preferred deadline. 
An important element in the interaction was the cordial relations 
developed between the different actors. The media and industry 
commentators contrasted the Hawke government's dealings with the 
petroleum industry, with the disastrous relationship the industry had 
"enjoyed" with the Whitla m Labor govern ment in the early 1970s. 
Intervie ws undertaken for this case study with BHP's policy 
analysts indicated that they welcomed the negotiations introduced by 
the Hawke government, contrasting them with the attempts at industry 
involve ment by the Whitla m, and perhaps surprisingly, the Fraser 
governments. These interviews indicated that although these company 
representatives may have disagreed with the proposals developed by the 
government they appreciated the use of discussion papers as it enabled 
them to know what item was to be discussed. 
The 	 interest 	 and 	 close 	 proximity 	 of 	 the 	 Minister to 	 the 
negotiations gained the approval of the industry. The industry commended 
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the Ministers for Resources and Energy in the Hawke government's 
Ministries, (Senator Walsh and Senator Evans) on their ability to master 
their portfolios. Walsh had a short period in office before beginning 
negotiations on the RRT, Evans similarly faced a steep "learning curve" 
after taking on the portfolio, being responsible for the interaction 
over the cash bidding issue. It is interesting to note that the BHP 
representatives placed great store on the Minsister being able to grasp 
the complexities of the policies they were responsible for. Part of the 
Minister's role according to these sources was to assess the data 
provided by the DRE and if necessary reject it. These interviews 
indicated wariness over the inordinate influence of the 
bureaucracy when a Minister is unfamiliar with his portfolio, 
restricting his ability to accept industry opinion which may have 
differed from the departmental viewpoint. 
5:6:2 The Policy Process, Interaction and the Development of the RRT and  
Cash Bidding Policies. 
Earlier 	 discussion 	 has 	 examined 	 aspects 	 of 	 policy 	 analysis, 
particularly the concept of the policy process or, in Hogwood and 
Peters' terminology, the policy cycle (see Chapter's Two and Four). This 
process or cycle can be seen as the mechanism by which issues, actions 
or decisions become policies, the latter differentiated from the former 
by a policy's authority, legitimacy and action orientation (Kerr 1976, 
Bulock et al 1983, Hogwood and Peters 1983, Hogwood and Gunn 1984, Ham 
and Hill 1985). While considerable literature has analysed the policy 
process and its components this study has viewed the policy process as 
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setting major parameters in which the interaction between different 
policy actors, as members of an issue community takes place. In the 
study of interaction during the policy process the process was seen to 
contain three phases; issue emergence, issue processing and 
implementation of policy. 
Analysing the interaction between actors comprising the the 
RRT/cash bidding issue community, (described earlier), can further 
enhance the the understanding of the impact of these relationships and 
linkages within the interaction network on the development and 
implementation of policy. 
The RRT, and later, the cash bidding, issue emerged as a result of 
decisions made by the Hawke Labor Cabinet and Government to implement 
part of its platform on natural resources and energy. This platform 
commited the government to increasing the level of return to the 
Australian people from these resource projects. The issues did not 
emerge into the political arena from traditional "pressure group 
politics" where interest groups successfully agitated for the placement 
of specific issues on the agenda, but were imposed on these interest 
groups by the institutions responsible for setting the policy agenda. 
One of the strengths of the issue community thesis is its 
rejection 	 of 	 the traditional 	 "demand articulation" role of interest 
groups (Jenkins 	 1978), 	 arguing that increasingly these groups are 
involved 	 in 	 al 	 phases 	 of 	 the 	 policy 	 process, 	 including 	 the 
implementation of policy (Richardson and Jordan 1979, see also Chapter 
Two). Richardson and Jordan do however acknowledge the importance of 
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interest groups and particularly relevant in this case study, political 
parties, in the identification of issues (1979). The potential for 
political parties to gain power and i mple ment their platfor m can be 
attractive to interest groups who may engage in what has been recently 
termed "issue packaging" (Hogan 1986). 
The partisan nature of the emergence of the RRT and cash bidding 
issues focusses attention on the issue identification role of political 
parties. Although Richardson and Jordan view the interaction process as 
being a better determinant of policy outcomes than the analysis of party 
platforms or manifestos (1979), the actions of the Hawke government 
stress the importance of such platforms on specific issue agendas or 
issue communities. 
The 	 pattern of the emergence of these issues provides support for 
Ziegler's (1980) view that the interaction between interest groups and 
institutional 	 actors 	 occurs 	 as 	 a 	 result 	 of 	 action by 	 these 
institutional 	 actors 	 rather 	 than 	 being 	 initiated from 	 the 	 interest 
group. Ziegler claims that 
more significant is a policy process model which reverses the 
notion of de mands and responses. Govern mental and 
non-governmental experts develop policy proposals which are then 
responded by broader segments of the public, including the most 
visibly responsive interest groups. A few groups, those with 
technical resources, are involved in the development of policy. 
Most groups participate only in response to policy. 
(1980:16) 
The pattern of issue emergence is particularly clear. The issues 
concerned with petroleum revenue policy were placed on the agenda as 
a result of a change in government, the election of a party commited to 
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overhauling the existing petroleum taxation regime. Such a pattern of 
issue emergence (which can be conveniently labelled the "top down" 
approach) contrasts with the fisheries issue discussed previously, which 
arose, in part, from agitation from the user groups concerned with the 
mangement of the fishery. In similar terms the emergence of the scallop 
management issue can be characterised as a pattern of "bottom up" 
interaction. 
The non-institutional actors did, however, have some influence in 
the structure of the issue agenda even if their influence in 
agenda-setting was minimal. The Government, through the Minister for 
Resources and Energy, regarded the RRT and the cash bidding issues as 
closely related, part of a coordinated initiative proposing increased 
return or economic rent for these resources. Industry, in contrast, 
argued that the issues were distinct and should be dealt with 
separately. Industry claims that the RRT was incompatible with the cash 
bidding proposal, were never seriously entertained by the government. 
The Minister did agree to the industry's proposal to settle the RRT 
prior to negotiating the cash bidding issue, indicating that in some 
cases these groups had an impact on the structure of the agenda. 
The particular features associated with the emergence of the issues 
had, as could be " expected, important influences on the interaction 
during subsequent phases of the process. In these latter phases, 
particularly the processing phase concerned with the development of the 
policy proposal prior to implementation, the interest groups and 
corporate bodies were in effect continually responding to government 
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initiatives. 	 This 	 enabled 	 the 	 institutional 	 actors, 	 chiefly 	 the 
Minister for Resources and Energy, to maintain tight control over 
the interaction process during the latter phases of the policy process. 
The announcement in May 1983 of the government's intention to 
implement the RRT placed this issue on the agenda and initiated the 
second phase of the policy process. The level of interaction was 
increased in December 1983 following the publication of the government's 
discussion paper on the RRT. The publication of the government's 
position paper set the basis for the subsequent interaction between the 
different actors during this phase of the process. 
The government followed the initial discussion paper with a second 
in Febuary 1984 concerned with the provision of exploration offsets. In 
April 1984 the government released a 	 further discussion paper which 
contained an outline of the 	 proposed "greenfields" RRT. Following 
further negotiation the final format of the RRT was released via a 
statement issued jointly by the Minister for Resources and Energy and 
the Treasurer in late June 1984. Industry responded to each of these 
papers, the first government discussion paper invited the industry to 
provide written submissions as well as to attend a meeting to discuss 
the RRT. Several companies provided these submissions. 	 As is evident 
from the earlier discussion BHP published 	 its response to the proposed 
RRT. APEA , likewise, published a major paper in response to the 
government's papers and the meeting held between the Minister and 
industry and company representatives held in January. APEA's paper 
argued strongly against the imposition of the RRT. 
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The formalising of the interaction process through the use of 
discussion papers and submissions is an important feature of this phase 
in the development of the policy. The media reported that some industry 
sources were unhappy at being "locked in" to the discussion of the 
specific issues related to the government's proposed RRT rather than 
being able to discuss broader questions surrounding the taxation of 
these resources. 
The maintenance of a focus for the interaction during this phase of 
the process avoided long and interminable discussion on generalities. 
In response to this control imposed by the government negotiators the 
industry groups, particularly APEA, attempted to broaden the membership 
of the issue community to include the Liberal-National Party opposition 
and Australian Democrat political parties. Although unsuccessful in 
involving these actors in interaction over the RRT, APEA was able to 
include these actors in the processing of the cash bidding issue. 
The announcement of the government's intention to implement the 
cash bidding system for the allocation of offshore titles emerged onto 
the agenda in January 1984, immediately prior to a key meeting over the 
RRT. The system of cash bidding was chosen over alternative allocation 
systems as these were seen as incompatible with the RRT, currently under 
negotiation (Aust. Fin. Rev. 24/1/84). 
The processing of the cash bidding issue, 	 begun in earnest 
following the finalisation of the structure of the RRT, involved a less 
lengthly 	 period of interaction. 	 Following initial industry interaction 
the proposal for cash bidding was introduced into Federal Parliament as 
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an amendment t6 the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act, providing a 
different arena for interaction. APEA lobbied the Senate since the Upper 
House held a majority of non-government members, and could overturn or 
encourage the government to substantialy modify the legislation. APEA 
concentrated on convincing the Democrats that the cash bidding Bill 
would restrict offshore exploration and particularly harm the smaller 
companaies undertaking exploration as they may not have the financial 
resources to co mpete in the auction of titles. Fro m the earlier 
discussion it is apparent that APEA strategy was initially successful, 
with the Democrats and Opposition Senators combining to torpedo the Bil 
in March 1985. 
The processing of the cash bidding issue illustrates 	 to a degree 
the utility of Lowi's 	 "arenas of power" argument (1964, 1970, 1972). 
Lowi argues that 	 different policies lead to different patterns of 
interaction between the actors. The responses in turn provide different 
arenas within which the interaction process takes place (Lowi 1964). 
Using the concepts developed by Lowi one can see that the RRT issue 
was negotiated outside the parliament (one particular arena), the cash 
bidding issue, although involving actors fro m "outside" parlia ment, 
contained significant interaction inside the parliament (an alternative 
arena). Interestingly the introduction of the cash bidding Bill into the 
parliament reduced the chance of active involvement of the interest 
groups and other non-parlia mentary actors but at the sa me ti me 
broadened the membership of the issue community. 
An important influence on the interaction over the processing of 
cash bidding policy was the fact that industry was more united in 
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its opposition to the policy. 	 Most companies regarded this form of 
title allocation as an additional cost at a time when the particular 
project may have a limited possibility of proving viable. The industry 
argued that the move to auction style bidding would reduce the amount of 
finance available for the drilling programme, although this would 
obviously relate to the size of the company, its financial base, and any 
"farm-out" agreements it had entered into over the permit. Interviews 
with representatives of BHP indicated that the larger companies were 
less affected by cash flow problems which may arise out of this system 
of bidding. Part of the government's counter to this oposition was that 
even in titles allocated under work programmes "farm-in" agreements were 
common to complete the exploration programme. 
The fact that APEA had submissions incorporated into Hansard 
indicates the extent to which the organisation was successful in 
gaining access to this arena. The Democrat spokesman (opposing 
the Bill in May 1985) included aspects of APEA's submission, and the 
Minister for Resources and Energy, (Senator Gareth Evans), leading the 
government support for the Bill, moved to the incorporate his reply to 
APEA's submission in debates during the introduction of the 
Bill. (Hansard 15/5/1985:1956). 
Folowing 	 the 	 initial 	 rejection 	 of 	 the 	 Bil 	 the 	 government 
continued negotiations with industry, the "dry hole" work programme 
being the major result of this interaction. The reintroduction of the 
Bill into the Senate in December. 1985 provided further modifications, 
chiefly the Democrat initiated amendment of, a two year "sunset 
clause", to the Bill. 
240. 
The successful passage of the cash bidding Bill in late 1985 
indicates that the policy interaction process can involve a range of 
factors. These factors may be less concerned with the issue than with 
the dynamics of the political-legislative system, or interest group and 
political party interaction. The latter phases of processing the cash 
bidding Bill involved• the Government reiterating the implementation of 
cash bidding to highly prospective areas under sole Commonwealth 
control, (in effect restricting the policy to permits in the Timor Sea), 
the addition of the dry-hole modifications to the work programme and 
finally, and perhaps the most influential, changes in the membership of 
the Democrat Senate team. The passage of the cash bidding policy 
emphasises the importance of legislative process on policy outcomes and 
the extent to which this process can influence the interaction among, 
and membership of, the issue community. 
The interaction during the implementation phase of the policy 
process is traditionally seen as enabling institutions to fine-tune the 
policy, using interest groups or interested parties and individuals to 
act as "sounding boards" for the policy makers (Matthews 1976, 1980, see 
also Chapter 2 and 4). The processes involved in the implementation of 
the two issues examined in this case study were different. This was 
not unexpected given the different patterns of processing between 
the RRT and the cash bidding issues. 
The differences in the implementation of the two policies are 
highlighted by enactment of the cash bidding legislation following its 
assent in late December 1985. The first permits allocated under the 
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system (in the Timor Sea) were made in June 1986. In contrast, as yet 
the RRT has not been incorporated into legislation, although such a tax 
will be levied on any greenfields project initiated after the 1st July 
1984. 
5:7 INTEREST GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONS - THE INTERACTION OVER 
REVENUE POLICIES FOR OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS RESOURCES. 
This analysis of 	 the 	 develop ment of the RRT and cash 
bidding policies highlights the influence of the interaction among the 
actors comprising the issue community. This interaction arises as issues 
emerge and the processing, and later implementation, of policy occurs. 
The case study indicates that the interest groups and other 
non-institutional bodies are important actors within the policy process. 
The involve ment of these groups in the latter phases of the policy 
process supports the underlying theme of the Richardson and Jordan's 
model; the concept that policy is developed by institutions in 
conjunction with these groups. 
The i mpact of the oil and gas interest groups on the policy 
outputs, (initiating changes to the para meters of the RRT and 
influencing the introduction of a dry hole work programme system in 
conjunction with the cash bidding proposal), was quite substantial. The 
non-institutional members of these issue communities had access to 
financial resources to mount strong lobbying campaigns. These actors 
had a good working knowledge of "the corridors of power" which 
increased their influence. Interaction was enhanced by the government's 
commitment to the RRT and cash bidding issues and the government's 
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desire to include the industry in negotiations over these initiatives. 
This allowed considerable input fro m the industry into the policy 
process. It is also interesting that the case study indicates that the 
bureaucracy played a reduced role in the interaction process, providing 
advice to the Minister(s) but retaining a secondary role to the Minister 
and his specialist advisors, (including consultants). 
This case study suport's Schattschneider's view that the relative 
strengths of the participants in the policy process are a major 
influence in the interaction process, since these strengths are known in 
advance (1960). The oil and gas interest groups gained "strength" from 
their understanding of the political system, and as a result of having 
had a long period of involvement with government over the management of 
these resources, were able to maximise the impact of their involvement 
(or interaction) in the policy process. These factors contributed to the 
particular pattern of interaction experienced over these issues which 
contrasts 	 with the pattern of interaction experienced in the fisheries 
case study. Part of an explanation of these differences, 	 (to be 
considered in greater detail in the conclusion of the thesis), may be 
gained fro m Schattschneider's vie w on the policy process. 
Schattschneider states "powerful interests • . • want private settlements, 
whereas the weak, the losers in private conflicts go to the government 
[and] involve the wider public" (1960:39). 
The case study of the RRT and cash bidding issues illustrates a 
number of factors concerning interaction among different policy actors. 
The first point is that this interaction is influenced by features 
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of the broader political system (the 	 impact of the legisldive system 
for example). Second, the interest groups can influence what can be 
termed the policy ouput through this interaction. Third, the concept of 
the issue community allows the analysis of the interaction within what 
can be see as a network of relationships between policy actors. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE 
RESOURCES POLICY 
POLICY INTERACTION, THE ISSUE COMMUNITY AND THE CASE STUDIES 
6:1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has examined the interaction between policy actors, as 
a factor influencing the development and implementation of specific 
marine resource policies. The analysis of issues underlying the 
management of fisheries and offshore hydrocarbons policy has been 
undertaken utilising a framework derived from public policy literature. 
As previously noted the study of Australian marine policy has been 
somewhat neglected by public policy analysts, perhaps surprisingly 
considering the importance of Australia's "maritime interests" (Bateman 
and Ward 1985), The thesis attempts to indicate the utility of such an 
approach in contributing to an understanding of how and why such marine 
resource policies were developed (Haward 1986 -emphasis added). 
The thesis utilises the issue community model developed by 
Richardson and Jordan (1979), as discussed in Chapter Two, to examine 
the inter-relationships between institutions and interest groups 
emerging from what Richardson and Jordan call a 'shared concern over 
specific policy areas'. These inter-relationships foster interaction  
between actors concerned with policy development. The analytical 
framework arose from a premise that non-institutional actors, chiefly 
resource-user interest groups, were important contributors in shaping 
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public policy. 	 From this premise a proposition was developed that, 
given the involvement of such interest groups, and 	 as a result of 
limitations in the existing 	 institutional structure within the policy 
environment to adequately represent such actors, such interaction will 
create new 	structures within the institutional framework in order  
to 	 deal 	 adequately 	 with 	 representative 	 non-institutional 	 interests, 
chiefly from the principal resource-user groups .. (see Chapter Two). 
This proposition was examined in detail via case studies of 
specific issues relating to marine resources of Bass Strait. Case 
studies involving the introduction of a management regime for the 
scallop fishery of Bass Strait and the introduction of a Resource Rent 
Tax, (RRT) and cash bidding relating to the "return" gained from the 
exploitation of offshore oil and gas resources, provided an empirical 
base from which to analyse interaction between different policy actors. 
Bass Strait provided a suitable spatial focus for this analysis as it 
supports a diverse, yet significant, fishery (22% of Australian live 
weight production and 25% of Australian value of production, (Archer 
Report 1982), in addition to a major oil and gas production system 
(McKay 1985). Bass Strait also contains the sole maritime domestic (i.e. 
interstate) boundary in Australia, separating the States of Tasmania and 
Victoria. The presence of such a boundary creates complexities in the 
policy environment in which decisions relating to the management of 
marine resources are made, as policies for the Strait may involve 
overlaying responsibilites between different jurisdictions in a federal 
system of government. 
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Prior to presenting details of the fisheries and offshore oil and 
gas policy case studies, the third chapter of the thesis examined the 
characteristics of this policy environment. This analysis highlighted 
the complexity, and implication for policy, of the evolution of what 
has been termed "Australian offshore federalism" (Cullen 1985). The 
variables which make up the policy environment, and give offshore 
federalism a particular character, are first constitutional and  
legislative framework, and second the structure and function of the 
political and administrative institutions responsible for marine 
resource management, operating within such frameworks. 
The most significant feature of the current constitutional and 
legislative framework underpininning the development of marine resources 
policy was the introduction of what became known as the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement (OCS). The OCS provides the cornerstone of 
marine resources policy making in the 1980s. Despite its title the OCS 
was a political settlement of constitutional questions regarding the 
"head of power" in the territorial sea, through the device of Section 51 
xxxviii of the Constitution. Of importance to this study was the impact 
of the OCS in reinforcing State control within three miles of the low 
water mark and providing a cooperative decision making framework and 
legislative packages (regimes) for both fisheries and hydrocarbons. 
This policy environment provides the background to the development 
of specific policy areas, discussed in Chapters Four and Five. These 
case studies were in two parts, a narrative of the development of the 
policy followed by an analysis which provides an insight into the 
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operation of the interaction network arising out of inter-relationships 
within the issue community. 
6:2 ISSUE COMMUNITIES AND MARINE RESOURCE POLICY: Evidence from the 
empirical analysis. 
Empirical analysis of the fisheries and oil and gas policy areas 
provides some interesting conclusions about the impact of interaction 
within the issue community on policy development and output. This 
analysis also provides a means of examining the impact of such 
interaction on the creation of particular policy structures, resulting 
from such policy style. 
It is argued that, as a result of the involvement of non 
institutional actors (resource user groups) in the policy process with 
the emergence of an issue community style of policy making and 
limitations in the existing institutional framework responsible for 
policy development, specific structures incorporating these resource  
user groups should be evident in the policy process. Such a structure is 
evident in the fishery case study, but not in the oil and gas case 
study. The possible reasons for this, and its implications, will be 
considered later. 
6.2.1 The Scallop Fishery Management Regime  
The creation of the Bass Strait Scallop Task Force, incorporating 
representatives of the resource user groups and State management 
agencies, had, as has been discussed previously, an important impact on 
the development of a scallop fishery policy for Bass Strait. The scallop 
248. 
Task Force illustrates the impact of the interaction of resource user 
groups in the policy process. This particular policy structure arose out 
of the failure of the existing institutional framework to resolve 
conflicts between the different actors. These factors are emphasised by 
Pontin and Millington who claim that 
[w]ith 	 representatives 	 from 	 industry 	 and 	 government, 	 the 
Task Force was designed to increase consultation between all 
interest groups   [with an] aim ... to develop a management 
regime to protect the resource and maintain efficient fishing 
operations and a viable fishery for the participants ... The 
Task Force had to meet these aims while trying to reconcile the 
differences both within and between the States. 
(1985:4) 
The Task Force provides therefore an example of "the proliferation of 
institutions and processes to enable the necessary accomodation [and] 
adjustment of respective interests", (Richardson and Jordan 1979:172), 
arising out of the interaction within issue communities. 
The issue community which arose as a result of the interaction 
during the emergence, processing and implementation of the scallop 
management regime contained two key factors which influenced the 
development of this particular policy. The first is that the 
multiplicity of actors  comprising the interaction network gave the issue 
community a particular complexity. This compexity was enhanced by the 
second factor that the issues involved interaction between resource 
users and institutions from different, and to a certain degree 
overlaying, jurisdictions. Although at times the interaction within the 
scallop fishery issue community was less concerned with the resource 
user group's input than the over-riding intergovernmental 
considerations, these groups did provide a significant impact in the 
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policy process. The resource user groups contributed to, and were a 
prime reason for the success of, the "Task Force" and also had 
considerable involvement in interaction at the State level. Fishermen's 
agitation for a review of management of the fishery resulted in the 
introduction of the Interim Management Regime in late 1983 and was 
directly responsible for the implementation of the zoning regime rather 
than a single line of demarcation between the two States preferred by 
the Commonwealth government (Pontin and Millington 1985). 
The Archer Enquiry into the Australian Fishing Industry (1982) 
was critical of existing consultation between the different groups 
involved in policy making. The Archer Report identified weaknesses with 
the existing industry consultative body, then AFIC and recommended its 
replacement (which occurred in 1985 with the creation of NFIC) and 
importantly for this study saw benefits in species based consultative 
groups recommending that the "establishment of advisory committees ... 
be mandatory [and that] the advisory committees be structured on a  
species basis" (1982:72 emphasis added). The Task Force established to 
incorporate representatives from all major actor from the broader issue 
communtiy, particularly those from the catch sector, illustrates the 
efficacy of such bodies in developing policy. 
6.2.2 RRT and Cash Bidding Policies  
The development of the RRT and cash bidding policies, while 
incorporating many of the features identifiable with an issue community  
style of interaction and policy development, did not result in the 
emergence of any structure such as the Bass Strait scallop Task Force. 
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A number of reasons can drawn from the evidence and be put forward 
to explain the lack of an "accomodating institution" (Richardson and 
Jordan 1979). First, the partisan nature of these issues influenced both 
the pattern of issue emergence and proximity to, and control of, 
interaction by the Commonwealth Minister. Second, the issues had a 
reduced input from the States, shortening the temporal aspects of 
interaction during the policy , process and focussing interaction on one 
level of government. Third, the characteristics of the resource user 
groups are important, interaction involved a small number of 
non-institutional actors, politically aware, with financial strengths 
and well developed links with other mining sector groups and experienced 
in negotiating their way through the corridors of power. Fourth, there 
was less dispute over what was at issue, interaction was focussed on 
specifics, as much as the groups attempted to broaden the issue agenda. 
Fifth, the interaction network involved a broad range of actors, 
including Parliament, providing a different arena of interaction. Sixth, 
the issues concerned economically significant resources, which may 
contribute to the tendency for actors to engage in what Schattschneider 
(1960) called private settlements. 
While a number of these factors mentioned above are inter-related, 
for example the partisan character of the issues and the "top down" 
interaction (see earlier discussion) such partisanship inspired, may 
influence the temporal aspects of the interaction process. The reaction 
of interest groups, the perception of the issue, and the scale of the 
linkage network may be greatly influenced by particular patterns of 
issue emergence. In addition, partisan actions can reinforce the 
tendency to "private settlements". 
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It is clear that a range of factors influence the interaction which 
occurs within the issue community, some of which will affect the 
structures in which issue processing, or in broader terms policy 
development, takes place. 
6:3 INTERACTION, THE ISSUE COMMUNITIES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 
The particular pattern of interaction observed in the RRT/cash 
bidding issue community arose out of the characteristics of the issues  
which influenced the character of the issue community. Unlike the 
fishery case study this interaction was focussed at one tier of 
government, interest groups negotiated with the Commonwealth government, 
particularly the Minister for Resources and Energy. This reduced the 
number of institutional actors involved and decreased the potential for 
intergovernmental tensions to disrupt the policy process. While the 
interest groups attempted to broaden the interaction network to include 
such actors as alternative political parties, the firm agenda control 
wielded by the office of the Minister for Resources and Energy precluded 
this from being a successful strategy. 
The small number of interest groups (including coporate bodies) 
involved in the RRT/cash bidding issue community has important 
influences on the pattern of interaction. With only one industry 
organisation and a literal handful of corporate actors actively involved 
in the communtiy the possibilities for internalising the interaction 
was increased. Such a pattern of interaction corresponds to 
"internalised policy making" (Jordan and Richardson 1982, Hogwood 1986) 
where issues are processed in closed communities involving few 
252. 
non-institutional actors. 	 Such communities are contrasted to open 
communities such as that experienced in the scallop case study. 	 The 
internalising of interaction within government may relate to the 
contrasts between high and low policy issues, (Ilogwood 1986), based on 
the relative importance of each issue. More important issues ("high" 
policy concerns) may be internalised within the executive or government, 
while the mundane, ("low" policy) remain within open communities. 
Although the relative importance of the issue will tend to 
influence the consultation process (Hogwood 1986), "for a number of high 
and low policy issues, however, the processing of the issue will be 
handled largely within the executive, with little direct consultation of 
groups" (Hogwood 1986:17). The RRT/cash bidding issues involved a 
broader level of consultation than that described by both Jordan and 
Richardson (1982) and Hogwood (1986) as internalised policy making, 
although this case study does indicate the impact of what Hogwood calls 
"a single group policy community" (1986:28) on the interaction process, 
and obviously, the resultant pattern of interaction. 
The pattern of interaction emerging from this particular community 
may be justifiably different from that emerging from a community drawn, 
as Hogwood describes, from "the opposite extreme from the single group 
policy community, [the] 'open consultation' [community], where a large 
and varied collection of groups or even the general public, are able to 
participate, or at least have the opportunity of formally recording 
their views" (1986:28). 
The development of what may be termed a closed issue community 
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(such as that arising out of interaction over the RRT/cash bidding 
issues) is enhanced by mechanisms of agenda control employed by 
particular institutional actors. The RRT/cash bidding issues were, in 
comparison to the scallop fishery, clearly defined. This focussed 
interaction, reducing, perhaps, the need for an accomodating institution 
such as the scallop "Task Force". The agenda control was evident in the 
resistance to interest group attempts to broaden the agenda, and the 
control exerted over the options contained within the agenda. At no 
stage did the Minister offer to negotiate the agenda, except perhaps in 
the agreement over the processing of the RRT to precede the cash bidding 
issue, to include more broad assessments of petroleum taxation. The 
imposition of a date on which the RRT was to be implemented from the 
announcement of the "setting of the agenda" also illustrates effective 
agenda control. 
6:4 INTERACTION, ISSUE COMMUNITIES AND ACCOMODATION 
SOME CONCLUSIONS. 
The differences in interaction experienced in the two issue 
communities studied may not be unexpected. Brian Hogwood, in a recent 
paper, states "that differences between policy areas would lead us to 
expect some differences between communities in the way issues are 
processed at one point in time" (1986:5). It is evident from the case 
study material that the differences in policy area, including resource 
management objectives and overall political and economic significance 
between the two marine resource issues examined, contributed to 
variations observed in the interaction over issue processing. The 
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evidence from the case studies indicates that the interaction deriving 
from the characteristics of the  issue and influencing the character of  
the issue community is the key factor in the need for policy structures 
such as the "accomodating institutions" identified by Richardson and 
Jordan (1979). The failure of the hypothesis to be supported by the 
offshore hydrocarbons case study relates to the varying pattern of 
interaction rather than the validity of the application of the issue 
community model. 
Richardson and Jordan argue 
that public policies are the outcomes of a process of ajustment 
between organisations. No longer do the assets of government 
outweigh the assets of any given group or sets of groups in a 
particular bargaining situation. Increasingly, pressure groups 
and governments have come to realise that they need each other 
in order to achieve their respective objectives. This has meant 
the relationship has beco me closer and closer... 
(1979:172). 
It is 	 felt that this relationship, the "relationships involved in 
committees, the policy community  of departments and groups, the 
practices of co-option and the consensual style...[have] better 
account[ed] for policy outcomes" (Richardson and Jordan 1979:74 original 
emphasis) in the development of marine resource policy making in Bass 
Strait. Whether or not this relationship gives rise to specific 
accomodating institutions depends to a considerable extent on factors 
such as the charactersitics of the issue, the numbers of actors 
involved, and the extent to which institutional actors exert measures 
such as issue definition, management of interest group interaction and 
control of the temporal aspects of the policy process. These 
institutional actions can be conveniently labelled as "agenda control" 
measures. 
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6:5 INSTITUTIONS, INTEREST GROUPS AND MARINE RESOURCES POLICY: 
A CONCLUDING COMMENT 
A single thesis cannot cover the range of issues "concerned with the 
development of marine policy, or even all the factors influencing 
marine resources policy. This study has concentrated on the development 
of specific policies highlighting the interaction between different 
policy actors, which ' it is argued, provide a contribution to the 
"understanding of how and why specific policies were implemented" 
(1-laward 1986:16). 
The seas and oceans of 	 world have been regarded as the "world's 
last frontier" (Suter 	 1983), 	 now under threat from a range of 
pressures linked to the Tofflerian "third wave" of technologic 
development. The expansion of technical capabilities in terms of the 
exploitation of marine resources has reduced, if not negated, the limits 
to exploitation posed by the character of the marine environment itself. 
In response to international concerns about "ocean management", 
policy-making has increased in scope, and complexity, highlighted by the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, commonly known as 
UNCLOS III, held between 1974 and 1980. UNCLOS III provided influence 
on domestic policy through the introduction of 200 mile extended 
jurisdiction for coastal states, and also focused attention on the 
issues of Australian marine policy, discussed in an earlier chapter. 
As a result of both international and domestic policy imperatives 
"issues concerning Australian marine resource policy have had increased 
increased impact on the political agenda in the last twenty-five years" 
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(Haward 1986:12). What is also apparent is that research deriving from 
this increased attention to such issues tends to be applied, that is 
aimed at specific resource management needs, rather than on an 
understanding of the processes by which the management strategies or 
policies deriving from this research are developed or implemented 
(Haward 1986). "The neglect of the processes and the groups involved in 
the development of marine resources policy is perceived as a current 
limitation of Australian marine policy" (Haward 1986:12) 
This thesis has attempted to illustrate the utility in examining 
both the processes of, an& the groups involved in, the development and 
implementation of marine resources policy. The study of interaction  
between the different policy actors comprising particular issue  
communities enables one to investigate the impact of such groups on the 
operation of the policy process and policy output. Public policy 
literature therefore provides a mechanism to increase the understanding 
of the operation of what was in the past perceived , although perhaps 
not understood, as "the black box" of the policy process. Such analysis 
can facilitate the understanding of the linkages between what can be 
called the policy environment, individual actors and outcomes. 
Bergin "suggested ... that our knowledge of Australian marine 
policy is very weak ... for students of Australian public policy the 
analysis of Australian marine policy offers the exciting opportunity 
of sailing into unchartered waters" (1983:11). Although there are many 
hazards in undertaking any "voyage of discovery", it is felt that the 
"issue community model" provides a suitably sound vessel with which to 
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chart a course in attempting to indicate aspects of the development of 
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APPENDIX 1:1 
BASS STRAIT SCALLOP FISHERY 
CHRONOLOGY OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
1905-1950s: 	 Scalop 	 fishery 	 based 	 on 	 beds 	 in 	 the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel, Southern Tasmania. This was the major fishery 
for scalops in Australia. 
1952: AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES ACT proclaimed: This established the 
Commonwealth's role in fisheries management, prior to this management 
of Australian fisheries, including scallops had been the responsibility 
of the states. 
1950s: Decline in scallop catch fro m Channel area due to over-
fishing caused by increases in fishing effort, and an increased number 
of scalop boats. 
1956: Scalop beds discovered in Queensland waters off Bundaberg. 
1957: Port Phillip Bay fished for scallops. A large catch landed 
by 1980s standards however little interest in the results of this 
survey and catch. 
Mid 1950s:  Tasmanian boats discover scalop beds off the East Coast 
of the State, relieves pressure on stocks of the Channnel beds. 
1963: Two Tasmanian scalop boats enter Port Philip Bay and begin 
fishing for scallops. The relatively large catches encourages more 
vessels. This marks the establishment of ther Victorian scallop fishery. 
June 1970: A Victorian fisherman discovers extensive scallop beds 
off Lakes Entrance, Gippsland. By December 1970 sixty eight boats were 
harvesting scalops from these beds. 
1972: Tasmanian Fisheries Division undertakes a major survey of 
Bass Strait waters which results in the discovery of new beds in Bass 
Strait waters around the North Coast of Tas mania, and around the 
Furneaux Group. 
1973: Scallop fishery established in the wsters of the North Coast 
of Tasmania. 
1973: Commonweath government introduces the SEAS AND SUBMERGED 
LANDS ACT. 
1975: The High Court in the SEAS AND SUBMERGED LANDS CASE upheld 
the Co m monwealths power under the constitution to legislate for 
control of the territorial sea. 
1979: Premiers Conference agrees to the OFFSHORE CONSTITUTIONAL 
SETTLEMENT, OR (OCS), as a means of resolving the impasse between the 
States and Commonwealth over offshore federalism. 
1980:Bass strait scallop fishery moved to beds located in deep 
water areas of the Strait, under Commonwealth jurisdiction as they were 
more than three miles from the low water mark of either Tasmania or 
Victoria. This fishery necessitated a Commonwealth license. The area 
was open to both Tas manian and Victorian fisher men. 
1980: OCS legislation introduced, particularly i mportant for 
scallop fishery management was the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 
1980, and the Fisheries A mmendment Act 1980. 
1981: Alied Fisheries set up. 
1981-82: Scallop catches 	 fro m beds in Bass Strait start to 
decline, competition for the resources increases and Tasmanian fishermen 
begin 	 to 	 agitate 	 for 	 a 	 state 	 based 	 scalop 	 fishery 
April 1982:  Meeting between the Tasmanian Fisheries Development 
Authority, (TFDA ) and the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry 
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Fisheries Division, at which the TFDA pressed Tasmania's claim to manage 
scalop resources. 
31 March 1982:  Discussion paper on options for scallop fishery 
distributed to industry by TFDA 
27 April 1982:  Moratorium on the issuing of state scallop licenses, 
after meeting of Scallop Liaison Co m mittee where the industry 
representatives presed for this moratorium. 
May 1982:  Liberal Party Government elected, Mr. Gray premier, Mr. 
Beswick Minister for Sea Fisheries. 
11 June 1982:  Professional Fishermen's Association of Tasmania 
(PFAT ) Council meeting which opposed any limitations on licenses "unless 
proven biological danger to species or if any danger of being over 
exploited". 
2 July 1982:  TFDA presents written case to the Director of the 
Fisheries Division, DPI over the State's claim to manage all waters in 
Bass Strait south of a line drawn along Latitude 39°12' South. 
28 July 1982:  Scalop Branch of PFAT ( the major sector grouping of 
scalop fishermen belonging to the PFAT with some shared membership in 
the Liaison committee and the PFAT Council ) wrote to Tasmanian Minister 
requesting a freeze on any further Tas manian scallop licenses. 
September 1982:  Tasmanian and Victorian governments agree on shared 
scalop management in Bass Strait, Tasmania claims that this cannot be 
put into effect until OCS is proclaimed. 
15 October 1982:  Press Release following Australian Fisheries  
Council, 	 clearing 	 way 	 for 	 discussions 	 between 	 Tasmania 	 and 
Commonwealth 	 over 	 fisheries 	 management 	 in 	 Bass 	 Strait. 
28 January 1983:  Meeting of Scallop Liaison Committee meeting 
discussed the opposition of Commonwealth to sharing of control over 
management, TFDA representative pointed out that Commonwealth has the 
final say in Bass Strait. The Liason Committee recommended lifting the 
moratorium on licenses as it is disadvataging Tasmanian fishermen. 
	
February 	 1983: OCS Legislation proclai med, 	 however not yet 
implemented. 
March 1983:  Hawke Labor Government elected, Mr. Kerin Minister for 
Primary 	 Industry. 	 Hawke government announces 	 review of OCS. 
29 April 1983:  Commonwealth formaly rejects Tasmania's claim to 
separation of Bass Strait along 39°12' line. Tasmanian Minister accuses 
the Tasmanian fishermen of lobbying against Tasmania's claim, arguing 
that as a result the Commonwealth used the lack of cohesion in the 
Tasmanian fishery as an excuse for rejecting mananagement proposal. 
13 May 1983: Tasmanian Minister reiterates Tasmanian claim to manage 
scallop fishery in the Tasmaian sector of Bass Strait in a letter to the 
Commonwealth Minister. 
10 June 1983:  TFDA sent letter to Fisheries Division, Dept. Primary 
Industry agreeing to an Interim Management Regime for Bass Strait 
scallops .The Tasmanian minister claimed that this was due to the fact 
that the industry was not united and that they were sabotaging attempts 
to develop a state based fishery in the Strait. 
19 August 1983:  Scalop Liason Committee meeting. Wayne Baker, a 
Tasmanian representative on the Interim Fishing Industry Consultative 
Panel, (IFICP ) , agreed to take the Tasmanian view to the inaugural 
meeting of the IFICP , to be held on the 29 August. 
23 August 1983:  Meeting called of Tasmanian Scallop fishermen, 
which endorsed Liason Committee's views on scallop management. 
September 1983: Australian Fisheries Council meeting Sydney, which 
discussed, among other matters, the management of Bass Strait scalops. 
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13 	 September 	 1983: 	 IFICP 	 caled 	 a 	 meeting 	 of 	 industry 
representatives to discuss management of scallop fishery, and agreement 
was reached to the introduction of a jointly managed zone with limited 
entry. 
September 1983:  The problems associated with Allied Fisheries 
surface in financial and business magazines. These articles stress the 
failure of Allied to return the amount of revenue to the syndicates and 
emphasise the isssue of taxation minimisation in the Allied operation 13 September 1983:  Tasmanian Minister contacts the Commonwealth 
Minister for Primary Industry overconcern at lack of progress over the 
implementation of the OCS so that a permanent management regime could be 
established. The Tasmanaian letter stressed the need to take account of 
the nature of Tasmanias multipurpose fishery in the drafting of 
management proposals. 
26 September 1983: PFAT Annual Conference supported a motion of no 
confidence in the TFDA over "mismanagement of the scallop industry". September 	 1983: 	 Minister 	 rejects 	 criticism 	 of in 	 TFDA 5 October1983: Commonwealth Minister, Mr. Kerin, warns investors 
over activities of Allied Fisheries, through statement in Parliament. 19 October 1983:  Meeeting of Scallop Branch of the PFAT. Resolved 
that licenses in the interim reime should be restricted to thise who had 
lodged returns for catches in Bass Strait in the last six months and 
others on a show/cause basis. 25 October 1983: Tasmanian Minister contacts the Commonwealth 
Minister noting continuing disagreement in the Tasmanian Scallop 
industry groups and accepts the interim management proposals, but 
stressing his view that the regime should be regarded as an interim 
arrangement and be replaced by a State based regime in future. 15 November 1983:Interim Management Regime announced in a joint 
statement from the Tasmanian, Victorian and Commonwealth Governments. 15 November 1983: Scallop Liaison Committee meeting which approved 
the announced Interim Management Regime. The Liaison Committee 
recommended John Hammond as representative on appeals committee. November-December 1983:  Applications for licenses and criteria 
covering 	 Interim 	 Regime 	 sent 	 out 	 to 	 al 	 scalop 	 fishermen. 8 February 1984: Press article stating that the PFAT was opposed to 
the limited entry access to Bass strait scallops, and challenged ruling 
on the Allied Fisheries licenses. The PFAT accused TFDA of selling out 
tradtional fishermen. 
8 February 1984 : Mr. Beswick (Tasmanian Minister) claims that the 
action of Tasmanian, Victorian and Commonwealth governments were in the 
best interests of the fishermen. 9 February 1984: -PFAT  states it does not recognise the Interim 
Management Regime. 
11 February 1984:  PFAT sets up a special committee to look at 
problems of Bass Strait scallops. March 1984:  TFDA receives conflicting submissions from Scallop 
Branch, Council and St. Helens Branch of the PFAT, which were referred 
to the PFAT Executive for a consistent view. 28 March 1984: Review of TFDA announced 30 March 1984: Claims of graft and corruption in operation of 
TFDA made in State parliament 13 April 1984: Further details on Interim Management Regime 
announced. Commonwealth Minister releases Fisheries Notice 121, which 
limited entry to proclaimed waters, within Bass Strait scallop fishery 
from 23 April 1984. To fish for Bass Strait scallops a Commonwealth 
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license endorsed with exemption from Fisheries Notice 121 was needed. 
12 April 1984:  PFAT Executive meeting with Tasmanian minister. 
16 April 1984:  Circular from PFAT Executive to branches and 
members on scalop management issues. 
April 1984:  Hobart Branch of the PFAT moved a no confidence motion 
in the Tasmanian Minister and the TFDA. 
23 April 1984:  Effective date of Fisheries Notice introducing 
restrictions in the Bass Strait scallop fishery. INTERIM MANAGEMENT 
REGIME established. 
24 April 1984:  Tasmanian fishermen call for talks over future of 
fishery, 	 and 	 announce 	 their 	 claims 	 in 	 the 	 press. 
26 April 1984: Public Meeting in Hobart Town Hall organised to publicly air complaints of Hobart PFAT members. Title of meeting "Don't 
Let the Tide Run Out". 
27 April 1984:  Report of meeting which resolved to call for the 
abolition of the TFDA. 
9 May 1984: Article in the Examiner  claiming the scallop fishery is colapsing 
June 1984: Bass Strait Scallop Task Force set up. The task force was initiated by the Commonwealth, comprising representatives of the 
fishermen from both Tasmania and Victoria, processors and the State 
govern ments chaired by an officer fro m the DPI. 
8 June 1984:  Commonwealth Media Release announcing Interim closure of area of Eastern Banks Strait to scallop fishing from 13/6 to 31/7/84. 
27 June 1984: Announcement of closure of further area from the 28/6 
to the 31/7/84. 
10 July 1984: O'Kelly review of the TFDA handed to Minister. 
13 July 1984:  Opposition calls for the release of the O'Kelly 
Review, in Tasmanian Parliament. 
July 1984: Cabinet reshuffle, Roger Groom replaces John Beswick as Minister for Sea Fisheries. 
25 July 1984:  Extension of interim closure to Eastern Banks Strait 
to January 1985. 
1 September 1984:  PFAT claims there is a need for a Commonwealth 
Fisheries Secretariat in Tasmania. 
6 September 1984: BASS STRAIT SCALLOP FISHERY: MANAGEMEMENT 
ISSUES discussion paper produced by the Scallop Task Force published. 
20 September 1984:  O'Kelly Review of the TFDA released, recommends 
that the TFDA be scrapped and be replaced a Department of Sea Fisheries 
13 September 1984:  Letter from the Department of Primary Industry 
regarding the announcement of the publication of the Bass Strait 
Scalop Task Force discusssion paper 
19 September 1984: Media release from DPI Fisheries Division, 
announcing the publication of Task Force Issues Paper for Bass Strait 
Scalops. 
24 September 1984: Media release from the DPI. Management of Bass 
Strait Scallops. Modifications to management regime with a new 
category of inshore licence to be introduced into the Interim Management 
regime and a similar category retained in the longer term management 
arrangements. 
16 November 1984:  Closures of scallop grounds East of Lakes 
Entrance, North of King Island and continuing the closure of beds in the 
Eastern Banks Strait region. 
December 1984: FINTAS,  the major Tasmanian journal of the fishing 
industry, published by the TFDA, announces that the PFAT had given its 
representatives on the Scallop Task Force a "blank cheque" to negotiate 
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the best deal possible for Tasmanian fishermen. 
28 December 1984:  Extension of Interim Management Regime for Bass 
Strait scallops until at least the middle of 1985, announced in a media 
release from the DPI. 
31 	 January-2 February 	 1985: Australian Fisheries Conference, 
Canberra. 	 The 	 conference 	 brought 	 together 	 fishermen, 	 fisheries 
processors and marketing bodies, fisheries agencies fro m the 
states, Northern Territory and the Commonwealth Governments to discuss 
industry participation in policy making. Specific fisheries management 
issues were discussed at the conference including issues fro m the 
scalop fishery in Bass Strait. 
February 	 1985: For mation 	 of 	 the Rock Lobster Fisher men's 
Association of Tasmania at a meeting in Launceston, caled by a steering 
committee based at St. Helens. 
February 1985:  TFDA replaced by Department of Sea Fisheries, with 
a new director, Marc Wilson. 
April 1985:  Rock Lobster Fisher men's Association pushes for all 
Tas manian rock lobster licence holders to be allowed to fish for 
scallops south of 39°12' Latitude in Bass Strait. 
10 April 1985: Partial opening of Lakes Entrance grounds from 15th 
April 1984. 
11 April 1985: Letter from DPI to industry and fisheries agencies 
outlining 	 "current 	 situation 	 on 	 scalop 	 management 	 arrangements". 
May 1985:  Scalop Task Force meeting. 
24 	 May 	 1985: 	 Bass 	 Strait 	 scalop 	 beds 	 opened. 
June 1985:  Proble ms in Victorian scallop fishery e merge, 
particularly concerning licence restictions. Lakes Entrance fishermen, 
facing a severe decline in catches from the Bass Strait beds claim that 
they will attempt to fish in Port Phillip Bay even though they are not 
legaly entitled. 
21 June 1985:  Tasmanian Fishing Industry Council (TFIC) established 
at a meeting of Industry in Launceston, involving al sectors and groups 
in the Tasmanian fishing industry 
July 1985: Australian Fisheries Council meeting in Darwin, which 
discussed, among other matters, the state of play with the OCS, and the 
progress towards a manage ment regi me for Bass Strait scallops. 
22 July 1985:  Decision to implement OCS announced in a media release 
by Co m monwealth Pri mary Industry Minister at Australian Fisheries 
Council. Also announced was agreement on a scalop management plan for 
Bass Strait, by the Tasmanian, Victorian and Commonwealth Ministers. 
22 July 1985:  Media release announcing details of zoning system of 
management in Bass Strait scallops, using baselines of twenty nautical 
miles from the Low Water Mark of each State. The State would control the 
zones ajacent to their coastlines, with the Commonwealth allocating 
licences for the central zone. With the i mple mentation of the OCS 
responsibility for this central zone would be given to the States to 
jointly manage. The Management Plan awaiting assent by the Governors of 
the States and the Governor General, with implementation expected within 
three to six months. 
August 	 1985: 	 New 	 scalop 	 beds discovered 	 of Banks 	 Strait 
North-Eastern Tasmania, outside three mile limit in "proclaimed waters". 
Tasmanian fishermen agitate for sole access to these beds, and push for 
rapid implementation of the management plan, which would bring the beds 
under Tasmanian control 
Mid August 1985:  Threat of "scalop war" between Tasmanian boats 
and Victorians in Banks Strait, and clai ms of an a marda of Victorian 
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boats sailing southwards to fish the beds are publicised in the 
Tasmanian media. Tasmanian Minister raises question of a closure of the 
Banks Strait with Commonwealth. 
September 1985: Moratorium 	 on the alocation of commonwealth 
fishing 	 licenses 	 as 	 agreed 	 at 	 the 	 Australian 	 Fisheries Council. 
September 1985: Australian Fisheries 	 carries an article on the 
Scalop Management Regime. 
September 1985: Meeting of Tasmanian scallop fishermen ends in 
uproar. The Tas manian fisher men's Task Force representative, 
John Hammond, claimed that the fishermen did not understand the 
proble ms in gaining a manage ment regi me, and that continual 
representations for a solely Tasmanian fishery was pointless as it was 
impossible to attain. 
September 1985: 	 Exa miner reported the view of a Stanley 
fsher man, Mr. F. Hursey, that part of the proble ms in the scallop 
industry in Tasmania was caused by an ignorance of the role of the 
Commonwealth fisheries agency. Hursey claimed there was a need to make 
the Commonwealth's role, and the effect of legislation governing the 
manage ment of Bass Strait, clearer for the fisher men. 
September 1985: Commonwealth agrees to interim closure of Banks 
Strait to allow survey of scallop beds to be undertaken. Survey 
commissioned by DPI. 
October 1985: Meeting in Launceston •between Tasmanian and 
Commonwealth fisheries officers over results of survey, closure had been 
extended due to poor weather conditions in Banks Strait hindering 
completion of survey. 
October 1985: Decision by Commonwealth Minister to open Banks 
Strait scallop beds to appropriately licensed vessels, that is those 
with Commonwealth licenses issued under the conditions of the Interim 
Management Regime. Closed area to be opened from the 8th of October at 
midnight. 
October 1985: Tasmanian fishermen agree to self imposed bag 
limits from beds in an attempt to provide some controls on exploitation 
of beds. They claim that the Victorian vessels fishing the Banks Strait 
beds are not under any such "gentle man's agreee ment". 
October 1985: Claims in the Examiner that scallops taken from 
the Banks Strait beds were rotting on Melbourne wharves as scallop 
processors in Victoria could not handle the increased yields. 
23 December 1985: Scallop Liason Ctee circularised proposal for 
the future manage ment of scallops in Tas manian waters. This plan 
recommended the introduction of an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) 
method over other methods of manage ment, bag li mits or zoning. 
26 December 1985: DPI announces summer closure of Bass Strait 
scalop fishery. 
7 April 	 1986: Victorian Liberal Party opposition clai med that 
Victorian Government should assist scalop fishermen at Lakes Entrance. 
9 April 1986: Tasmanian Minister announced Tasmanian scalop season 
to open on May 12th for all areas except the Channel, Storm Bay and 
Norfolk Bay. 
17 April 1986: Commonwealth Minister announces combined closure of 
Bass Strait beds until decision regarding implementation of OCS is made, 
expected around mid May. 
May 1986: Tasmanian Minister announces imposition of bag limits on 
the scallop fishery, based on boat size, up to a maximum of 140 bags. 
The opening of the season was to be delayed until the 12th June, to 
allow ti me for i mplernntation of OCS agree ment and in response to 
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survey of Banks Strait beds by CSIRO. 
7 May 1986:  John Hammond, a Flinders Island scallop fisherman and 
member of the Bass Strait Scallop Task Force, is reported in media as 
being critical of the 140 bag limit proposed for the coming season. 
7 May 1986:  TSFA supports the postponment of the opening of the 
scallop season until June 12th, as announced by Minister. The TSFA 
supported the delay on the grounds that the scallops were not ready for 
harvesting, and that the OCS agreement may be in place before the season 
opened. 
8 May 1986:  The head of the scallop commodity group TFIC slates 
continued minority group of fishermen who were critical of the bag 
limits proposal as being out of step with the rest of the industry. 
20 May 1986: Announcement that extented Tasmnaian control over the 
scallop fishery should be introduced by June 12th, regulations based on 
bag limits linked to vessel size were to apply for 1986 season only. 
Fishermen had no need to fish in this season to protect an entitlement 
pending a longer ter m manage mnt plan being devised. 
24 May 1986: Media announces that there was reluctant agreement 
between fishermen over the imposition of trip limits on the Banks Strait 
fishery. Agreement was reached on the compromise of two trips per week 
after proposal that fishermen voluntarily limit fishing to one trip per 
week. 
6 June 1986: Agreement finalised between Commonwealth, Tasmania and 
Victoria over the implementation of zoning regime for Bass Strait 
scallops as the first stage of the implementation of the fisheries 
package of the OCS. 
7 June 1986:  Trials urged to assess the suitability of the modified 
Queensland 	 prawn 	 trawl 	 for 	 the 	 Tasmanian 	 scalop 	 fishery. 
12 June 1986:  Bass strait seasson opens, Banks Strait beds within 
Tasmanian jurisdiction, government reiterates the bag limit restriction 
on effort, and did not implement the fishermen's wish for a trip limit. 
This trip limit reached by agreement at a meeting called by the TSFA was 
to be carried out by "gentlemen's agreement" following government 
reluctance to enforce such a measure. 
19 June 1986:  TSFA publicises a definition of the scallop week to 
avoid 	 confusion 	 over 	 loandins 	 and 	 the 	 voluntary 	 trip 	 limits. 
4 July 1986: TSFA claims that dispute over license allocation was a 
"storm in a teacup", although media focused on vessels being forced back 
to ports as a result of not gaining correct endorsements. TSFA claimed 
that a backlog of license applications had caused problems. TSFA 
spokeman stressed the cordial relationship the group had developed with 
the Minister and the DSF and also pointed to the industry initiative of 
voluntary trip limits as indicating a desire for longer term management 
of the resource. 
7 July 1986: Tasmanian Minister announces freeze on the transfer of 
Tasmanian scallop licenses to stop profiteering from inflated values 
posed by the opening of the Banks Strait beds. 
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AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES SERVICE, Department of Primary Industry. The AFS 
functions to 
advise government on the conseravtion, managemnt ansd 
utilisation of the living marine resources of the 
Australaian Fishing Zone (AFZ), 
[to] consult with State governments, CSIRO, industry and 
other agencies on fisheries matters. 
[and] implement and administer Commonwealth fisheries 
policy 
(Aust. Fish. June 1986:48) 
The AFS is organised into three branches responsible for administration, 
management and development and industry services. In addition the AFS 
developed and provides support for nine task forces, including Bass 
Strait scallops (see below) which contain industry and state government 
members 
VICTORIA 
MARINE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT BRANCH Fisheries and Wildlife Service, 
Department of Forests Conservation and Lands, containing what was 
formerly the COMMERCIAL FISHERIES BRANCH, (initially in the FWS and then 
restructured as part of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Affairs 
- see Chapter Three) and the MARINE SCIENCE LABORATORIES (MSL ). 
TASMANIA 
DEPARTMENT OF SEA FISHERIES, (DSF ), (formerly the TASMANIAN FISHERIES 
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY) with responsibility for the management, 
developemnt and administration of marine living resources in waters 
around the State of Tasmania. The DSF's histrory and structure is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
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Commonwealth-State Consultative Bodies. 
AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES COUNCIL: (AFC) This council, established in 1968, 
has responsibility for formal consultation between the Commonwealth and 
the States at a Ministerial level. The AFC meets at least once a year at 
different venues around Australia. It is advised by a STANDING COMMITTEE 
ON FISHERIES, and several specific advisory committees, whose 
membership may include State or Commonwealth bureaucrats or academic 
or scientific experts. 
SOUTH-EASTERN FISHERIES COMMITTEE: Is a subcommitee of the Standing 
committee of the AFC, which provides advice to the Council on fisheres 
in the South Eastern Region of Australia, including the fisheries of New 
South Wales, Victorian, Tasmanian and South Austalia. the SEFC has 
comprises members of the Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) task force and 
several research groups. 
BASS STRAIT SCALLOP TASK FORCE: This body contains representatives of 
the State and Commonwealth agencies and members drawn from the catch and 
processing sector groups from Tasmania and Victoria. The success of the 
Task Force in providing a forum for discussion between industry and 
government has been emphasised by Byrne, (1985), who claims that it gave 
a chance for industry to see the constraints influencing the 
development of a scallop management regime. The Task Force structure 
also enabled a face to face contact between the institutions and the 
fishermen, providing a formal forum for policy discussions. The 
importance of the Task Force in resolving the problems of the 
development of the scallop regime cannot be underestimated. 
Commonwealth-Industry Organisations. 
AUSTRALIAN FISHING INDUSTRY COUNCIL, (AFIC). 
This body was set up as a result of the establishment of the Australian 
Fisheries Council in 1968 	 and aimed to provide a means of providing a 
basis for formal interaction between the 	 fishing industry and the 
Commonwealth government.AFIC was organised around a federal structure, 
each State having a branch to liase with the State fisheries agencies. 
These branches elected a federal Council. AFIC aimed to " represent all 
facets of thre fishing industry", however it never achieved an effective 
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role in either Tasmania or Victoria due to the pre existing industry 
organisations. In Tasmania for example AFIC (TAS) numbered approximately 
fifteen members, most of whom joined the group after a dispute with the 
PFAT. The development of the VICTORIAN FISHING INDUSTRY COUNCIL in 1979 
resulted in the demise of the very small AFIC branch in Victoria. Even 
though AFIC had a chequered history its influence cannot be discounted 
in the evolution of the Bass Strait scallop management regime, as 
individuals from within the AFIC (TAS) brach particularly were active on 
the Tasmanian Scallop Liason Committee and, more importantly, active on 
the Bass Strait Scallop Task Force, representing AFIC's successor body, 
IFICP. 
INTERIM 	 FISHING 	 INDUSTRY 	 CONSULTATIVE 	 PANEL, 	 (IFICP). 
With the decline in the effectiveness of the AFIC organisation, pressure 
was 	 directed 	 to 	 develop 	 a 	 more 	 effective 	 government-industry 
consultative body. The Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry 
sponsored the development of the IFICP as a vehicle to first organise 
the Australian Fisheries Conference in 1985, (the first such conferesnce 
covering all aspects of the fishing industry and the role of government 
agencies since 1973) and secondly to consider options for the new 
Commonwealth-industry body. The conference was organised around a 
number of themes concerned with fisheries management and administration. 
At the conclusion of the conference the meeting considered the type and 
funding of a national fishing industry body. The recommendations from 
the Conference, later endorsed by the Commonwealth Minister, for a new 
industry organisation to be called the National Fishing Industry 
Council. IFICP was replaced by this new organisation in late 1985. The 
IFICP was made up of two represenatives of each State, one from the 
catch sector and the other from the processing/marketing sectors. 
NATIONAL FISHING INDUSTRY COUNCIL, (NFIC). 
The endorsement of the Australian Fisheries Conference for a new 
fishing industry body resulted in the develop ment of 
the National Fishiong Industry Council in June 1985. Unlike AFIC the 
NFIC charter firmly emphasised the importance of giving all sectors of 
the industry adequate representation through their own national 
associations which would in turn provide the membership of the NFIC, 
an industry peak council. This recognition of the diverse interests of 
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the 	 catching, 	 processing/marketing 	 and 	 industry 	 sectors 
of the Australian fishing industry provides the basis for a broadly 
based body. NFIC contains an executive which represents al constituent 
associations as well as each state and territory. The Constituent 
Associations are: 
NATIONAL FISHER MENS ASSOCIATION, representing the catch 
sector, 
NATIONAL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, representing the service 
sector of the Australian fishing Industry, 
NATIONAL FISH PROCESSORS AND MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, 
representing the processing and marketing sectors. 
While it is too early at this stage to assess the effectiveness of the 
NFIC organisation its structure and broad basis of support may well•
overcome many of the deficiencies of the previous "national" body. The 
support of the State fisheries agencies and the fisher men in the 
development of the NFIC body is also significant, emphasised by the 
develop ment of si milar state based councils in Tas mania and other 
States. 
State Government-Industry Organisations. 
Victoria 
VICTORIAN 	 FISHING 	 INDUSTRY 	 COUNCIL, 	 (VFIC 	 or 	 VICFISH ) 
The council was set up through legislation in 1979, providing a formal 
statutory basis for the councils operations. VFIC is an executive 
council drawn from representatives of all the sectors of the Victorian 
fishing Industry, and includes a consumer representative. The Council is 
chaired by a member of the Commercial Fisheries Branch. The council's 
main focus has been on the develop ment of the Victorian fishing 
industry, particularly in ter ms of marketing and pro motion. The 
management of the scallop fishery in Victoria has not been a major 
concern of the Council. 
Tasmania 
TASMANIAN FISHING INDUSTRY COUNCIL 
The establishment of the TFIC in 1985 was a significant development in 
the 	 relationship 	 between 	 the 	 fishing 	 industry and the Tasmanian 
goverment and management 	 institution. 	 The splintering of industry 
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support through the development of single fishery groups at the expense 
of the traditional fishermens body, the PFAT, resulted in a perceived 
lack of cohesion in the industry. The establishment of the Department of 
Sea Fisheries and the importance the head of the new department placed 
on developing a good relationship with industry, as well as the need to 
have a state based body to provide representatives to the newly formed 
NFIC associations, were all influential forces in creating this new 
body. The Council was established as a result of a public meeting 
attended by 200 fishermen who heard discussion on the need and funding 
arrange ments proposed for the Council. This meeting in June 1985 
esatblished a TFIC steering committee made up of representatives of the 
eight major fishing and industy sectors. This steering committee was to 
meet and interview applicants for the position of executive officer, a 
position funded by government contribution and a, levy on Tasmanian 
fisher men. It is again too early to assess the effectiveness of the 
TFIC, however its broad base may provide a bridge between the various 
fisheries groups, and provide a means of consultation with the industry 
and the state agency. 
SCALLOP LIAISON COMMITTEE. 
The Scalop Liaison Committee was established by the TFDA as a means of 
providing a discussion between scallop fishermen over issues of policy 
or management. The liaison committee contained representatives of the 
Tasmanian scalop fisherrmen, drawn from the major interest groups, the 
PFAT and AFIC(TAS). The liason committee concept was established by the 
TFDA as a means of involving resource users in the self management of 
their fishery. The Scallop Liaison Co m mittee's concerns beca me 
specifically involved with the issue of the management of Bass Strait 
scallops as theis area provided the major area of exploitation. The 
committee had a direct input into the deliberations of the Bass Strait 
Scallop Task Force as the Tasmanian industry represenatives of this 
body were also members of the Liason Committee 
Industry Organisations. 
VICTORIAN 	 PROFESSIONAL 	 FISHERMEN'S 	 ASSOCIATION 	 (VPFA) 
The VPFA seeks to represent all Victorian fishermen through a series of 
port based zones which elect representatives to the VPFA Executive. The 
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group has a full time secretary who is located in the same office as the 
Executive Officer of the Victorian Fishing Industry Council, providing a 
means of close liason between the groups. The VPFA has a membership of 
approximately 230 fishermen, with the number depending to a great extent 
on the condition of any one fishery. 
PROFESSIONAL FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF TASMANIA, (PFAT). 
The PFAT was the traditional umbrella group representing all of 
Tasmania's fishermen, although this role has diminished somewhat as 
single fishery groups have developed. These groups emerged as the result 
of a perceived lack of action by the PFAT in specific fisheries, or 
through the development of different organisations within the PFAT 
structure. The PFAT is organised on the basis of port based branches, 
which elect delegates to a Council and Executive. Some of these branches 
are active and vigorous in their lobbying, often in conflict with the 
actions of the PFAT executive bodies. In the 1970s the PFAT developed 
branches concerned with specific fisheries. This move was thought to 
encourage the input from different ports in the development of policy 
for a specific fishery. These fisheries sector branches became important 
and due to their concern with specific fisheries may have been in 
conflict with the other sectors of the parent body. The PFAT is an 
important interest group even if its influence has declined in recent 
times. 
AUSTRALIAN FISHING INDUSTRY COUNCIL-AFIC (TAS) 
The problems with the AFIC organisation, both nationally and at the 
State level have been discussed previously. The reason for including 
AFIC (TAS) in this 	 survey of groups is to emphasies its role in the 
development of the scallop regime 	 for Bass Strait.The ability of the 
AFIC represenatives to put forward 	 their concerns at a number of 
forums, together with their ability to understand the policy process, 
gave this group influence that could be regarded as being out of all 
proportion to its size and degree of representativeness. 
TASMANIAN SCALLOP FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION (TSFA) 
The TSFA emerged in the latter period of the interaction over the 
Bass Strait scallop management regime as the major industry group in 
Tasmania. The TSFA formed in 1983 as a result of disaffection among a 
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group of scallop fisher men over the treat ment of a range of scallop 
issues by the PFAT. The TSFA ai med to effectively represent the 
interests of the operators of s maller vessels, who were seen to be 
be underrepresented in existing organisations. By 1986 the TFSA had 
eclipsed the PFAT as the major scallop grouping, with a large 
membership, •and good relations with the Minister and The DSF. The 
president of TSFA was also the head of the scallop comodity group in 
TFIC. 
TASMANIAN ROCK LOBSTER FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION 
This group formed in early 1985 in response to a threat to the existing 
manage ment regi me for the Bass Strait rock lobster fishery fro m 
Victorian fishermen. 	 These fishermen fishermen initiated a campaign 
during the Victorian State 	 election requesting the Commonwealth to 
investigate opening up more of Bass Strait to Victorian Rock Lobster 
fishermen. The importance of this interest groups for the discussion of 
Bass Strait scallop policy is that the TRLFA requested that all 
licensed Tasmanaian Rock Lobster Fishermen should have unlimited access 
to Bass Strait scalops, as it was used as an "off season " fishery 
LAKES ENTRANCE SCALLOP FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION 
This is a single issue group main impact in the discussions during the 
development of the management regime was to press the Victorian 
government for a "better" deal from the Victorian fisheries agency in 
ter ms of access to Port Phillip Bay scallop beds.These beds were 
restricted to those with a "Bay" license. 	 The fact that this group has 
a vested interest in 	 the Bass Strait scallop fishery as they have both 
State and Commonwealth licenses for the region involved them in the Task 
Force Discussions. The internal problems within the Victorian Scallop 
fishey during the early part of 1985 was the focus of this groups 
activities, the discovery of the Banks Strait beds in mid 1985 enabled 
thse fishermen of dredge these stocks with the appropriate endorsements. 
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PORT PHILLIP SCALLOP FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION 
The 	 smal 	 Port 	 Philip 	 scalop 	 fleet 	 is 	 highly 	 restricted 	 inits 
operations. The number of licenses is strictly controlled and other 
restrictions such as bag limits and controls on size and time of 
dredging occur. The strong ethnic group linkages within this fishery is 
important, and provides another source of organisation. This groups is 
concerned with limiting the access of Lakes Entrnce vessels into the 
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This is a discussion paper only. 
The purpose of this paper is to inform scallop 
fishermen of those issues identified by the Bass Strait Scallop 
Fishery Task Force as being important to developing a long-term 
management regime for the Bass Strait Scallop fishery and to 
stimulate discussion and comment from fishermen to aid the Task 
Force in its evaluation of the various options. The Task Force 
has not yet made any recommendations regarding specific options 
for a long-term management regime and will not do so until 
after consultations with the scallop fishing industry. 
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279. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Bass Strait Scallop Fishery Task Force was established in June 1984 to consider and develop a plan for the future management of the fishery. The Task Force membership includes officials from the Tasmanian and Victorian fisheries authorities, seven industry representatives and a Chairman from the Department of Primary Industry. The Task Force will consider all available information, meet with fishermen and processors to hear their views and prepare a report on options for future management of the fishery for consideration by Governments. 
2. The terms of reference of the Task Force are as follows: 
(i) Collate existing information on the fishery and recommend modifications or additions to current data collection; 
(ii) Assess the effectiveness and impact of current management collection; 
(iii)Specify management objectives for the fishery; and 
(iv) Identify options for management of the fishery and indicate to Standing Committee on Fisheries, Australian Fisheries Council and relevant Governments not only what it considers to be the advantages of the options but also the options it considers the most appropriate. 
3. Task Force members include: 
Mr Bruce Lilburn, 	 Commonwealth Department of Chairman 	 Primary Industry 
Tasmania  
Mr Tony Harrison 	 Tasmanian Fisheries Development Authority 
, Mr Brian Daff 
- Mr John Hammond 
Mr Dennis King 
Victoria  
Mr Jeff Byrne 
Mr Bill Cull 
Mr Chris Fenner 
Mr Tom Kivelos 
Mr Geoff Stackhouse 
Victorian Fisheries and Wildlife Service 
IFICP 
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By early 1983, the Commonwealth, Tasmanian and Victorian Governments, as well as many fishermen, had become concerned about the rapid increase in the number of boats in the Bass Strait scallop fishery. It was concluded that unless measures were taken to limit the increase in boat numbers, fishermen would face serious economic problems. There was also concern that there may be a spillover of excess fishing capacity into other fisheries. This resulted in extensive discussion between the Commonwealth, Tasmanian and Victorian authorities concerning appropriate management arrangements. The Interim Fishing Industry Consultative Panel also formed a sub-committee in mid-1983 to address the issue. 
6. On 15 November 1983, an interim management regime for the Bass Strait scallop fishery was announced jointly by the Commonwealth, Tasmanian and Victorian Ministers responsible • for fisheries. The interim management regime began on •23 April 1984 and principally defined an area of Bass • Strait within which the number of boats allowed to participate in the fishery was limited. A map illustrating the management area is attached. 
SCALLOP MANAGEMENT 
7. The two broad objectives of any management plan for Commonwealth waters are specified in the Fisheries Act 1952 as 
ensuring through proper conservation and management measures that the living resources of the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) are not endangered 
achieving the optimum utilization of the living resources of the AFZ. 
8. Natural fluctuations in the number of scallops mean that the number available to be caught may vary greatly over time and from area to area each year. 
9 	 Given the natural fluctuations in scallop populations, achievement of these broad objectives may be difficult. Nevertheless, the Task Force will need to address a series of management issues. 
3. 
1 KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
A. 	 Boundaries to the Fishery and Zoning  
10. Should the Bass •Strait fishery be managed as a single unit with uniform management measures throughout or should it be divided into two or more zones? 
- if a single unit, what area should be covered in the fishery and what management measures should be applied? 
if two or more zones, how should the fishery be zoned and what management measures should apply in each zone? 
In both cases who should be the management authority? 
11.Scallops in Bass Strait occur in both Commonwealth proclaimed waters and the coastal waters of Tasmania and Victoria. 
12.The present boundaries of the fishery encompass a single area from 143° 30'E to 149° 00'E and along the Victorian coast and the Tasmanian coast above 400 45'S (see map). One option is to have two or more zones in the fishery. One suggestion is to divide the fishery into two zones north and south of 390 12'S. Alternatively two or three zones could be considered with certain classes of vessels restricted to areas close to the coast. 
13.Zoning has advantages 
- it recognises previous differences in management approaches by Tasmania and Victoria 
- it avoids the possibility of greater concentrations of vessels in one area, leaving processors elsewhere short of product, and congesting both the grounds and the ports 
and disadvantages 
it is harder to administer than one set of regulations 
it could interfere with traditional fishing patterns 
- there could be problems of enforcement. 
14. Irrespective of zoning, boundaries of the fishery must be resolved. 
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B. 	 Administration  
15. Currently the fishery is managed by the Commonwealth in accordance with the provisions of the Fisheries Act 1952. Long term responsibility for administration has yet to be resolved. Whilst this is difficult without implementation of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement (OCS) the Task Force may consider the following options: 
- could be managed by Commonwealth regulation and control throughout proclaimed waters of the fishery with State control in coastal waters 
- regulation and control by a joint authority (Commonwealth, State and Industry representatives) 
- regulation and control by the two States concerned (Victoria and Tasmania). 
16 For a management plan to be effective in Commonwealth waters, it will be necessary to ensure that both Commonwealth and State regulations are complementary and co-ordinated. 
17. The Task Force may assume one of the above options as a basis for further consideration, noting that the first two options may or may not include zoning. 
C. 	 Choosing a Management Option  
18 In the extreme, the fishery could be subject to no management control and industry would "sort itself out". On the other hand, limited entry, catch quotas, gear restrictions, seasons, size limits and closures could apply in various combinations. 
19.The management regime will need to accommodate fishermen who fish only for scallops as well as those who engage in more diverse operations. 
20.Prior to the interim regime, Victoria and Tasmania had different management strategies. The current regime has implemented a form of limited entry on an interim basis. 
21.Re-examination of these measures is required, with attention being paid to the following key issues: 
- is a limited entry regime appropriate for the fishery 
- should there be size limits on scallops 
- should there be controls on fishing efficiency 
- are seasonal or area closures appropriate. 
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FORMS OF MANAGEMENT 
22. Alternatives to limited entry include open entry, •total catch quotas, individual transferable quotas and variable closed seasons. 
A. 	 Open Entry Fishery  
23. Characterized by: 
- the freedom for new or outside fishermen to enter the fishery 
- the freedom of fishermen to upgrade or buy larger boats 
- a variety of biologically oriented management controls such,as seasonal closures, area closures, catch quotas and some types of gear restrictions that generally become more retrictive as increasing numbers of fishermen 
• 	 compete for a finite resource 
- there would be no control on the number of boats, fishing effort or catching capacity. In the long term, fishermen are likely to be faced with persistent low, profits, and the fishery may experience overall and regional economic hardship. 
B. 	 Individual Transferable Quotas  
24. Individual (per vessel) quotas can address both biological and economic problems simultaneously. Relies on allocating the available resource (a quota) to individual fishermen. 
The consequences include: 
- they give fishermen some certainty of their catch amount regardless of the actions of other fishermen 
- they will result in a fall in unproductive competition 
- costs of fishing should fall 
- if quotas are divisible and saleable, fishermen will be able to adjust to their desired level of operations without affecting the resource or the other fishermen 
- individual freedom will be high as restrictions on fishing method, boat size, gear and boat replacements will be unnecessary 	 • 
- fleet reduction programs are unnecessary as the market place will eventually determine the optimum fleet size 
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- individual boat catches may be difficult to monitor 
the cost to police and administer the scheme may be high 
- a• means of allocating the quota to fishermen must be devised and agreed to (boat catch records must he reliable): 
C. 	 Limited Entry  • 25. A limit on the number of boats operating in the fishery. This is the regime which has been operating in Victorian waters for a number of.years. 
The consequences include 
- the ability to enter the fishery will .remain, but only through buying out an existing operator (if transferability is allowed) 
there would be some control', though not necessarily complete, on the expansion of fishing effort and capacity 
in the longer term a basis is established from which it should be possible to reduce effort/capacity by measures such as individual boat quotas and thereby improve the economic position of those remaining 
upon the issue of an endorsement which provides a right to fish, a value for that endorsement is established, if they are freely transferable. 
D. 	 Other Alternatives  
26.These could include total catch quotas and/or variable closed seasons which might be applied to either open entry or limited entry management schemes. 
27.Limited entry management regimes established for other Australian fisheries such as rock lobster and abalone have not been wholly successful in preventing the range of resource and economic problems generally associated with open entry fisheries. These problems may compound in scallop fisheries where resource availability is subject to extreme fluctuations. 
28.If limited entry is accepted as appropriate a number of further issues will require consideration. These include: 
1. Endorsement Transferability 2. Endorsement Splitting 3. Boat Replacement Policy 4. Fleet Reduction 5. Conservation of resources 
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ISSUES POSED BY LIMITED ENTRY 
Issue 1: ENDORSEMENT TRANSFERABILITY 
29. The ability for fishermen to sell or transfer their 
endorsement should be considered. 
Consequences of transferability include 
- flexibility for fishermen to move into or out of the 
fishery according to individual circumstances 
- non-transferability encourages fishermen and boats to 
remain in the fishery beyond their appropriate age of 
retirement 
- even with non-transferability, there may be 
exceptional circumstances where transfer is essential 
to prevent unnecessary hardship, e.g. •deceased estates 
windfall gains will also be created for initial 
licence holders if endorsements are freely transferable 
- removes the ability to reduce 
over-capacity/capitalisation through natural attrition 
- the cost of entering the fishery will rise as the 
value of the endorsement increases. 
Issue 2: ENDORSEMENT SPLITTING 
30. As Bass Strait scallop fishermen may also operate in a 
number of other fisheries (lobster, shark, etc), operators 
will undoubtedly wish to hold multiple endorsements. 
31. For those fishermen who qualify for endorsements in more 
than one limited entry fishery, they may wish to sell or 
transfer one or more endorsements while retaining one on 
their own licence, i.e. endorsement splitting. 
32. Consequences of endorsement splitting include 
- provides a financial gain to the fisherman while 
allowing him to continue operations 
- would result in increased total fishing capacity if 
fishermen specialise and/or, sells his endorsement to 
a specialist 
- reduces the flexibility of fishermen after sale of one 
or more endorsements 
- fishermen wanting to buy an endorsement may have to 
buy a higher priced endorsement package. 
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- fishermen with multiple endorsements may have a better chance of combating temporary economic problems in the scallop fishery caused by variable availability of scallops than do specialist fishermen. 
Issue 3: -BOAT REPLACEMENT POLICY 
33. Currently, boats endorsed for the scallop fishery can be replaced only if they sink or are -destroyed. and wher.e the replacement boat is no larger than the one -replaced. The Task Force will need to consider whether this policy . Should be continued or Modified. 
34. The options include one, or a combination of 
A. 	 No Restrictions  
35. lhe absence of any restrictions on replacement of boats allows fishermen complete flexibility in upgrading or changing their vessel but has the disadvantage of allowing increases in effort and capacity. 
B. 	 No Replacement or Extreme Restrictions  
36. No replacement or extreme restrictions on the replacement of any boat has the advantage of 
- minimise an escalation in capacity 
- may reduce the number of boats over time through • natural attrition.. 
37. Disadvantages include 
if continued too long it may lead to an increase in the age, unsuitability and inefficiency of boats 
- may also tend to cause fishermen to operate unsafe boats rather than leave the fishery 
- could cause severe hardship for some fishermen. 
C. • Limited Replacement  
38. Units can be defined for sale or transfer. 
(i) 	 Based on Boat Length  
39. A policy based on boat length would have the following advantages 
- simple to understand and administer 
- length is already surveyed, but standardisation of measurement must be sought 
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allows technological improvements 
allows more boats and employment for any given level of resource exploitation or maximum allowable capacity 
40. Disadvantages include 
- it does not fully restrict effort or capacity 
- it can lead to the distortion of boat shape 
- it could restrict a fishermen's flexibility to increase the size of his fishing operation. 
	
(ii) 	 Based on Under Deck Volume (UDV)  
41. To base a boat replacement policy solely on UDV would have the following advantages 
guidelines for measurement have been established in other fisheries 
it controls capacity more closely than boat length 
- units can be defined for sale or transfer 
- allows for flexibility of design 
42. Disadvantages include 
- industry may have to bear part of the cost of maintaining a register of boat units 
- scope still exists for increased fishing capacity. 
(iii) 	 Based on Engine Capacity  
43. A boat replacement policy based solely on engine capacity has the following advantages 
- engine capacity for standard engines would be available 
- engine capacity must closely correspond to real fishing power in scallop dredging vessels 
- allows flexibility in size and design of boats. 
44. Disadvantages include 
- engines can be modified to improve power and efficiency, eg. kort nozzles 
- difficult to define engine capacity or maximum continuous rating 
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- measurement of engine capacity varies with each. manufacturer 
- if engine capacity is inflexibly defined, the policy could be too restrictive. 
Issue 4: FLEET REDUCTION 
45. Involves a management structure with a'mechapisp to actively _remove vessels from the fleet and thus reducing over-capacity and excess fishing effort. Options include: 
A. 	 A boat buy-back scheme. 
46. Consequences include 
- that it removes vessels quickly from the fleet 
- often the least productive vessels are offered for buy-back first, with little impact on fishing effort 
- is expensive to administer and fishermen in an economically distressed fishery are often the least capable of funding the program 
- in other countries there has been a tendency to auction bought-back vessels to the highest bidder Who transfers that capacity to other potentially 	 . distressed fisheries. 
B. 	 Surrender of units on transfer  
47. The surrender of a number of vessel units of fishing capacity or catch shares in the fishery upon the transfer of endorsements and/or the requirement to purchase additional units or shares when upgrading or replacing vessel. The concept of utilisation means that 
- the owner of each vessel would be allocated a number of shares or units which represents that part of total fishing effort or catch in his fishery which is able to be applied with that vessel. These shares would have a unit (or part) value for which each vessel owner would have to pay to enable his vessel to work as a fishing boat 
- the basis of unitisation of effort may incorporate one or a combination of the parameters (length, UDV, engine capacity) mentioned in Issue 3 
- the concept would allow an acceptable proxy for identifying the level of capital investment and fishing capacity. 
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4 . Further advantages for unitization in replacement are 
- fishermen would have the option of maintaining their 
existing level of fishing capacity without incurring a 
penalty 
- to upgrade, additional units would have to be 
purchased from the available pool 
- there would be an opportunity for fishermen to •reduce•
capacity and retain surplus units for sale 
- units of effort could be gradually reduced if desired 
- provides flexibility in vessel replacement while 
• containing capacity 
- allows effort to be redistributed within the fishery 
- provides a market for units 
- may allow marginal operators a financial incentive to 
leave the fishery 
capacity could be reduced to account for technological 
change. 
49. Disadvantages are 
- fishermen would have to buy extra units to upgrade or 
otherwise leave the fishery 
a fisherman's potential income from forfeited units 
may be lost 
- could be slow in taking effect in reducing vessel - 
numbers.. 
50. There is an upper limit on the available number of units in 
the pool, thus, if no-one leaves the industry or 
down-grades, no-one can up-grade. 
Issue 5: CONSERVATION OF RESOURCES 
51. In other Australian fisheries limited entry alone has 
proven ineffective in the longer term in containing fishing 
catch or effort where there are incentives and 
'opportunities to increase individual catches. Thus, 
additional management measures directed at biological 
conservation may be needed. Such measures could include 
minimum size, closed s.easons, closed areas and direct 
limits on catch. 
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ISSUES POSED BY INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTA (ITO) 
Issue 1: ESTIMATING TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH (TAC) 
52. One system of allocating ITQ's is to determine a Total 
Allowable Catch annually and divide it among individuals. 
Each individual's quota is some percentage of the TAC, 
which may vary from year to year. 
53. From a biological viewpoint it is important that the. TIC 
does not exceed the biologically safe annual yield. 
available from the fishery and result in overfishing the 
stocks. However, in the case of scallops, it may be 
difficult to determine the safe annual yield or year to 
year variations because of their erratic recruitment and 
patchy distribution. 
54. If the TAC is overestimated, some fishermen may not catch 
their entire quota and would have to choose between ceasing 
to fish at this point and continuing to fish in the face of 
declining catch rates and reduced profitability. For those 
fishermen making the latter choice, the economic benefits 
of ITQ's would be reduced. Also, fishermen will be tempted 
to concentrate . their effort at the beginning of the next 
season in order to ensure they catch their individual 
quota, rather than fishing in the manner which is most 
efficient- for their style of operations, eg operating at a 
more reduced level over the entire season.' 
55. If because of lack of information,. the TAC is not set at a 
level less' than the biologically safe yield it can be 
argued that the resource is being under-utilized and 
fishermen unduly restricted. It seems likely that the TAC 
would be set at a reasonably high level and/or 
consideration given to allocating additional quotas during 
the season if abundance is high. 
Issue 2: ALLOCATING CATCH QUOTAS 
56. Any quota allocation mechanisms must inevitably deal with 
the subject of determining which fishermen are eligible for 
the initial allocation. Entry is limited to those 
fishermen who hold quota but because quota may be freely 
transferable there may be no restrictions on who may own 
quota and participate in the fishery. 
57. A number of quota allocation mechanisms are possible and 
the choice of which to use depends on political, social and 
economic factors including, but not limited to, matters of 




58. Possible allocative mechanisms include: 
A. 	 Past Fishing Performance  
59. For example the average or best catch over the last two, three or four years. 
B. 	 Equal Allocation  
60. All the participants are allocated the same quota: 
C. 	 Existing Vessel Catching. Potential  
61. This can be measured in terms of.underdeck volume, shaft' horsepower, tonnage etc. 
D. 	 Bidding  
62. Quota could be bid for on a once only basis or at the beginning of each quota season. 
E. 	 Points System  
63. This usually incorporates fishing performance with other •factors considered socially relevant such as economic dependance, availability of alternative occupations, •ownership or investment in vessel and gear, etc. 
F. 	 Mixture  
64. For example, all boats are assigned an equal base quota while a surplus is held for bidding at the start of the quota Season. 
SCALLOP SIZE LIMITS 
65. Protecting juvenile scallops until they reach an age and size where the population's gain in weight is balanced by losses through natural deaths would maximise the yield in weight per recruit. 
66. Size limits are the most common method for achieving this. (Short term closures are another method - these are discussed below) 
economic yield may also be maximised if the return from harvesting larger scallops more than offsets the costs of foregoing the harvest of smaller scallops, i.e. costs of searching for beds of larger scallops and/or the costs of sorting. Foregoing the costs of harvesting smaller scallops must also include fishery induced mortality to discarded undersize scallops, although fishing practices can reduce the proportion of these 
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- delaying recruitment to the fishery until after age of first spawning affords additional protection to the spawning population 
- size limits and meat counts require enforcement with associated costs 
- further research may be needed to determine the optimum size for first capture. 
CONTROLS ON FISHING EFFICIENCY 
67. To achieve the objective of controlling increases in capacity and fishing effort, it may be necessary to implement additional controls on fishing efficiency, at least until such time as long term measures to reduce capacity and effort are effective. Some of these measures include 
A. 	 Dredge Controls  
68. The Task Force has recommended that a maximum dredge width regulation of 3.86m be applied to the entire management area beginning 1 January 1985 (this is still under consideration by Governments). Other controls such as restrictions on dredge height, volume, etc. might be considered. 
B. 	 Trans-Shipment  
69. Scallops are normally transported to port by the vessel which caught them. Relieving the catcher vessel from having to return to port to unload effectively allows an increase in fishing effort by allowing the catcher boat to concentrate on fishing. Prohibiting carrier boats, at least as a short term measure, might aid in controlling fishing effort. 
C. 	 On-Board Shucking  
70. Scallops are currently landed in the shell. The practice of on-board shucking, which is common in the United States Atlantic Coast scallop fishery, if introduced in Bass Strait could effectively result in increased fishing effort in the fishery. Prohibiting on-board shucking might help to prevent increases in effort but at the cost of reducing individual efficiency. 
D. 	 Sorting Machines  
71. There have been several scallop boats which have recently installed on-board sorters which have the potential to improve the efficiency and speed of the sorting operation and thus possibly increasing fishing effort. It may also allow fishing in areas which may not otherwise be fished. 
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72. With respect to the just described three potential 
improvements in fishing efficiency, the Task Force may wish 
to consider whether the benefits, in terms of controlling 
increases in fishing effort and total fleet costs, outweigh 
the individual costs imposed by legislating inefficiency. 
SEASONS AND CLOSURES • 
73. Seasons or temporary closures may assist In maximizing 
yield per recruited scallop and improved settlement of 
juveniles. Fishing scallops in peak seasonal conditions is 
also suggested. as a worthy objective. 
74. These measures demand considerable survey- information if 
they are to be applied logically. 
COST OF MANAGEMENT 
75. Any management controls imposed on the fishety, involve 
costs of administration, monitoring and . enforcement. The 
more complex the Management arrangements, the higher the 
costs. 
76. Any limited entry schemes proposed would result in 
additional costs, including 
administration of applications and licences, including 
transfers 
- maintenance of a licence endorsement and/or boat unit 
register 
- measurement of boats for unit allocation 
- review of claims with respect to unit allocation 
- enforcement of the arrangements both on land and at sea 
- log books, if instigated, would have to be printed, 
distributed and collected, and the resulting data 
would have to be processed. 
77. Transferrable boat quotas could be difficult and expensive 
to enforce. It would also require an initial allocation of 
quotas to individual fishermen. The criteria to be used to 
do this may be difficult to agree upon. 
78. It is argued that industry will have to bear part of these 
costs. Where individuals within an industry enjoy a 
protected right to operate in that industry , for profit and 
may accrue a capital gain, they should pay for that 
privilege. 
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79. For a management plan such as limited entry to be 
effective, some surveillance and enforcement is essential. 
The level of such activities needed or wanted will remain 
largely unknown for the first twelve months or more of the 
plan. The costs of surveillance and enforcement may be 
high and part or all those costs will be met by industry. 
Consequently, it is envisaged that fishermen will be 
involved in discussions with government to identify the 
extent of surveillance, and level of enforcement •and the 
areas where concentrated coverage is required. 
DATA REQUIREMENTS AND RESEARCH 
80. What records and what research is needed to manage the 
fishery? 
6 September 1984 
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APPENDIX 1 : 4 
MINISTER FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRY RELEASE CANBERRA 
PI 85/136 	 22 July 1985 
JOINT STATEMENT 
JEW MANAGEMENT REGIME FOR BASS STRAIT SCALLOP FISHERY 
Ministers responsible for fisheries in the Commonwealth, 
Victorian and Tasmanian Governments, John Rerin, Evan Walker 
and Roger Groom jointly announced today details of a new 
management regime for the Bass Strait Scallop Fishery. 
The regime involves the staged handing over of responsibility 
for the fishery to Victoria and Tasmania. State fisheries 
will be established adjacent to Victoria and Tasmania, as a 
matter of urgency (as shown in attached chart). Subsequently, 
Victoria and Tasmania will also take responsibility for joint 
management of the remainder of the fishery. 
Such an arrangement is now possible because of the decision of 
the Commonwealth Government to now implement the Fisheries 
element of the Off-shore Constitutional Settlement. This 
enables the Commonwealth and the States to enter into an 
arrangement to manage a fishery under a single law. 
The current limited entry regime administered under 
Commonwealth law will continue to apply until the States 
assume responsibility for the area. 
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The Ministers said that the proposal was based on a package 
which had been developed by the Bass Strait Scallop Fishery 
Task Force, an industry/government group which had been 
established by Mr Kerin to advise on longer term management 
arrangements for the fishery. 
It took into account the different histories and management 
objectives for the Victorian and Tasmanian components of the 
fishery. 
Given the agreement on longer term management Mr Kerin also 
indicated that the current ban on transfer of Commonwealth 
Bass Strait Scallop licences would be lifted. 
• 
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297 
APPENDIX TWO 
BASS STRAIT PETROLEUM REVENUE POLICY CASE STUDY 
2:1 CHRONOLOGY OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
2:2 MAJOR ACTORS 
2:3 INTRODUCTION OF AN RRT FOR GREENFIELDS OFFSHORE 
PETROLEUM PROJECTS: Statement from Minister for Resources and Energy 
and the Treasurer 
2:4 PETROLEUM POLICY IN 	 AUSTRALIA: THE EXPLORATION 
INDUSTRY'S PERSPECTIVE: APEA March 1985 
APPENDIX 2:1 
RESOURCE RENT TAX AND CASH BIDDING FOR OFFSHORE TITLES 
CHRONOLOGY OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
1975: The RRT concept developed by R. Garnaut and A. Clunies Ross. 
in a paper titled "Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of 
Natural Resource Projects" published in the Economic Journal. 
1976: The RRT concept as proposed by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 
received the support of the then Liberal Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser, and 
the Labor Opposition, although not part of the government's programme 
1977: The introduction of a RRT became part of the platform for a 
future Labor government, and became part of the party's policy. The 
Fraser Liberal government was forced to abandon the introduction of the 
RRT due to strong representations from the mining industry, particularly 
the Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC). 
5 	 March 	 1983: 	 Hawke 	 Labor 	 government 	 elected. 
May 1983: The Bulletin magazine 	 contains an exclusive interview 
with the newly appointed ALP Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator 
Peter Walsh, over the implementation of the Government's 	 taxation 
policy for the minerals sector. 	 The Minister reiterates the intention 
of the government to introduce the RRT for the offshore petroleum 
resources. 
3 June 1983: Meeting of the Australian Minerals and Energy Council, 
(AMEC), the council of State and Commonwealth Ministers responsible for 
minerals and energy policy. This meeting discussed the intention of the 
Commonwealth to levy a RRT. 
December 1983: The Commonwealth government releases a Discussion 
Paper 	 on 	 the 	 Resource 	 Rent 	 Tax 	 in 	 the 	 Petroleum sector. 
January 1984: BHP publishes its response to the government's 
Discussion Paper, entitled Resource Rent Tax: Risk and the Drilling  
Decision. 
20-23-24-25 January 1984: The Financial Review publishes a series 
of articles on the RRT proposal, giving both the industry and government 
viewpoints. The series was titled "The Oil Tax Minefield", and was 
authored by the AFR's feature writer on oil and gas matters, Rick 
Wilkinson 
24 January 1984: Preliminary discussions between Senator Walsh and 
representatives of the oil and gas interests and corporate interests in 
Canberra over RRT. Submissions were made to the Minister on the 
December Discussion Paper. Meeting was reported as leading to an 
appreciation of each side of the others point of view. Reported at this 
meeting were representatives of the Department of Resources and Energy 
(DRE), the Treasury, APEA, AMIC, and the following companies, WOODSIDE, 
ESSO, BHP, CSR, SANTOS. Sentor Walsh emphasised link with the RRT to the 
Cash bidding proposal, and the desire for the RRT to be dealth with 
before discussions were made on this policy. 
February 	 1984: Commonwealth government releases paper titled 
Effects on Exploration of RRT with Full Exploration Loss Offsets. 
February 1984: APEA produced a paper Key Arguements Against a  
Resources Rent Tax 
3 February 1984: Meeting between States and the Commonwealth 
government 	 over 	 the 	 introduction 	 of 	 a 	 RRT 	 onshore. 
15 February 1984: APEA Seminar "Financing of Petroleum Exploration 
and Production" 
March 1984: APEA circulates its paper Key Arguements Against a  
Resources 	 Rent 	 Tax 	 to 	 al 	 members 	 of 	 federal 	 Parliament. 
April 1984: APEA Conference, Hobart,Tasmania. 
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April 1984: Combined submission of APEA and AMIC to the Economic 
Policy Advisory Council (EPAC) 
April 1984: Comonwealth government releases paper Outline of a  
Greenfields 	 Resource 	 Rent 	 Tax 	 in 	 the 	 Petroleum 	 Sector  
18 April 1984: Press Statement by the Treasurer and the Minister 
for Resources and Energy summarising the proposed taxation arrangements 
to apply to the petroleum sector. 
1 May 1984: The Bulletin publishes an article critical of the 
potential of the RRT to disrupt exploration in offshore Australia. 
5-11 May 1984: Business Review Weekly states the the level of 
impost is looming as the main issue between the oil and gas industry and 
the govern ment over the introduction of the RRT. 
27 June 1984: Joint Press State ment by the Treasurer and the 
Minister for Resources and Energy: Resource Rent Tax on "Greenfields"  
Offshore Petroleum Projects. Announcement that the RRT would begin to 
apply to new developments from 1st of July 1984. (See Appendix 1:3). 
1 July 1984: Abandon ment of "new oil policy", the policy that 
guaranteed producers full i mport parity prices for post 1975 oil 
discoveries, with no additional tax to the the royalties and company 
tax. Introduction of an oil excise for existing offshore fields and 
onshore fields. The introduction of the RRT for offshore areas, unless 
excluded in announcement on 27 June 1984. 
October 1984: Announce ment that crude oil exise reduced for 
currently underdeveloped fields discovered before September 1975 in 
areas specifically excluded fro m "greenfields" RRT, including Bass 
Strait, 	 a 	 move 	 welcomed 	 by 	 oil 	 and 	 gas 	 interests. 
February 1985: APEA Offshore Seminar. Paper by J.C. Starkey, 1st 
A ssisstant secretary Petroleum Division DRE. 
March 1985: APEA published Petroleum Policy in Australia: The  
Exploration Industry's Perception. 
24-27 March 1985: APEA Conference Perth, Western Australia. Cash 
Bidding 	 policy 	 key 	 government 	 policy 	 under 	 discussion. 
28 March 1985: 	 Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Cash Bidding)  
A mmendment 	 Bil 	 1985 	 second 	 reading 	 in 	 the 	 Senate. 
14 May 1985: Second Reading of "Cash Bidding Bil" resumed in the 
Senate. 
15 May 1985: Liberal-National Party Opposition and the Australian 
Democrats combine to defeat the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Cash  
Bidding) Ammendment Bil. 
28 May 1985: APEA Financial Seminar. 
25 June 1985: 	 Joint Statement from Premier Burke, Western 
Australia, and the Commonwealth Minister for Resources and Energy, 
Senator Evans over new royalty arrangements for Barrow Island oil field. 
October 1985: Introduction of Petroleum Revenue Exise Tariff Bill  
Number 2 into Federal parliament. This bil aimed to develop a Resource  
Rent Royalty, or RRR, for application onshore. The RRR would complement 
the RRT developed for offshore areas. 
6 November 1985: Reintroduction of Petroleum (Submerged Lands)  
(Cash Bidding) Ammendment Bill 1985 into the Senate, Bill modified to 
apply only to Timor Sea permits and was passed with a two year sunset 
clause appended. Title allocation in other areas was to be undertaken 
using a modification to the work programme system, including a "dry 
hole" agreement. 
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DEPARTMENT OF RESOURCES AND ENERGY ( DRE ) 
BUREAU OF MINERAL RESOURCES, GEOLOGY AND GEOPHYSICS ( B MR ) 
Victoria: 
OIL AND GAS DIVISION, Office of Minerals and Energy, Department of 
Industry, Technology and Resources 
Tasmania: 
DEPARTMENT OF MINES 
The structure, function and influence on policy of the oil and gas 
agencies can be found in detail in Chapter Three of the thesis 
Commonwealth - State consultative Bodies 
AUSTRALIAN 	 MINERALS 	 AND 	 ENERGY 	 COUNCIL, 	 A MEC . 
A MEC was established in 1976, replacing the former Australian 
Minerals Council ( Aust . Year Book 1985:384). A MEC is the Council of 
Commonwealth and State Ministersresponsible for minerals and energy 
matters. The Ministerial Council is advised by a standing Committee 
comprising Departmental heads or their nominees, ( Yearbook 1985:384) and 
has establisherd several advisory committees. these advisory committees 
deal with a range of issues as directed by the council. 
OFFSHORE PETROLEUM JOINT AUTHORITIES. 
The establishment of these authorities to manage the oil and gas 
production in offshore areas ajacent ot the states derives from the "oil 
and gas package" of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement ( OCS ). The 
day to day administration of the areas is left to the designated 
authority, usually the State Minister responsible for minerals or energy 
policy, the Joint Authority negotiates royalty and exise payments and 
oversees the management of work programmes and other factors. The most 
Improtant joint authority , in terms of both revenue and scale of 
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operation, is the Gippsland joint authority, reponsible for the ESSO-BHP 
production licenses. 
Industry Organisations 
AUSTRALIAN 	 PETROLEUM 	 EXPLORATION 	 ASSOCIATION, 	 APEA. 
The major industry group representing the oil and gas industry is 
APEA, as has ben indicated above. As of February 1985 APEA had 
ninety-nine full members and one hundred and fifty associate members 
(APEA 1985).The associate members include the compnies servicing all 
sectors of the ol and gas exploration industry, including suppliers of 
driling rigs and major Australian banks (APEA 1985). 
APEA was founded in 1959, as an organisation which would be able to 
help develop petroleum self sufficiency in Australia following intial 
discoveries of oil in the Rough Range area of Western Australia. (APEA 
1985) The increasing numbers of companies involved in the oil search 
encouraged the development of APEA. APEA was able to provide a forum for 
technical and policy discussions concerning the exploration industry. 
The fact that APEA effectively predates the discovery of commercial 
quantities of oil and gas in the Gippsland Basin has allowed the 
association to have major input into the oil and gas policy in 
Australia. Today the APEA annual conference is the major meeting of its 
kind in the southern hemisphere, with up to nine hundred delegates 
attending (APEA 1985) APEA's involvement in the oil and gas policy 
process is emphasised by the association's perception of its role 
aspromoting and developing the interests of the petroleum exploration 
industry through the maintenance of contact with thew governments of the 
Commonwealth and the States and the Northern territory. (APEA 1985). 
APEA is administered by a directorate based in Sydney, with a full 
time staff of thirteen. The directorate is responsible for producing a 
range of publications and bulletins for its members, and undertaking 
lobbying of government and the bureaucracy. APEA is governed by a 
council, voted in to office at an Annual General Meeting. The 
councillors represent a range of corporate interests, with the council 
comprising members of small, medium and large companies. APEA's strong 
financial support from its corporate members allow the association to 
maximise its position in the policy process. An example of this impact 
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can be seen in the distribution of a paper . giving APEA's opposition to 
the cash bidding proposal to all members of the federal parliament. 
APEA runs a series of seminars each year addresing specific issues 
concerning oil and gas developments, in addition to the annual 
conference. These forums are seen as important mechanisms for the 
association to discuss policy issues concernin the petroleum 
exploration industry. The APEA conference allows the leaders of 
government and senior administrators to meet and discuss policies with 
the industry. The last two APEA conferences, (1984 and 1985) have had 
contributions from both the government and opposition on, the RRT and 
later the cash bidding proposals. 
AUSTRALIAN MINING INDUSTRY COUNCIL, A MIC. 
A MIC is the peak council for the mining industry, and has a similar 
role to that of APEA in the oil and gas industry. A MIC"s involvement in 
the case study relates to the production of joint submissions on 
government policy in the mining sector with APEA. One such submission 
Was to EPAC, the Economic Planning and Advisory Council. A MIC's concern 
with the RRT was in part due to the governments original intention to 
establish a RRT regime in the coal industry. 
OIL AND GAS COMPANIES. 
Although APEA provides an industry viewpoint in policy discussions, 
it is important to indicate that individual oil companies are also 
actively involved in interaction with policy making agencies and the 
government. In some cases the individual companies may pursuepolicy 
options independent of the industry organisation, APEA. This is evident 
in the development of the RRT policy where BHP was particularly active 
in discussions over the tax. This is in response to the company's 
interests in the Bass Strait fields but more importantly the company was 
concerned over the parameters of the RRT due to its discovery of a large 
oil field, Jabiru, in the Timor Sea. BHP was instrumental in gaining 
support from other companies that the key issues with the RRT were the 
parameteres of the tax, particularly the threshold rate. BHP may have 
felt that since Jabiru initially at least had a extremely high level of 
prospectivity, the production from the field would soon exceed the 
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margin set by the government's threshold rate. This active involvement 
in discussions over the implementation of the RRT contrasts with APEA's 
position of being in opposition to the tax. 
BHPIs role in management decisions in the Bass Strait fields is 
a secondary one, as ESSO (AUST ), its joint venture partner in the 
development is the manager of the field. ESSO is involved in discussions 
with the Commonwelth and Victorian governments (the "designated 
authority") over discussions on production rates and the payments of 
royalties and excise. on production. ESSO was also involved in 
discussions with the Commonwealth Minister over the RRT in January 1984, 
its expertise in the Gippsland field making it an important actor in the 
discussions. Several other companies were involved in the meeting with 
the then Minister for Resources and Energy, Senator Walsh, including 
WOODSIDE, SANTOS and WAPET. These companies were involved in the 
discussions due tothei interests in either exploration or production in 
offshore areas outside Bass Strait. WOODSIDE is involved in the 
North West Shelf development. Other companies involved in the 
exploration programmes in either the Otway or Bass Basins, either as 
individual companies or in consortiums, (which includes SHELL, AMOCO and 
AQUITAINE), were not involved in discussions as separate actors. 
The companies_ involved in exploration programmes in offshore waters 
around Australia have to comply with standards regarding the ammount of 
foriegn investment allowed in resource development projects. These 
standards encourage the development of consortiums which have foreign 
ownde companies (a trans-natiuonal oil company for example) as a partner 
with Australian companies. Successful Australian companies who gain 
permits may enter into "farm out" agreements with foreign compnies to 
increase the potential for success in the development. Major foreign 
owned oil and gas companies may establish Australian subsiduaries to 
fulfill foriegn investment standards. 
Appendix 2 :3 
Resource Rent Tax on `Greenfields' Offshore 
Petroleum Projects —Joint Press Statement by the 
Treasurer and the Minister for Resources and 
Energy, 27 June 1984 
The intention to introduce a resource rent tax (RRT) in respect of certain mineral-based activities 
has been in the policy platform of the Australian Labor Party since 1977. Following its election in 
March 1983. the Government set about the task of giving effect to this intention and, after 
extensive consultations with industry over sereral months, is now in a position to announce firm 
details of the RRT to apply to 'Greenfields' offshore petroleum projects with effect from 1 July 
1984. 
The Government believes that an RRT regime. which is related to achieved profits, is the most 
efficient mechanism for deriving for the community an appropriate share of the large returns that 
can be associated with the development of particularly rich mineral deposits. Alternative secondary 
taxing regimes. such as the excises and royalties applying in the petroleum sector, are often based 
on production and, as such. can both discourage marginal projects from getting under way and 
bring about the early termination of projects. 
In its consideration of possible RRT arrangements for the petroleum sector. the Government 
released three papers for public discussion: 
• Discussion Paper on Resource Rent Tax in the Petroleum Sector. December 1983: 
• Effects on Exploration of RRT with Full Exploration Loss Offsets. February 1984: 
• Outline of a 'Greenfields' Resource Rent Tax in the Petroleum Sector. April 1984. 
Comments were invited and received on these papers and consultations have been held with the 
industry and the States. The Government has given very careful consideration to the views of the 
industry and the States and. in so doing. has modified significantly its initial thinking on a number of 
aspects of the RRT. During the course of these consultations the Government decided, for a variety 
of reasons, to narrow the focus of the proposed RRT to 'Greenfields" offshore petroleum projects. 
This statement outlines the principal policy elements of the RRT arrangements to apply to such 
projects. The Government considers these to be firm and settled. Some of the finer details in 
relation to certain aspects of the tax will need to be finalised as the drafting of legislation and the 
development of administrative guidelines proceeds. That process Will be completed as soon as 
practical: any further comments that industry might wish to offer on matters of detail will be 
considered by the Government 
It is the Government's intention to abolish royalties (10 to 12.5 percent of net wellhead value) in 
respect of projects for which the RRT will apply. The Government will be approaching the States to 
discuss the arrangements to give effect to this intention. Abolition of royalties in 'Greenfields' areas 
is an important part of the RRT package which should not be overlooked in any assessment of its 
likely impact on exploration and development activities. The abolition of royalties can be expected 
to be especially beneficial to the development of small. marginal fields. To the extent that these 
fields attracted any RRT payments those payments would tend to be late in the life of the fields. 
In contrast to alternative production based secondary tax regimes. the RRT will be payable only 
on those projects earning, before company tax, a minimum rate of return on the project outlays. 
The :government RRT take' from large offshore fields of the size of Fortescue will be substantially 
less than it would be if. for example. the recently announced excise (and royalty) arrangements for 
'new' oil were to apply. Clearly. highly profitable projects will still be able to earn profits well above 
the threshold rate. since the tax rate is well heli,w WO per Cent. 
The Government believes that. seen in their totality, the arrangements decided upon represent a 
very reasonable balance between the obiectives of satisfying the interests of the community as a 
whole in sharing in the benefits of very profitable offshore petroleum protects, and of providing 
companies with adequate rewards in return for the risks that they accept in undertaking offshore 
exploration and development activities. The Government alco believes that these arrangements 
should be seen as forming a firm and stable basis upon which companies can progress their 
exploration and investment decisions. 
Coverage 
The RRT regime will apply with effect from 1 July 1984 in offshore areas where the 
Commonwealth's Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act applies, other than in specified areas which 
will continue to be subject to excise and royalty arrangements. The excluded areas are those 
covered by production licences granted before 1 July 1984 and the permit areas from which those 
licences were drawn — specifically, the Bass Strait and North West Shelf production licence areas, 
and the unrelinquished areas of associated permits Vic-P-1. WA-1-P and WA-28-P. Within these 
areas, the present excise and royalty arrangements applicable to 'old' and 'new' oil will continue to 
apply. 
The RRT will apply in respect of income from the recovery of all petroleum. including crude oil. 
condensate, natural gas, LPG and ethane. 
Order of Assessment 
The RRT will be levied prior to company tax and payments of RRT will be a deduction for 
company tax purposes. The RRT is to be applied separately to each individual project and not to 
aggregate company results. Consequently, levying RRT after company tax would involve having to 
split company tax assessments so that an appropriate company tax deduction could be attributed to 
each project subject to RRT. Levying RRT before company tax avoids this administrative 
complexity. 
The Tax Base 
The tax will apply to profits which exceed the specified threshold level. Profitability will be 
determined by reference to actual expenditures. Further details are provided in Attachment 1 but, 
in brief, the tax base will be defined to: 
• allow current and capital expenditures to be written off immediately in the year in which they are 
paid, with any excess of expenditures over receipts at the end of a year being compounded 
forward at the threshold rate; and 
• exclude payments and receipts relating to the provision of debt and equity capital. 
When the accumulated value of net assessable receipts (assessable receipts less deductible 
expenditures) becomes positive at the threshold rate, the RRT will be applied at the specified tax 
rate. Future positive net assessable receipts will be liable for RRT at the specified tax rate. If in 
subsequent years deductible expenditures exceed assessable receipts, the excess will be 
compounded forward at the threshold rate again. An illustration of the operation of the RRT is 
given in Attachment 2. 
Threshold and Tax Rate 
The Government has given further consideration to the threshold and tax rate in the light of strong 
representations made by the industry. It has decided that the threshold should be set at the 
long-term bond rate (currently about 14 per cent) plus 15 percentage points. The tax rate is to be 
set at 40 per cent. 
The linking of the threshold rate to movements in the Commonwealth long-term bond rate is 
intended to allow automatically for changes in the rate of inflation and movements in real interest 
rates. 
The threshold and the tax rate have been set at levels which, In the Government's view, 
represent a reasonable balance between revenue and oil exploration objectives. The chosen 
parameters compare with the proposed threshold of long term bond rate plus 10 percentage points 
and the proposed tax rate of 45 per cent presented in the Government's April 1984 discussion 
paper. 
Exploration Expenditure 
Eligible exploration expenditure will be expenditure within the original exploration permit area 
from which the associated production licence(s) is drawn. Eligible exploration expenditure from 1 
July 1984 will be deductible for RRT purposes against assessable receipts derived from the 
production licence area(s) contained within the original permit area in which the exploration takes 
place. The Government has also decided to allow deductions for eligible exploration expenditure 
made in the 5 years preceding 1 July 1984 on the same basis as for that made on or after that date. 
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eligible exploration expenditure may be compounded year by year at the threshold rate wil be 
limited to 5 years. Expenditure prior to that 5 year period wil not attract compounding at the 
threshold rate: instead, such expenditure wil be compounded year by year at a rate equal to the 
GDP deflator so as to alow for the effects of inflation and deducted after al expenditure subject to 
the threshold rate has been deducted. 
The Tax Unit 
The RRT wil be assessed on a project basis. Rules for determining a project for RRT purposes wil 
be specified in legislation but the basic principles are that: 
•the project wil represent an integrated investment and could include a number of proximate 
fields. Broadly, the boundaries of an integrated investment wil comprise a production licence 
area and treatment and other facilities and operations outside that area which are integral to the 
production of a 'marketable petroleum product; 
•the taxable output of a project (that is, the 'marketable' petroleum product) wil be treated as 
'marketable' for assessment purposes at the first point in the production process at which it is 
saleable commercialy, even though an actual sale may not have taken place at that point; •if no sale takes place at that point, or where a non-arm's-length sale occurs, an income value wil 
be attributed to the product at the RRT assessment point: 
•project boundaries for RRT assessment wil not extend beyond the petroleum production stage 
to downstream activities such as refineries and facilities for transporting 'marketable' products. 
This means that neither expenditure on downstream activities, nor value added to products 
through those activities, wil be taken into account in calculating liability for RRT; 
•the scope of project expenditure and income to be taken into account wil encompass certain 
infrastructure where this is integral to the production of a 'marketable' product, including social 
infrastructure leg housing and associated facilities of the kind that qualify for deduction under the 
petroleum mining provisions of the income tax law) provided principaly for employees of the 
project and their dependants, and office buildings situated at or proximate to the site of 
petroleum operations; and 
•expenses not directly related to the project wil be excluded. For example, where an entity has 
diverse interests, only one of which is a project assessable for RRT, only those costs incurred at 
its head office which are solely attributable to the RRT project wil be deductible for RRT 
purposes. Clearly identified expenditures, such as project engineering design costs carried out in 
the head office therefore would be deductible, even though this might involve an apportionment 
of some employees' wage costs between time spent on that activity and the remainder spent on 
other activities not directly associated with an RRT project. General overhead costs incurred at 
head office would not, however, be deductible. 
Some further details on the tax base are provided in Attachment 1. 
Changes in Ownership and Farm-Ins 
A project's year-by-year overal liability for RRT wil not be influenced by changes in ownership or 
implementation of farm-in agreements: the project participants wil be assessed on the basis of 
eligible project expenditures and receipts. Any cash payments made for entering a joint venture wil 
not be deductible to the purchaser or assessable to the vendor for RRT purposes. This treatment 
wil apply to changes in ownership and farm-ins effected both prior to and on or after 1 July 1984. 
In the case of ful acquisition of a company's interest in a project, the purchasers wil be entitled to 
claim deductions for the whole of the vendor's undeducted expenditure for RRT purposes. In the 
case of partial acquisition, whether by a cash transaction or a farm-in, deductions wil accrue to the 
party actualy making the eligible expenditure. However, in respect of eligible expenditure incurred 
prior to 1 July 1984, formal agreements among the parties concemed for sharing deductions for that expenditure for RRT purposes would be recognised. 
Joint Ventures 
In general, each joint venturer in a project wil be assessed for RRT on the basis of his actual 
expenditure on. and revenue from, the project. The only exceptions relate to eligible undeducted 
expenditures in the case of ful acquisitions and expenditures prior to 1 July 1984 realocated 
according to any formal agreements, as discussed above. 
hands of the recipient i ne comp. 	 , such royalty payments in the assessment of RRT. This wil place the treatment of ovemoe royalties 
on the same footing as that for cash payments made in the context of ownership changes and 
farm-ins. This means that a project's annual overal liability for RRT wil not be affected by cash 
transfers under either override royalty or acquisition arrangements. 
Treatment of Cash Bids 	 • 
As announced previously, the Government is considering introducing a system of cash bidding for 
the alocation of selected offshore exploration acreage. Should such a system be introduced. the 
Government has decided that cash bids wil not be deductible for RRT purposes. Non-deductibility 
has the advantage that it would simplify the RRT arrangements. It could also assist in promoting 
competition for acreage relative to alowing deductibility. 
Provisional Payment Arrangements 
A system of provisional instalments of RRT wil be incorporated in the RRT legislation to reduce 
lags in RRT payments, but no RRT payable in respect of any income year wil be colected in 
advance of that year. In this connection it is noted that the RRT is an alternative to royalty and 
excise payments which are colected on a current year basis. 
End-of-Project-Life Adjustments 
It is possible that the expenses of closing down petroleum operations could result in unrecouped 
RRT deductions at the end of a project. In practical terms, however, this wil not be an issue in 
Australia for many years hence. Accordingly, the Govemment has decided not to attempt to 
anticipate at this stage the specific end-of-project-life adjustments to RRT liability that might 
eventualy be appropriate. The Government wil re-assess the need for, and nature of, such 
adjustments in the fight of future developments. 
Canberra 
27 June 1984 
Attachment 1 RRT Assessable Receipts and Deductible Expenditures 
This attachment provides additional detail in regard to the treatment for RRT purposes of certain 
receipts and expenditure items discussed in the body of the paper. 
Liability for RRT wil be assessed on a cash flow basis. This means that income from the project 
wil be taken into account when it is received. or deemed to be received (see below), and 
expenditures wil be taken into account when they are paid. 
Assessable Receipts 
Assessable receipts for RRT purposes wil include the folowing: 
•receipts from the sale of a marketable petroleum product (including crude oil, condensate. natural gas, LPG and ethane) derived from the project, where sale occurs at the point at which 
the product is first marketable commercialy and the sale is on an arm's-lergth basis. If no sale 
takes place at that point, or where a non-arm's-length sale takes place, a taxable value wil be 




Sample Calculation of Revenue under RRT 
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the project and in respect of which an RRT deduction has been alowed or is alowable: 
•charges for accommodation facilities, eating facilities. etc for project employees or their 
dependants. the cost of which has been alowed or is alowable as an RRT deduction: and 
•insurance recoveries received on project property for which an RRT deduction has been alowed 
or is alowable. 
Classes of receipts which wil not be assessable for RRT purposes include: 
•amounts received as loans and, in respect of loans made, receipts of interest and capital 
repayments received from borrowers: 
•share capital and other amounts received as shareholders' funds, dividends and bonus share 
issues from associated companies; and 
•private override royalty income.  
interests only one of which is a project assessatne ror as accounting and auditing fees, pay-rol preparation costs, and the costs of maintaining the head 
office motor vehicle fleet, wil be deductible for RRT purposes. (However, those head office 
expenditures clearly identified with the project assessable for RRT. such as project engineering 
design costs, wil be deductible): 
•private override royalty payments: 
•any payments made under a cash-bidding system; 
•expenses accrued but not paid, eg accruing employee leave entitlements and provisions for 
contingent costs such as platform dismantling; and 
•depreciation charges and income tax payments. 
Deductible Expenditures 
Capital and current expenditures directly related to a project which is assessable for RRT purposes 
wil be deductible in the year of payment. 
Exploration Expenditure 
Eligible exploration expenditures for RRT purposes are discussed in the body of the paper. • 
Exploration expenditure wil be defined in broadly the same manner as it is under the company tax 
provisions for petroleum miners, and wil include, for example, geological, geophysical and 
geochemical surveys, exploration driling and appraisal driling. 
Other Expenditure 
Other deductible project expenditures wil generaly comprise those in respect of a production 
licence area and expenditures outside that area necessary to obtain a marketable petroleum 
product 
Some indicative examples of the kinds of expenditures which wil be alowed as deductions are: 
•expenditure on production platforms, driling plant and equipment and overheads at the 
welhead: 
•expenditure on pipelines and other facilities (including tankers dedicated to the project) for 
transporting petroleum from the welhead to a mainland reception point or to a point of further 
treatment as described hereunder, 
•expenditure on plant for use in treatment processes necessary to produce a marketable 
petroleum product, eg expenditure on a crude oil stabilisation plant, or a gas liquids fractionation 
plant: 
•expenditure on land and buildings dedicated to the project, eg site offices and maintenance 
buildings; 
•expenditure on providing water, light, power, access and communication facilities for the project; 
•expenditure on housing, health, educational, recreational and meals facilities provided wholy or 
principaly for project employees and their dependants; 
•project closing-down costs, eg for the removal of driling platforms and environmental . 
restoration; 
•wage costs of project employees (including costs of staff located away from the project area but 
who are fuly engaged for al or part of a year in project-related activities) and payments to ' 
project contractors: 
•general administration and management expenses associated with running a project site office; 
•insurance premiums on buildings, plant. etc dedicated to the project; 
•licence fees and like costs relating to attaining a production licence; and 
•costs of feasibility studies and environmental impact studies related to the project. 
Non-deductible expenditures wil include: 
•interest payments and repayments of principal in respect of borowings: 
•dividend payments, bonus share issues and equity capital repayments; 
•expenditure on treatment processes beyond the stage where petroleum products obtained from 
the project are in a commercialy saleable form leg expenditure on natural gas liquefaction 
processes OT on the refining of crude oil) and on transport costs beyond that stage: 
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1.0 APEA aims and objectives 
The Association's members comprise most of the companies, local and foreign, engaged in 
Australia in the search for oil and natural gas, and the Council of the Association consists of 16 
company nominees elected to represent these explorers. 
All APEA policy is based on the belief that petroleum resources will be sought, developed and 
properly used if their true worth is recognised by all concerned — explorers, producers, 
landowners, retailers, consumers and governments. 
APEA believes that the most basic Australian energy policy for 
the 1980s must be not only to explore diligently for petroleum 
in our continent and its offshore areas, but also to maximise 
the recovery from fields already in production. 
The Association's aim is to obtain recognition of the following 
principles as essential for the achievement of long-range 
energy goals: 
• Maintenance of a substantial domestic petroleum energy base 
is vital both to the security of Australia and to avoid balance 
of trade deficits associated with large-scale imports; 
• The extent to which Australian petroleum energy needs can be met from 
secure sources must be increased both by development of domestic energy 
sources of all types and by greater efficiency of their use; 
• Policies necessary to ensure continuance of the 
vital flow of petroleum energy must be developed by 
government in consultation with industry. Market 
forces of a competitive economy must guide the most 
economical means to develop and allocate these 
resources; and 
• Environmental protection must be an integral part 
of any programme to develop the secure energy 
resources required to meet Australia's essential needs. 
Environmental regulations 
must be clearly stated, 
equitably applied, cost 
effective and sufficiently 
durable to assure 
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2.0 Policy summary 
The petroleum exploration and production industry has an important role to play in Australia's economic 
growth through its contribution to strategic energy supplies, the balance of payments, investment, 
employment via linkages with other industries, and government revenue. In order to continue making this 
contribution the industry will need a long-term potential to earn profits commensurate with the risks 
involved. 
Australia has very large recoverable gas resources with the prospect of finding much more, but a high 
proportion is remote from the main markets. On the other hand, Australia's oil resources are insufficient to 
maintain the present level of self-sufficiency in light crude oil beyond about 1988. Self-sufficiency will 
decline rapidly in the 1990s unless substantial new reserves are found soon. 
Assessments of Australia's future oil potential indicate that Australia has a 50:50 chance of finding between 
three and four billion barrels of which about two billion barrels will probably be in areas reasonably 
conducive to conventional development practices. 
There is less certainty about the time span over which the estimated oil potential will be discovered. This 
uncertainty stems from the fact that the rate at which Australian industry discovers and develops new oil is 
more a function of economic expectation than geology. 
The next 20 years will be the minimum time necessary to bridge the gap between dependence on 
conventional liquid fuels and development of non-conventional energy sources. Thus, it is crucial that 
industry be encouraged to realise Australia's full prospectivity by maximising discovery and development of 
conventional liquid fuels during this critical period. 
The balance between taxation and investment in exploration and production is extremely delicate. As the 
real cost of finding and developing oil and gas increases while energy prices are projected to decline in real 
terms, governments cannot expect to extract the same proportion of revenue from the petroleum industry 
as they have in the past. 
Economic and political factors are no longer providing sufficient incentives for offshore exploration. Overall 
rates of activity are being sustained because of recent programmes onshore where the success rate is high 
•but the field size is relatively small. Given its scale of contribution to production compared with Australia's 
medium to long term needs, onshore exploration needs to be maintained at even higher rates than at 
present. This activity would be best stimulated by improved incentives to raise risk capital and less 
competition between State and Federal governments in regulating and taxing such operations. 
APEA believes that medium and long-term goals should be: 
• To maintain the present level of self-sufficiency in light crude oil. 
• To make optimum use of natural gas, condensate and LPG resources. 
Maintaining self-sufficiency will require a big increase in exploration in view of the small size of oil 
discoveries now being made. Some fluctuation in exploration activity is inevitable for cyclical reasons but 
sharp fluctuations caused by `stop-go' government policies should be avoided. 
Policies necessary to achieve steady continuous growth in exploration are: 
• Import parity prices for crude oil and alternative fuel parity prices for gas. 
• A stable non-discriminatory tax system which recognises a need for a reward commensurate with the 
high risks involved. 
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• Ready access to markets — domestic or export. 
• Unrestricted access to equipment and expertise. 
• Access to high risk capital (foreign investment, stock exchange raisings, retained earnings). 
• A supportive fiscal and regulatory environment which will provide access to acreage unimpeded by 
onerous Aboriginal land rights legislation and environmental restrictions, cash bonus bidding and other 
•government regulations. 
• Macroeconomic policies which restrain inflation and interest rates. 
3.0 Bipartisan policy recommendations 
APEA recommends to all Federal political parties that the following points should form the basis of policy 
relating to energy exploration, development and transportation: 
3.1 Oil and gas exploration and development is a high-risk business in which governments should not 
gamble. Given the necessary economic and political environment and reasonable regulations, the private 
sector can pursue this business more efficiently and at lower ultimate costs to society; 
3.2 The Federal Government should maintain clearly expressed conditions under which all explorers may 
obtain exploration rights as well as produce and sell the oil and/or gas they find. When the Government 
lays down petroleum tax policies, these policies should not be changed following a successful outcome. To 
do so is to no longer recognise the real risks of failure and loss of capital initially faced by explorers; 
3.3 To safeguard the national interest, Australian jurisdiction over the seabed and sub-soil mineral 
resources to the outer edge of the continental margin should be retained; 
3.4 Very large capital investments will be required if the nation's rising energy demands are to be met. To
• generate and attract these funds, it is vital to strengthen rather than reduce tax incentives which encourage 
the discovery and development of additional reserves. Historically, these incentives have played a key role 
in making available new sources of oil and gas to meet consumer needs. Foreign investors need to be 
encouraged both because the Australian capital market is not large enough to finance resource projects 
and because most of the technologies associated with the petroleum industry are generated overseas; 
3.5 Because of the economic handicap attached to the remoteness of many of the prospective areas and 
actual discoveries, production at rates in excess of those required by the limited Australian market will be 
needed to justify the development of discoveries, particularly of natural gas. Reserves are not usable until 
markets have been assured and facilities for production have been installed. Realistic domestic reserves/ 
consumption ratios should be assessed and hydrocarbon reserves above that ratio requirement be freed for 
export. This will ensure sufficient annual return on funds to justify the enormous capital expenditures 
required in exploitation; 
3.6 Co-ordination in the administration of energy policies between Federal and State governments that 
clearly reflect the principles outlined above, and which embrace all forms of energy, is imperative to ensure 
that Australia's energy needs are met; 
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3.7 There is a need for co-ordination of Federal/State taxation policies to overcome the duplication, 
competition and fractured nature of the current system which exacerbates taxation pressures on the 
resources-based industries. A major dimension of the current resource debate concerns the distribution 
between the States of the benefits of mineral development and the States are tending more towards 
employing practices to increase their revenue by indirect measures of resource taxation. A central concern 
of resource industry tax policy must be to provide an appropriate working environment for petroleum 
exploration and development when both levels of government have some jurisdiction over these activities. 
4.0 Demand/supply outlook 
4.1 The Australian oil and gas production industry is undergoing significant structural changes: 
• Crude oil production from the major Bass Strait fields, discovered in the 1%0s, is already declining. 
Total Bass Strait crude oil production is projected to begin declining rapidly within the next few years. 
• A small but increasing proportion of crude oil is being supplied from the Cooper/Eromanga, Canning 
and Amadeus Basins. 
• Fuel oil usage is being replaced by natural gas in Western Australia from the North-West Shelf and 
potentially in other parts of Australia from the Amadeus and Bowen Basins. 
• Condensate production is growing with additional supplies of condensate being generated for the 
domestic and export markets by the Cooper Basin liquids project (about 15,000 barrels per day) and 
about 6,000 barrels per day will be generated by stage one of the North-West Shelf natural gas project. 
• LPG production is being expanded by the Cooper Basin liquids project by almost 20,000 barrels per 
day and about 80 per cent of this additional production is being exported. 
4.2 Australia has large deposits of recoverable natural gas in relation to requirements but major deposits 
are inconveniently located in deep cyclone-prone waters or desert areas remote from markets. More than 
half Australia's natural gas resources are offshore north-western Australia and will not be commercially 
developed for many years. The industry and the Bureau of Mineral Resources are confident that further 
large natural gas resources will be discovered during the oil search particularly offshore Western Australia 
and Northern Territory. 
Natural gas deposits offshore north-western Australia provide a huge capacity for export with the second 
stage of the North-West Shelf gas project scheduled to supply LNG to Japanese utilities from October 
1989. 
The options for further use of other north-western Australian natural gas resources are mainly long term 
without a technological breakthrough, or market changes. Options include the development of new 
industries in Western Australia based on natural gas, transport as gas by pipeline or as LNG by ship to 
eastern Australia, shipment as LNG to overseas markets, or conversion to liquid fuels such as methanol or 
synthetic crude oil. 
The natural gas potential is comparatively limited in eastern Australia though still significant in relation to 
demand into the next century. Cooper Basin producers have stated they have proved sufficient reserves to 
fulfil contractual obligations in New South Wales until 2006. Additional reserves will need to be proved to 
guarantee supplies to the South Australian market into the 1990s and beyond. Victoria has sufficient 
reserves until 2030 and the possibility exists to pipe surplus supplies to Adelaide or New South Wales. 
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Recent discoveries in Queensland will help assure supplies for that State's market and could also supply 
the South Australian market. Amadeus Basin gas is being piped to Alice Springs and a project to use this 
gas in Darwin and Gove is being planned. 
Most pricing arrangements for the sale of natural gas to eastern Australian markets currently provide little 
incentive to explore for gas and most additions to reserves occur while looking for oil. 
4.3 Recent expansions in production capacity coinciding with a fall in demand have resulted in a 
temporary surplus of light crude oil. The exportable surplus of light crude oil is expected to continue for 
only two or three years. 
Indigenous crude oil supplied about 75 per cent of Australian refiners' crude oil requirements in 1983/84 
and 6.6 million barrels was exported. Australia does not have reserves of heavy crude oil which are 
therefore imported to produce fuel oil, lubricants and bitumen. 
Even if demand grows at an average annual rate of only 0.2 per cent as projected by the Federal 
Department of Resources and Energy, Australia's self-sufficiency will fall to about 30 per cent by 1995 if no 
further discoveries are made. 
The two most recent published sources for assessing Australia's undiscovered oil potential are the Bureau 
of Mineral Resources and Esso Australia. Both agree that there is about a 50:50 chance of a further two 
billion barrels of oil being found in Australian basins by the end of the century. 
To sustain self-sufficiency at a reasonable level will require both onshore and offshore exploration activity 
to remain at or above historically high rates achieved in the past few years. Indications are that this is 
particularly at risk in offshore areas. Seismic activity, the forerunner to drilling, has fallen sharply since 
1982 and only four drilling vessels were working in Australian waters at the end of 1984 compared with a 
maximum of ten in 1983. The decline in activity is attributed to the failure to make a major discovery in the 
past six years, declining international oil prices, adverse changes to the taxation system, the completion of 
some work programmes and the awarding of few new exploration permits in the past two years. 
Meanwhile, onshore activity remains buoyant, although it is concentrated in the Cooper/Eromanga, 
Bowen/Surat and Canning basins, encouraged by the high success ratio there, comparatively low costs, 
shorter lead times and existing or planned infrastructure such as pipelines. However, discoveries in these 
areas remain small. In order to make a greater contribution to offset the decline in production from Bass 
Strait, onshore activity will need to be increased considerably in both producing and non-producing areas. 
4.4 Current demand/supply projections suggest that international oil prices will continue to decline in real 
terms through to the end of the decade. The crude oil oversupply situation is expected to be exhausted by 
the end of the decade when some analysts suggest there might be a mild oil shock. One scenario Australia 
cannot afford to overlook is that, unless large reserves are found elsewhere, the world will again become 
dependent on the Middle East for oil in the 1990s. Thus, the next five years will be critical for finding oil in 
Australia to offset the steep decline in production from existing reserves and to insulate this country from 
oil supply shocks when the - Middle East regains its dominant position. 
4.5 Although Australia has large supplies of natural gas, oil shale and coal which could be converted to 
liquid fuel, the costs are very high and in many cases the commercial application of the technology is 
unproven. Oil exploration is still regarded as one of the most cost-beneficial means of improving the oil 
demand/supply balance. Given the right economic and political climate, costs can be contained and oil 
exploration is a cheaper way of obtaining oil than producing synthetic crude oil. 
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5.0 The key arithmetic 
5.1 Crude oil and natural gas production have helped to insulate Australia's balance of payments from the 
adverse impact of the two OPEC oil price shocks. 
In 1983/84, indigenous production saved crude oil imports worth $5,535 million as well as generating 
crude oil exports worth $203 million and LPG exports worth $502 million. Without these credits, Australia's 
balance of trade surplus of $231 million would have been a loss of $6,019 million. The current account 
deficit would have almost doubled which would have required a huge increase in net overseas capital 
inflow or a large reduction in foreign exchange reserves. 
5.2 The petroleum exploration and production industry is a major long-term investor. It is capital intensive 
and a major source of foreign capital inflow through equity and loan funds. 
In the five years to December 1984, it spent about $3,400 million on exploration and $4,800 Million on 
development. For example, in 1983, petroleum exploration and development expenditure amounting to 
$1,849 million contributed 67 per cent of new fixed capital expenditure by private enterprise in the mining 
sector. Projects included North-West Shelf natural gas, Cooper Basin liquids, Bass Strait oil and gas 
expansion, Palm Valley gas and Mereenie oilfield development. 
5.3 The petroleum production industry currently contributes about nine per cent of Federal Government 
revenue through the crude oil and LPG production excise, royalties and company tax. It also provides 
revenue to State governments through royalties and other payments. An industry survey indicated that, in 
1983, the oil and gas industry paid governments $4,794 million in excise, royalties, company tax and other 
taxes. 
5.4 Demand for petroleum fuels (excluding LPG) is assumed to be likely to increase at the rate of 0.2 per 
cent per year as forecast by the Department of Resources and Energy in its recent publication: 'Forecasts of 
Energy Demand and Supply, Australia 1982-83 to 1991-92'. Basically, this foresees demand rising 
gradually from just under 220 million barrels a year to some 235 million barrels. In order to maintain self-
sufficiency the industry needs to drill more than 200 wells per year and maintain an average annual 
discovery rate of 200 million barrels to compensate for the decline in production from existing fields. 
6.0 Comments on current issues 
The petroleum exploration industry is particularly sensitive to government policy. Positive action by 
government such as the pricing of 'new' oil at world ,parity in 1975 was followed by accelerated exploration 
activity. Conversely negative policies were responsible for a sharp decline in petroleum exploration activity 
in the mid-1970s. 
6.1 Taxation 
Within the petroleum 'industry the balance between government taxation and future investment is 
becoming extremely delicate. As the cost of finding and developing oil and gas increases with greater 
physical difficulties, governments logically cannot expect to extract the same proportion of the industry's 
revenue as they have in the past ... and yet they are seeking more. 
On 1 July 1984, the Federal Government formally abandoned the 'new' oil policy which guaranteed 
producers full import parity prices for post-1975 oil discoveries with no tax additional to royalties and 
company tax. A 'new' oil excise with a top marginal rate of 35 per cent was imposed on production from 
existing offshore fields and onshore fields. A resource rent tax of 40 per cent on cash flows exceeding a 
pre-company tax threshold rate of return of 15 per cent above the long-term bond rate will replace 
royalties on 'greenfield' oil and gas projects in offshore areas controlled by the Federal Government. 
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ese arrangements for additional taxation have: 
Increased the number of tax systems applying to the petroleum industry thereby discriminating 
between sections of the industry and distorting exploration investment decisions. 
Discouraged rank wildcat exploration in high-risk/high-cost areas which could offer the best prospect 
for a large discovery. 
Added to the complexity of the taxation arrangements applying to the petroleum industry, particularly 
for fields straddling both excise/royalty and RRT areas. The RRT involves considerable administrative 
problems which would be particularly severe if an attempt was made to apply a RRT to new develop-
ments associated with existing projects. 
Created problems for industry of competition for revenue by State and Federal governments. State 
governments have the residual constitutional right to charge royalties on minerals and the Queensland 
Government has refused to allow the 'new' oil excise to be deducted from wellhead value when calcu-
lating royalties. Other States have indicated they may follow Queensland's example. Moreover, the 
Federal Government has not resolved the political problem of compensating State governments for 
the royalties they will forego as a result of the RRT being introduced in Commonwealth-controlled 
offshore areas adjacent to States. 
Reduced the attractiveness of offshore Australia as a place to explore, compared with 'areas like the 
North Sea which have higher geological prospectivity. Furthermore, several countries including the 
United Kingdom have recently reduced taxation to encourage exploration. In addition to imposing a 
RRT, the Federal Government plans to introduce a system of cash bonus bidding for awarding 
exploration permits in 'highly prospective' offshore areas. Cash bonus bidding would be a front-end 
impost which would increase the cost of exploration and reduce the number of participants. Smaller 
Australian companies might not be able to afford to participate which could increase the difficulties 
foreign companies have in obtaining 50 per cent Australian equity at the exploration stage. 
rerage returns for the petroleum industry In Australia are low compared to the risks involved. The flow of 
nds into petroleum exploration is dependent importantly upon the possibility of an occasional financial 
manza' offsetting the very high risks and low average expectations. A few very profitable projects are 
eded to increase the overall profitability of the industry and thereby to attract more investment (with all 
e various indirect benefits flowing to the community) than would otherwise be the case. 
is APEA's view that the decisions made in 1984 to increase taxation on the petroleum industry will 
iuce benefits to the community through a lower level of exploration and a consequently lower level of oil 
fficiency. 
)t all changes to taxation arrangements have been discouraging. In October 1984, the Federal 
wernment announced that the crude oil excise would be reduced for currently undeveloped fields 
>covered before September 1975 in areas specifically excluded from the `greenfields' RRT — that is, in 
ss Strait, the North-West Shelf, and onshore. The 'intermediate' excise will have a top marginal rate of 
per cent of the Bass Strait import parity price. 
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Cash bonus bidding 
he Federal Government proposes to amend the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act to introduce a cash 
onus bidding system to replace the current system of work programmes for awarding exploration permits 
offshore areas it categorises as 'highly prospective' for finding petroleum. 
kPEA's strong opposition to CBB is representative of the majority of petroleum exploration companies 
vho object in principle to a system which will reduce effective exploration for the following reasons: 
i.21 CBB will reduce funds available for exploration. In any particular area individual exploration 
ompanies have only a fixed amount of capital to spend, based on their assessment of the prospectivity of 
he area to find economically viable oil accumulations. Those accumulations will only be discovered 
hrough the drilling of wells which, in offshore areas, is both high risk and an exceedingly costly exercise. It 
herefore goes without saying that any upfront payment of cash through a system of cash bonus bidding 
vill have to come out of the same budget that would otherwise be earmarked for exploration activity. 
nevitably, this will mean that the amount of capital left for subsequent exploration work often will be 
›elow what companies assess to be needed for an area and therefore they will be unwilling to bid for 
hcreage. 
6.22 CBB will increase the financial risk of exploration and distort investment away from areas considered 
to have a high potential for finding oil but which still involve considerable risk. The Government plans to 
ntroduce CBB for those areas which it considers to be 'highly prospective'. However, areas placed in this 
:ategory still can involve considerable financial risk. For instance, seismic data and subsequent drilling from 
the Ashmore-Cartier area, where Jabiru was discovered, shows the geology to be complex and exploration 
extremely difficult. Even when discoveries are made, extensive appraisal drilling is required to assess oilfield 
reserves. 
6.23 CBB will be another disincentive to undertake exploration in offshore areas. Government policies 
such as RRT and CBB, which only apply to offshore areas, are in direct opposition to the Government's 
policy of maintaining a high level of oil self-sufficiency. 
6.24 CBB is an inferior system to the work programme bidding system in the Australian context. The 
work programme bidding system has the following advantages over CBB: 
• All major expenditure by explorers Is on genuine exploration; 
• It is easier to raise capital at the exploration stage; 
• Companies are committed to a work programme bidding system in Australia and CBB will further 
complicate exploring in offshore areas compared to onshore areas; 
• The work programme system provides the Government with more discretion to ensure that 
exploration activity is maximised; 
• The argument that work programme bidding could lead to resources being wasted on exploration is 
not valid in a lightly explored country like Australia, which faces a rapid decline in oil self-sufficiency 
from the late 1980s if large new reserves are not discovered in the next few years. All exploration adds 
to the scant knowledge about Australia's petroleum geology and potential. CBB guarantees the waste 
of exploration risk capital because money not spent on actual exploration does not provide new data 
and does not result in discoveries. 
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• The Government's contention that the current work programme bidding system is too difficult to 
administer because companies propose programmes which subsequently prove uneconomic is not 
sufficient justification for replacing the system with CBB. The Government, which receives more than 
$4.5 bilion in revenue from the petroleum production industry, should be able to hire appropriate staff 
to cope with the perceived complexities of analysing competing work programme bids and to ensure 
that commitments are met or the permit is withdrawn and made available to another. explorer. . 
Furthermore the existing system wil stil be retained for al acreage awards outside the CBB areas. 
6.25 CBB wil discriminate against companies which do not have access to large amounts of exploration 
capital from production cash flows. Al but a very few Australian companies are in this category. Funds for • 
exploration •must come from production cash flows or equity risk capital. Most Australian companies have 
to raise equity capital through the stock exchanges. By requiring a front-end payment, CBB wil make it 
much more difficult for most Australian companies to raise equity capital for exploration. 
6.26 CBB could make it difficult for Australian subsidiaries of multi-national companies to raise the 
required 50 per cent Australian equity. Although it is not mandatory to have 50 per cent Australian equity 
at the exploration stage, foreign-owned companies cannot be expected to expend risk capital knowing they 
must bear high risks yet share the benefits if successful. Foreign companies wil not readily take the risk of 
bidding front-end cash for exploration acreage without including Australian equity in a consortium at the 
outset. If CBB prevents foreign companies from obtaining sufficient Australian equity at the beginning of 
exploration, they could have difficulty in introducing the required Australian equity on a fair basis at the 
development stage. Australia's attractiveness for exploration compared with areas overseas wil be reduced 
accordingly. 
6.27 The last thing Australia needs in regard to highly prospective offshore areas is an industry restricted 
to smal blocks, limited security of tenure and no obligation to explore. 
6.28 CBB is unsuited to Australian conditions where there are no very intensively explored areas offshore 
and the industry is not financialy mature by comparison with areas overseas (e.g. the United States) where 
CBB is practised. 
6.3 Australian Hydrocarbon Corporation 
The industry is concerned at the prospect of being forced to carry direct government involvement in 
exploration. 
There is considerable uncertainty about the Government's proposal to establish a national hydrocarbon 
corporation. 
- 
APEA cannot support the establishment of such a company. The reasons for this are: 
• There is no evidence to show that national companies have a higher success rate in exploration than 
private companies. The use of taxpayers' money on high-risk projects is a principle to which any 
thinking Australian should be totaly opposed. The expense is unnecessary. If the proper conditions are 
created, private enterprise wil provide its own risk capital at the appropriate level. 	 . 
• The Association believes that no Federal Government should create a body to compete with private 
enterprise in Australia for skils, equipment and capital in the already tight market that exists for al 
three. 
• Government exploration companies rarely, if ever, explore .under the same conditions as private 
enterprises. They are usualy in a position of having preferential rights to al acreage or production as 
wel as in interpreting the rules. This places these organisations in a privileged position, making 
exploration by private enterprise more onerous and therefore less attractive. 
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The suggestion that the national hydrocarbon corporation would undertake exploration in areas that are 
unattractive to private enterprise does not, in APEA's opinion, have creditability. APEA believes that, if 
areas are unattractive to private enterprises, then chances are very low of finding commercial quantities of 
oil or gas in them. Such exploration would be an example of inefficient use of scarce funds and resources. 
It is also pointed out that the Federal Government already has the Bureau of Mineral Resources at its call 
to carry out investigations in areas of low prospectivity. 
6.4 Regulatory environment 
Extractive resource industries are highly regulated. During the past decade, project lead times have been 
considerably lengthened by increased government regulations and the number of consents required before 
operations can begin. 
For the petroleum exploration and production industry to operate efficiently, it requires a supportive 
regulatory framework which does not impede access to prospective acreage, capital, equipment, expertise 
and markets, or restrict prices and production. 
6.5 Access to acreage 
6.51 Aboriginal land rights 
Existing Federal and State legislation relating to Aboriginal land rights has the potential to curtail explorers' 
access to large tracts of prospective acreage. Twenty-nine Acts of Parliament contain legv 'ion relating to 
Aboriginal land rights and more legislation has been foreshadowed. 
The Association's belief is that petroleum exploration and development can be compatible with the long-
term interests of Aboriginal communities. 
The Association accepts that it is the responsibility of governments to weigh the social factors involved in 
petroleum exploration and development, to decide in the interests of the total community whether or not 
activity should proceed and, if so, under what conditions. 
Legislation giving Aboriginals the power to veto mining and to negotiate payments with companies is 
already discouraging exploration in parts of Australia. 
The first sign of a workable policy emerged in October 1984 when the Western Australian Government 
indicated it would accept its responsibilities in relation to Crown ownership of minerals. The Western 
Australian Government has assured industry that it does not intend to give Aboriginal landowners the right 
to veto exploration and development or to negotiate payments by mining companies. APEA is urging the 
Federal and other Stategovernments to adopt a similar policy. 
The Association accepts the principle of activity by governments to enable Aboriginal communities to 
obtain title to appropriate areas of land as a means of preserving their cultural heritage and aspects of their 
traditional lifestyle. 
The Association, however, maintains that governments in seeking to give effect to land rights legislation 
must bear in mind the following key elements: 
• Continuation of Crown ownership of minerals with governments, not quasi-governmental bodies 
controlling access to land for exploration. 
• Availability of land without unreasonable restrictions on exploration access and resource development. 
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Payment of royalties from development only to governments, with no difference between those 
payable on Aboriginal land and those on other lands. 
Compensation provisions for landholders to exclude payment for consent to access, to be unrelated to 
the value of minerals as well as spiritual or religious factors, and to relate only to actual disturbance to 
land or actual effects on landholders as laid down in the onshore petroleum Acts. 
Disputes to be referred to independent tribunals which have power only to make recommendations to 
governments who take responsibility for decisions. 
Government acceptance of responsibility for identifying sensitive areas before exploration permits are 
gazetted for bidding. 
Access for development to follow automatically on approval of access for exploration. 
Efficient administrative procedures to prevent undue delay or excessive administrative cost hindering 
resource development. 
he Association is concerned that in the past decade Aboriginal land legislation has granted one group of 
,ustralians unique rights controlling their land, and that such rights may be extended by future legislation 
) cover even larger areas of Australia. 
Lboriginal landholders are placed thereby in a position to prohibit access or to impose conditions which 
lake projects commercially non-viable. 
his must have the long-term effect of reducing opportunities for national economic development. 
■.52 Environment 
he APEA `Code of Environmental Practice — onshore and offshore' lists 67 pieces of legislation/guidelines 
elating to environmental protection. Compliance with these regulations involves dealing with a multiplicity 
I Federal, State and local government departments and can result in considerable extra cost and delay to 
Tojects. 
,PEA is concerned that moves to expand national parks, including marine parks, will limit exploration in 
rospective areas if ALP policy to oppose resource development in national parks is continued. The 
,ssociation has recommended that multiple land use should be adopted in Australian national parks as in 
)me parts of the United States. 
be petroleum exploration industry in Australia has an excellent environmental record. Since the first 
gnificant oil discovery in the early 1950s and throughout the intensive activity of the late '60s and '70s to 
ate no serious case of environmental damage has been reported. Nor has any significant oil spill occurred 
Australian waters as a consequence of offshore exploration and development operations. 
.6 Access to capital 
nimpeded access to local and foreign sources of capital is particularly important to the petroleum industry 
'hich relies solely on equity capital for exploration and large amounts of equity and loan capital for 
evelopment. 
apping Australian savings for petroleum exploration has been impeded by high real interest rates and 
!strictions associated with those sections in the Income Tax Assessment Act which are designed to assist 
xploration by allowing a tax rebate for Investments in petroleum exploration companies and allowing 
nmediate write off of exploration expenditure from any source of Income. 
potential problem facing many joint ventures is the requirement under Section 33(3) of the Companies 
ode that joint ventures exceeding 20 parties be incorporated. Joint ventures will be restricted to a 
laximum of 20 parties unless the Companies Code is amended to exempt exploration joint ventures in the 
ime way as accounting and legal partnerships are exempt. 
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Australian equity participation is not mandatory at the exploration stage but the requirement to introduce 
50 per cent Australian equity at the development stage means that foreign companies are asked to take 
exploration risks, then forced to divest significant equity only if they have been successful. 
Flexible application of the 50 per cent Australian equity rule at the development stage will continue to be 
necessary when insufficient local equity is available and when the benefits of access to foreign technical and 
marketing expertise outweigh the benefits of increased Australian ownership. 
Foreign investment could be discouraged if the Federal Government implements the ALP platform to 
establish a mutual resource development fund and foreign investors seeking approval : for new or expanded 
investment in the mineral area, are required to offer ten per cent of equity in each venture to the fund. 
Moreover, the Government's failure to explain this policy is creating uncertainty for foreign investors. 
6.7 Access to equipment and expertise 
In order to operate efficiently, petroleum exploration and production companies must be able to obtain 
equipment and expertise from the best available source with respect to cost, quality and timely delivery. 
Australian equipment and expertise is used whenever it is acceptable in quality, available and competitive 
but the industry is heavily dependent on foreign equipment and technology. Attempts to restrict the free 
flow of goods and services could threaten the viability of some projects particularly in the current scenario 
of energy prices projected to remain flat for the rest of the decade. 
6.8 Access to markets and pricing arrangements 
6.81 Natural gas 
Low prices and restricted market outlets have discouraged exploration for natural gas and most deposits 
have been found while searching for oil. Australian natural gas producers have had to contend with only 
one or possibly two buyers which, In most cases, are state-owned monopolies. 
For Australia to reap the maximum benefit from its natural gas resources, producers require: 
• Realistic prices which reflect the valuable properties of gas as a fuel and the cost of alternative fuels. 
• Approval to market gas in the most efficient manner even if this means piping the gas to another State 
or exporting LNG. 
• Approval to export condensate and LPG on a term contract basis so that producers can dispose of 
these co-products of gas production at the best possible price. 
• Limitation of Government imposts to normal petroleum royalties and corporate taxes. 
6.82 Crude oil 
Crude oil marketing is controlled by the Federal Government. On 1 January 1985 the Government 
introduced a partial allocation scheme which requires refiners to absorb all oil produced by small producers 
and most of Bass Strait production at import parity prices. The surplus may be exported or sold to 
domestic refiners at negotiated prices. It is proposed to reduce the Bass Strait allocation quota progressively 
during the next three years with a view to introducing a free market in 1988. 
APEA supports policies which recognise the need for explorers to have access to markets, whether 
domestic or foreign, at prices which will not discourage the exploration effort. 
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7.0 Statistical summary 
1984 1983 	 1982 	 1981 	 1980 	 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 
EXPLORATION WELLS 
-Total 247 211 	 230 	 149 	 90 	 59 52 21 21 23 
-Onshore 204 162 	 186 	 137 	 76 	 38 32 8 18 5 
-Offshore 43 49 	 44 • 	 12 	 14 	 21 20 13 3 18 
TOTAL METRES DRILLED 
-0000m) 513.2 409.4 	 462.5 	 316.6 	 197.9 	 147.4 116.4 63.2 48.6 49.8 
DEVELOPMENT WELLS 
-Total 110 62 	 93 	 55 	 27 	 48 36 20 11 4 
-Onshore 74 37 	 83 	 41 	 22 	 39 24 18 11 4 
-Offshore 36 25 	 10 	 14 	 5 	 9 12 2 o 0 
TOTAL METRES DRILLED 
-('000m) 285.2 157.8 	 163.0 	 113.3 	 68.9 	 78.4 96.6 48.7 23.6 8.9 
PRODUCTION 
-Crude Oil 
(106 kilolitres) 29.23 24.10 	 21.66 	 23.04 	 22.23 	 25.38 25.19 25.00 24.25 23.83 
-Natural Gas 
(109 cu m) 11.43 10.98 	 11.6 	 11.3 	 9.6 	 7.8 6.8 6.7 6.0 5.0 
CONSUMPTION 
-Petroleum Products 
(106 kilolitres) 34.02 32.53 	 33.76 	 34.27 	 3438 	 36.01 35.32 35.16 33.98 32.70 
EXPLORATION EXPENDITURE 
-Total ($ milion) na 835.2 1014.1 	 496.7 	 360.3 	 233.0 123.4 93.7 60.0 69.8 
-Private Enterprise 770.9 826.0 1006.8 	 491.0 	 355.5 	 228.0 118.8 88.5 54.7 65.2 
-Government na 9.2 	 7.3 	 5.7 	 4.8 	 5.0 4.6 5.2 5.3 4.6 
SEISMIC ACTIVITY (kilometres) 
-Total 61527 38761 118515 87295 62686 	43398 44425 11477 24468 7857 
-Onshore 42298 25393 65999 44522 	22315 	 9379 4189 2280 3040 1652 
-Offshore 19229 13368 	52516 42773 	40371 	34019 40236 9197 21428 6205 
RESERVES (as at 30.6.84) 
-Remaining -Crude Oil and Condensate (106 kilolitres) 272 
recoverable -Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) (106 kilolitres) 76 
-Natural (Sales) Gas (109 cu m) 475 
-Theoreticaly -Crude Oil and Condensate (106 kilolitres) 116 
recoverable -Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) (106 kilolitres) 20 
-Natural (Sales) Gas (109 cu m) 981 
-Total -Crude Oil and Condensate (106 kilolitres) 388 
reserves -Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) (106 kilolitres) 96 
-Natural (Sales) Gas (109 cu m) 1456 
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8.0 The Association 
The Australian Petroleum Exploration Association Limited represents the Interests of both national and . 
foreign-owned companies involved in the exploration and development of Australian oil and gas resources. • 
The Association promotes the interests of its members by maintaining contact with the governments of the 
Commonwealth, the States and the Northern Territory as well as with Opposition members of parliaments,' 
public servants, the media, educational institutions and a wide range of other bodies and people with 
interests in the industry. It publishes position papers at regular intervals on energy issues in Australia and 
contributes to public debate through its annual conference — which is one of the largest technical 
conferences in the southern hemisphere. 
APEA's primary objectives are: . 
• To present the Industry's views and activities in a concise and effective manner to opinion leaders; and 
• To provide information about the industry for all who require factual.data about . the search, for oil and 
gas on the Australian continent and in its waters. 
In forming the Australian Petroleum Exploration Association.in  1959, the founders had in mind to create .a 
body whose prime function was to help Australia to petroleum self-sufficiency, and generally to promote 
and develop the interests of the petroleum exploration industry in this country. 
A first opportunity to advance these objectives lay in unifying the .activities of companies with. the same . 
motives. This has been a continuing 'task since 1959 in a fast-developing industry. The Association has 
provided a melting pot . for ideas and policies out of which it has evolved . its own. Today it is. composed of • 
Australian and overseas petroleum exploration, producing and service companies, both large and Small. 
APEA was set up before the discovery of commercial oil and gas fields in Australia. The size and scope of 
the exploration and development industry today is an indication of the success achieved by the 
governments and companies promoting a suitable operational framework, although there have been times 
when unsympathetic policy decisions appeared to place the whole future of Australian petroleum 
exploration in doubt. 
The Association, aware that the petroleum industry is international, has always sought to see that the best 
experience of other oil-producing nations Is carefully studied and incorporated in Australian oilfield and 
industry practices. 
APEA's membership at 31 December 1984 stood at more than 250 companies, including 100 engaged in 
exploration, with service company members ranging from suppliers of drilling rigs to most of the major 
Australian banks. 
Structure and activities 
APEA is registered as a limited liability company. Its members contribute an annual fee according to their 
size and involvement in the industry. 
APEA's policies are set by an elected Council which, in turn, appoints a series of committees to advise it on 
policy. Councillors are elected for two-year terms with half retiring each year. 
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